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ABSTRACT
Maji, Amiya K. Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2015. Dependability where the Mobile
World Meets the Enterprise World. Major Professor: Saurabh Bagchi.
As we move toward increasingly larger scales of computing, complexity of systems
and networks has increased manifold leading to massive failures of cloud providers
(Amazon Cloudfront, November 2014) and geographically localized outages of cellular
services (T-Mobile, June 2014). In this dissertation, we investigate the dependability
aspects of two of the most prevalent computing platforms today, namely, smart-
phones and cloud computing. These two seemingly disparate platforms are part of
a cohesive story—they interact to provide end-to-end services which are increasingly
being delivered over mobile platforms, examples being iCloud, Google Drive and their
smartphone counterparts iPhone and Android.
In one of the early work on characterizing failures in dominant mobile OSes, we an-
alyzed bug repositories of Android and Symbian and found similarities in their failure
modes [ISSRE2010]. We also presented a classification of root causes and quantified
the impact of ease of customizing the smartphones on system reliability. Our evalu-
ation of Inter-Component Communication in Android [DSN2012] show an alarming
number of exception handling errors where a phone may be crashed by passing it
malformed component invocation messages, even from unprivileged applications. In
this work, we also suggest language extensions that can mitigate these problems.
Mobile applications today are increasingly being used to interact with enterprise-
class web services commonly hosted in virtualized environments. Virutalization suf-
fers from the problem of imperfect performance isolation where contention for low-
level hardware resources can impact application performance. Through a set of rig-
orous experiments in a private cloud testbed and in EC2, we show that interference
xiv
induced performance degradation is a reality. Our experiments have also shown that
optimal configuration settings for web servers change during such phases of interfer-
ence. Based on this observation, we design and implement the IC2 engine which can
mitigate effects of interference by reconfiguring web server parameters [MW2014].
We further improve IC2 by incorporating it into a two-level configuration engine,
named ICE, for managing web server clusters [ICAC2015]. Our evaluations show
that, compared to an interference agnostic configuration, IC2 can improve response
time of web servers by upto 40%, while ICE can improve response time by upto 94%
during phases of interference.
11. INTRODUCTION
The last decade has seen two significant evolutions in the field of computing. First,
there is an increased mobility of computing devices. Starting from the days of static
desktop-based computers we have now entered the era of mobile computing where
smartphones and tablets are more popular than any other computing devices. This
can be easily verified by the phenomenal growth of the smartphone market. Accord-
ing to surveys by Gartner [1], number of mobile phone sales from 2013 onwards far
exceed computer sales. The overall market share of PCs is expected to decline fur-
ther resulting in 87% of connected devices being tablets or smartphones by 2017 [2].
The second evolution is the tremendous increase in volume of data generated and
transferred over the Internet. Social networks and media sharing websites are the key
enablers of this evolution. To support this unforeseen increase in scale of computing
in a cost-efficient manner, organizations have adopted cloud-computing where physi-
cal resources are shared between multiple users in a virtualized environment leading
to higher utilization.
While smartphones allow users to connect to the Internet in a nearly uninter-
rupted fashion, they also open up the possibility of a new range of applications with
innovative user interfaces and input modules. On the other hand, cloud computing
allows service providers to scale up to larger numbers of users many of whom connect
via mobile devices. Today, mobile computing and cloud computing form a symbi-
otic ecosystem where each augments the functionality and utilization of the other.
Consider the example of a person posting her location to a social networking website
through her smartphone. Here, the smartphone with help of its gps sensor acts as the
key enabler for this information sharing. On the other end of the spectrum, cloud en-
ables a multitude of functionality on the smartphone—a simple example being online
search.
2We argue that smartphones and the cloud are not disjoint computing platforms
but form the basis for a unified computing platform. Both of them are responsible
for executing parts of the use-cases described above. From an end-user’s point of
view, both of these must operate reliably to provide uninterrupted services. Hence,
improving dependability of cloud-based applictions and their mobile counterparts
are equally important. Let’s take the example of a user purchasing books (or games)
from her smartphone (a vendor-specific example can be that of Android’s Google Play
app and the cloud-based Google-play store). A complex transaction of this nature
involves successful completion of the purchase both at the mobile and the online store,
followed by the book being delivered to the user’s phone. Failure in any of the steps
may result in user inconvenience or monetary loss or both. Unfortunately, reports
show that both mobile and cloud platforms are very failure prone. An example of the
Google Play app crash can be found in [3], while its cloud counterpart, the Google
Play services crashed in January, 2014 [4].
The landscape in mobile and cloud computing is changing rapidly over time thanks
to contributions from both researchers and developers. This can be verified by the
fact that Android has released 11 revisions (3 major) to its SDK Tools in 2014 alone
(similar inferences may be drawn from the improvements in both open-source and
proprietary virtualization solutions). A short time-to-market for softwares is often
characterized by poorer testing and larger number of bugs. We believe that the
recent advances in mobile and cloud computing, and current practices for mobile app
development leave significant scope for dependability research.
In this dissertation, we look at the dependability aspects of both these plat-
forms. First, we look at the dependability of smartphone applications and their
inter-component communication (ICC). Next we look at performance anomalies (of
which service outage is a small subset) in cloud-based services. Below, we present
key motivations for our work.
31.1 Motivations
Characterizing Mobile Failures. The release of iPhone in 2007 started a new
revolution in mobile computing, however, it was not until 2008 (when Android was
open-sourced) that researchers had freely available source code and failure reports
to analyze their reliability. Several researchers have studied failure characteristics of
popular operating systems like Windows and Linux [5,6] in the past. But evaluations
of mobile operating systems was rarely seen before release of Android. A notable
exception is the study of failures in Symbian OS-based smart phones [7]. However,
since Symbian was not open source at the time of the analysis, the authors of this
earlier study were limited in what they could do. They used failure logs from 25 smart
phones being used by volunteers participating in the study. Our work [ISSRE2010]
extends this prior work by significant proportions. Our study of failure characteristics
in smartphones is the first of its kind in that it looks into open-source mobile OSes
and classifies their failures based on a much larger number and greater diversity of
failure reports.
IPC Robustness. Several example failures that showed propagation of errors
across different components in Android [ISSRE2010] motivated us further to experi-
mentally evaluate dependability of smartphones. In case of smartphones, sources of
inputs to applications can be significantly diverse—these include touchscreen, key-
board, radio, microphone, sensors, untrusted third-party applications, or data from
one of many network drivers—and therefore it has great potential for receiving un-
expected data. Given the unorthodox techniques people employ to bypass password
locks on their smartphones [8], receipt of unexpected data is not a rarity. Our second
experiment [DSN2012] was designed to see how well Android reacts to unexpected
data, and more specifically to test its Inter Process Communication primitives. We
define robustness as the ability to handle unexpected data gracefully, therefore, lack
of robustness would imply an application crashing in response to an IPC message. In
4the context of Android applications, these crashes manifest as uncaught exceptions
in the stack trace.
Dependability of Cloud Services. While continuing our research on robustness
of smartphones, we realized that many of the popular mobile apps are supported by
cloud-based services, examples being, Facebook, Pandora Radio, Angry Birds, Skype
etc. (some of which showed exception handling errors in our earlier experiments). At
the same time, several incidents of cloud service outage [9, 10] motivated us to look
into the dependability aspects of cloud services. Today’s infrastructure clouds (IaaS)
are supported by some form of virtualization, which allows multiple users to run their
applications in containers called virtual machines (VM). Although one of the goals
of virtualization is to support isolation among multiple VMs, existing hardware and
software virtualization mechanisms do not provide perfect performance isolation. For
example, x86-based platforms do not allow for reservation of cache usage, memory
bandwidth, or I/O bandwidth. Lots of past work has demonstrated the extent of this
interference for production virtualization environments, such as, those using Xen or
KVM [11–13]. Existing work on mitigating interference require intrusive modifications
to hypervisors [14–17], which is infeasible in public clouds (such as EC2) due to limited
permissions of guest VMs. We were, therefore, encouraged to find innovative solutions
that would not require access to hypervisor.
Interference Mitigation using Middleware Reconfiguration. During our
experiments on evaluating impact of interference, we found that web service applica-
tions have a large number of parameters that have direct impact on performance. The
optimal values for these parameters change significantly during interference, there-
fore, we can mitigate interference by changing these parameter values when such an
event is detected. We use this observation to design and implement an autonomous
reconfiguration engine for web services middleware (called IC2, or Interference-aware
Cloud application Configuration). We further observed that in web server clusters,
interference may be mitigated by moving web requests away from the impacted web
server VM (WS-VM) to less loaded servers. This not only improves response times
5of the requests that are directed to other servers, but also the impacted WS pro-
cesses fewer requests efficiently. This observation led to the design of a two-level
configuration engine for web server clusters (called ICE or Integrated Configuration
Engine)—the first level reconfiguration happens at the load-balancer in front of the
cluster, while the second level reconfiguration happens in individual WS VMs suffer-
ing from interference (similar to IC2). Both IC2 and ICE helped us in mitigating
interference effectively without modification to the hypervisor and, therefore, present
practical solutions for public clouds.
1.2 Objectives
In this dissertation, our objective is to improve the dependability of smartphones
and the cloud-based services that interact with them. To this end, we characterize the
failures in these platforms and develop tools and techniques to detect and mitigate
them. More specifically, we seek to answer the following questions:
1.2.1 Smartphones
1. What are the applications and libraries that fail frequently in Android and
Symbian? Are there any similarity in failure manifestations of these platforms?
2. What are the types of code fixes that are applied frequently in Android?
3. Does customizability of smartphones impact their reliability?
4. How robust are Android’s ICC primitives? Can the Android runtime contain
exceptions within an application? How well does an Android component behave
in the presence of a semi-valid or random Intent?
5. How can we refine the implementation of Intents so that input validation can
be improved?
61.2.2 Cloud Services
1. Does interference cause performance degradation in public clouds such as Ama-
zon EC2? If so, how often and how much degradation is observed?
2. Does interference change the optimal configuration of an application? What
are the challenges associated with finding the optimal parameter values?
3. How can we detect when an application is suffering from interference? How can
we automatically reconfigure an application to mitigate performance interfer-
ence?
4. Does interference show performance degradation in load-balanced web server
clusters? How can we reconfigure such clusters quickly and efficiently to deal
with interference?
5. How much performance improvement can be seen by reconfiguring middleware
parameters?
1.3 Approach
Smartphones. To answer the first three questions in 1.2.1, we collected a large
volume of failure data from Android and Symbian bug repositories. Based on the
collected samples (628 bugs in Android and 153 bugs in Symbian) we looked into the
manifestation of failures in different modules in Android and Symbian, and identified
which modules are reported to cause the greatest unreliability. We further collected
a sample of 233 bug fixes in Android spread over 29 projects and classified the fixes
based on the type of corrections needed in code. We also measured the complexities
of these projects (in terms of lines of code and cyclomatic complexity) and compared
their bug densities found in our sample set.
To answer the last two questions on smartphones, we developed our Android ro-
bustness testing tool, JarJarBinks (in remembrance of the Gungan warrior of Star
7Wars fame, whose unusual accent created significant problems for the Droid). Jar-
JarBinks includes four Intent generation modules—semi-valid, blank, random, and
random with extras, and the ability to automatically send a large number of Intents
to all the components. JarJarBinks runs as a user level process, it does not require
knowledge of source codes of the tested components, and can be easily configured for
the robustness testing on any Android device. During our experiments we sent more
than 6 million Intents to 800+ application components across 3 versions of Android
(2.2, 2.3.4, and 4.0) and discovered a significant number of input validation errors.
Our most striking finding was the ability to run privileged processes from user level
applications (such as JarJarBinks) in Android without requiring the user-level appli-
cation to be granted any special permission at install time. We also suggested some
design-level guidelines for improving robustness of ICC in Android.
Cloud Services. We answer the first two questions in 1.2.2 by an extensive
empirical evaluation of the Olio [18] web-application benchmark in EC2 as well as
in a private cloud testbed. We run Olio with a variety of configuration settings and
under various cache-intensive interferences. The configuration settings we look at are
the performance critical parameters in the web application runtime, i.e. Apache and
Php runtime. These parameters are related to the parallelism (maximum number
of threads) in Apache and Php runtime (MaxClients,PhpMaxChildren), and their
idle timeouts (KeepaliveTimeout). We detect interference by using a collection of
hardware performance counters (Private Testbed) or a set of application performance
metrics (in EC2, where hardware performance counters are not available). A huristic-
driven configuration controller (IC2) is used to predict a good configuration value
during interference.
We repeated similar experiments in a load-balanced web-server setup and found
interference can degrade response time of websites significantly (question 4 in Section
refsec:conf-motiv). To mitigate interference our autonomous configuration engine
ICE performs two-level reconfigurations of the web-server cluster. The first level,
geared towards agility, is to reconfigure the load balancer in such a manner so that
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the maximum benefit in terms of reduced response time. The second level of recon-
figuration, which configures Apache and Php-fpm as described in IC2, is activated
only if the interference lasts for a long time. This prevents the server from incurring
unnecessary reconfiguration overheads if the interference is short. We evaluated both
IC2 and ICE by measuring response times of Cloudsuite during periods of interfer-
ence. We compare these with the response times when IC2 or ICE are not enabled
(baseline). Overall, we found that IC2 could improve response time by upto 40% and
ICE could improve response time by upto 94% compared to baseline.
1.4 Contributions
We summarize our findings and contributions to improve the dependability of
smartphones and cloud-based applications as follows:
1.4.1 Dependability of Smartphones
1. We were the first to analyze the failure characteristics of open-source mobile
OSes based on a large number and diversity of failure samples. We found
that the kernels of both these platforms are significantly hardened (only few
bugs per million lines of code), however, we need more efforts in improving the
middleware. Our analysis of code modifications in Android showed that a large
fraction (77%) of the bug fixes needed only small changes in code, as opposed
to significant code modification. We also presented a classification of the code
fixes.
2. By measuring the number of environment variables in the Android platform
across its different versions and comparing it with Linux Kernel, we analyze
the customizability of Android. This indicates Android’s dependence on a few
critical variables, which implies that these environment variables need to be set
9with care; else, significant error propagation can occur. We found that both
Android and Symbian provide a radically high level of customizability both in
building and executing the OS. While this customizability does lead to some
loss of reliability, especially in Development tools and Third-party applications,
such loss can be mitigated by more rigorous testing.
3. We developed a tool named JarJarBinks for evaluating the robustness of ICC in
Android. JarJarBinks runs as a user-level process, does not require knowledge
of source-code of applications, and can send semi-valid and random Intents to
any application on the same phone (either targeted, i.e. explicit Intent or via
mediation of Android runtime, i.e. implicit Intent).
4. Our experiments showed, in general, less than 10% of the components tested
crashed; all crashes are caused by unhandled exceptions. Our results suggest
that Android has a sizable number of components with unhandled NullPointer
Exceptions across all versions. The most striking finding that we have is the
ability to run privileged processes from user level applications without requiring
the user-level application to be granted any special permission at install time.
We found three instances, where we could crash the Android runtime from
JarJarBinks. Such a crash makes the Android device unusable till it is rebooted.
This has huge potential for privilege escalation, denial-of-service, and may even
lead to more security vulnerabilities, if an adversary could figure out how to
have these malformed (or “fuzzed”) Intents be sent out in response to some
external message.
5. To improve software design from the point of view of reliability, we found that
subtyping combined with Java annotations can be used very effectively to re-
strict the format and content of an Intent. Through this mechanism, the attack
surface of Android can be reduced significantly.
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1.4.2 Dependability of Cloud-based Applications
1. We rigorously studied the performance variability of web-based applications in a
public cloud environment. In this study, we run the CloudSuite [19] benchmark
in Amazon’s EC2 for 100 hours over a 5-day period. We then compare the
statistics obtained from these runs with sample runs of CloudSuite in a private
cloud testbed. We observe that CloudSuite has much longer response time
distribution in EC2 (ranging upto 5.5s) than in the local testbed (upto 0.42s
only) with identical resource configurations. This validates our hypothesis, that
public clouds have high degree of performance uncertainty.
2. We conducted a study to understand if applications can be configured to deal
with interference. We observed that an ideal operating configuration for Apache
web server depends on the type and degree of interference. Further, parameters
in different elements of the software stack depend on each other and the inter-
dependency changes with the degree of interference; and finally, the application
performance curves with the configuration values are discontinuous in places,
making traditional control-theoretic approaches for parameter tuning [20] in-
effective. Specifically we found three parameters corresponding to the degree
of concurrency and the time to live of existing connections to be particularly
significant.
3. We present a simple, heuristic-driven configuration manager, IC2 to reconfigure
the application upon interference. IC2 solves three key challenges for dynamic
reconfiguration—first, it presents a machine learning based technique for de-
tecting interference; second, it uses a heuristic-based controller for determining
suitable parameter values during periods of interference; and finally, it reduces
the cost of reconfiguration of standard Apache distributions by implementing an
online reconfiguration option in the Httpd server. A prototype implementation
of IC2 was deployed both in EC2 and our private testbed. The experiments
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show that IC2 can recapture lost response time by upto 29% in EC2 and 40%
in our private testbed.
4. We present the design and implementation of a two-level reconfiguration en-
gine for load-balanced web server clusters to deal with interference in cloud.
Our solution, called ICE, includes algorithms for: a) detecting interference
quickly (primarily cache and memory bandwidth contention), and b) predicting
new weights for impacted server to reduce load on them. Our evaluation ex-
periments show that on a combination of Apache+Php+HAProxy middleware,
ICE can reduce median response time of web servers by upto 94%. We evaluate
ICE for two different load balancer scheduling policies (weighted round-robin,
and weighted least-connection) in HAProxy and find that it improves response
time across both scheduling policies (upto 94% and 39% respectively). Median
interference detection latency was 3s.
5. To evaluate the generalizability of our framework, we also ran some experiments
with the Darwin media streaming server running with LVS load balancer. Our
results show that reconfiguring server weight in LVS can be used to reduce
the inter-frame delay for an affected Darwin VM. We also found that the op-
timal num_threads parameter in Darwin is vastly different with and without
interference indicating our WS reconfiguration is also applicable to Darwin.
1.5 Outline
The dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present relevant back-
ground material and terminology used in mobile application frameworks. Similarly,
Chapter 5 defines various terminologies used in Cloud Services. We also present an
overview of web server configurations in this chapter. Chapters 3–4 and Chapters
6–7 are organized in a manner such that each chapter, in combination with relevant
background material (Chapter 2 or Chapter 5), can be followed independently. For
each of these chapters, we first present the problem statement we address, followed by
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our design, implementation, experimental results, and suggestions for improvements.
Chapter 3 contains our case study on failures in Android and Symbian, while, Chap-
ter 4 contains our empirical evaluation of robustness of Android ICC. Chapters 6 and
7 present our solutions for mitigating performance interference in cloud under two
different setups, one where each web server VM is managed in isolation (Chapter 6)
and another where the web server cluster is managed as a whole (Chapter 7). Chap-
ter 8 presents an overview of earlier research related to our work and compare them
with the proposed solutions. Finally, we summarize our findings from Chapters 3–7
in Chapter 9 and conclude this dissertation.
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2. OVERVIEW OF SMARTPHONES: SYSTEMS AND
APPLICATIONS
In this chapter, we present some of the terminology and definitions used throughout
the rest of the dissertation. Here we highlight some of the key software layers of
mobile systems and identify principal components of mobile applications (also called
apps). We begin with an overview of Android which complements the discussions in
Chapters 3–4. The discussion on Symbian is relevant to Chapter 3.
2.1 Android
2.1.1 Android Architecture
Android is an open source platform for mobile system development with a stan-
dard Linux operating system, a customized runtime, a comprehensive application
framework and a set of user applications. It offers many features covering the areas
of application development, internet, media, and connectivity. These features in-
clude Application framework, Dalvik virtual machine, Integrated browser, Optimized
graphics, SQLite for structured data storage, Media support for common audio, video,
and still image formats, GSM Telephony, Bluetooth, EDGE, 3G, and WiFi, Camera,
GPS, Compass, and a rich Development environment. Based on Linux kernel, it pro-
vides a robust driver model, security features, process management, memory man-
agement, networking assistance and drivers for a large set of devices. The Android
platform primarily consists of five layers as shown in Fig. 2.1.
Applications: This includes a set of core applications that come with the Android
distribution like Email Client, Messaging application, Contacts application, Calendar,
Map browser, Web browser etc.
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Fig. 2.1.: Android System Architecture
Application Framework: This layer has been designed to facilitate the reuse of
components in Android. With the help of Application Framework elements (such as,
Intents, Content Providers, Views, and Managers) in Android, developers can build
their applications to execute on Android Kernel and inter-operate among themselves
and with existing applications.
Libraries: Libraries include System C library, Surface Manager, 2D and 3D graph-
ics engine, Media Codecs, the SQL database SQLite and the web browser engine
LibWebCore.
Android Runtime: The Android runtime consists of two components. First, a set
of Core libraries which provides most of the functionality available in Java. Second,
the Dalvik virtual machine which operates like a translator between the application
side and the operating system. Dalvik [21] is a register based [22] virtual machine
optimized to run under constrained memory and CPU requirements. Every Android
application runs in its own process, with its own instance of the Dalvik virtual ma-
chine.
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Linux Kernel: Android uses a modified version of Linux for core system services
such as Memory Management, Process Management, Network Stack, Driver Model
and Security. For more information on the Android platform and a schematic of the
Android architecture the readers are referred to [23].
2.1.2 Android Application Components
Here we first explain the different kinds of application components in Android and
then explain how the different components coordinate among themselves to achieve a
task. This background would be essential to understand the experimental methodol-
ogy that we have developed because we choose the inter-component messages (called
Intents in Android) as the target of our fuzz testing. To understand how Android ap-
plication components co-ordinate to achieve a task, consider two sample applications
(Email and Contacts) shown in Figure 2.2, that co-operate in replying to an email.
Consider, a user launching an email application from home screen. This starts an
Activity (user interface (UI)) showing the user’s Inbox. She then clicks on an email
she wants to read which starts another UI showing a particular Email message. To
reply, she clicks Reply button to invoke a third activity where she can type her re-
sponse. Consider, she wants to copy her reply to more recipients, so she hits the
“cc” button to find the address of the recipient. This invokes a fourth activity, i.e.,
Select Contact in Contacts application showing the available email addresses. This
fourth activity to user appears as a part of email application but in reality it is from a
separate application (Contacts) which runs in a separate process. Further, the main
activity in Contacts application, i.e., Select Contact calls a Content Provider, another
application component for data storage, to retrieve the recipient’s email address. The
sequence of called activities, Inbox, Email, Reply, Select Contact to achieve a given
task involves inter-component communication which can be either inter-application
or intra-application.
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Fig. 2.2.: Android Application Components
Each user application in Android (a *.apk file) typically runs in a separate pro-
cess and can be composed of Activities, Services, Content Providers and Broadcast
Receivers. These four components communicate through messages called Intents that
are routed through Android runtime and the Kernel. The underlying runtime man-
ages the Inter-component Communication. At application installation time, the con-
tract with the runtime is specified in AndroidManifest.xml. This contract details on
type of components, application permissions, etc. Here we briefly define each of the
component types.
Activities: An Activity is a graphical component, which is used to provide the
client with a user interface. It is invoked when a user launches an application. An
activity can send and receive Intents to and from runtime. It is implemented by
extending the Activity class while its life cycle is managed by a module in application
framework layer called Activity Manager.
Services: A Service is used when an application task needs to run in background
for a longer time period. For example, a user can run music player in background.
Also, a component can bind to a Service to send a request, e.g., a music player Activity
can bind to a music player Service to stop the current song that is being played.
Content Providers: A Content Provider is used to manage access to persistent
data. The data can be shared between multiple Activities in different applications.
Contacts application, as an example, can use the content provider to get a person’s
phone number.
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Broadcast Receivers: A component that is solely responsible to receive and
react to event notifications is called a Broadcast Receiver. For example, in SMS
application, the Broadcast Receiver component receives an SMS message and displays
an alert.
2.1.3 Android IPC
The inter-process communication (IPC) in Android occurs through a kernel space
component called Binder (/dev/binder), a device driver using Linux shared memory
to achieve IPC. The higher level user space components know how to use the binder,
i.e., how to pass data represented by Intents to Binder. Specifically, when a given
component, e.g. Activity Manager, wants to do IPC (either an IPC send or an IPC
receive) at OS boundary, it opens the driver supplied by the Binder kernel module.
This associates a file descriptor with the thread that called binder, and this association
is used by the kernel module to identify the caller and callee of Binder IPCs. All IPC
at OS boundary takes place through this descriptor. At the higher level, application-
runtime boundary, the application components send Intent messages, e.g., an Activity
sends Intents to Activity Manager.
2.1.4 Intents
Intent, a data container, is an abstraction for an action to be performed and
forms the core of Android’s IPC mechanism. An Intent encapsulates action, data,
component, category and extra fields in its object. As an example, an action can be
dial, with data as phone number and component as phone application’s main activity.
Category and extra fields give extra information on action and data respectively. An
Intent message can be specifically (Explicit Intent) sent to a target component by
naming it or it could be resolved by runtime to find a target component. When the
target is not explicitly specified in Intent message (Implicit Intent), the Android
runtime resolves the target component to be invoked by looking up the Intent mes-
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sage and matching it against components that can handle the Intent. A given target
component can handle an Intent, if it is advertised in a tag called Intent-filter in
AndroidManifest.xml. Different ways in which Intents are sent by application com-
ponents are: (1). By launching an Activity using startActivity(Intent) type of
methods; (2). By sending to Broadcast Receivers using sendBroadcast(Intent)
type of methods; (3). By communicating with a service using bindService(Intent,
ServiceConnection, int) type of methods; (4). By accessing data through Content
Providers.
2.1.5 Android Security
Android provides two important security mechanisms that are different from tradi-
tional Unix systems, i.e., application sandboxing and permissions. Sandboxing means
each Android application (*.apk) is given its own unique UID at install time that re-
mains fixed throughout its lifetime. This is different from traditional desktop systems
where a single user ID is shared among different processes. In Android, since two ap-
plications run as two different users, their code may not be run in the same process,
thus requiring the need of IPC. Moreover, applications are also assigned separate
directories where they can save persistent data. Applications can specify explicitly
whether it will share its data with other applications in AndroidManifest.xml.
Application permissions is a Mandatory Access Control (MAC) mechanism for
protecting application components and data. To use resources, an application re-
quests permissions through AndroidManifest.xml file using the uses-permission tag at
installation time. For example an application that needs to monitor incoming SMS
messages would explicitly specify permission of “android.permission.RECEIVE SMS”.
To protect or share an application’s own components, an application can define and
specify a certain permission for a caller. This mechanism gives fine-grained control
of different protected features of the device but fixes these permissions to install time
as opposed to runtime.
19
2.2 Symbian
Prior to 2011, Symbian held the largest market share for smartphone OSes. It is a
lightweight operating system designed for mobile devices and smart phones, with asso-
ciated libraries, user interface, frameworks and reference implementations of common
tools, originally developed by Symbian Ltd [24].
Since mobile phones’ resources and processing environments are highly constrained,
Symbian was created with 3 design principles: (i) Real time processing, (ii) Resource
limitation, and (iii) Integrity and security of user data. To best follow these princi-
ples, Symbian uses a hard real-time, multithreaded microkernel, and has a request-
and-callback approach to services. Symbian’s system model is segmented into 3 main
layers [25]:
OS Layer: Includes the hardware adaptation layer (HAL) that abstracts all higher
layers from actual hardware and the Kernel including physical and logical device
drivers. It also provides programmable interface for hardware and OS through frame-
works, libraries and utilities etc. and higher-level OS services for communications,
networking, graphics, multimedia and so on.
Middleware Layer: Provides services (independent of hardware, applications or
user interface) to applications and other higher-level programs. Services can be spe-
cific application technology such as messaging and multimedia, or generic to the
device such as web services, security, device management, IP services and so on.
Application Layer: Contains all the Symbian provided applications, such as mul-
timedia applications, telephony and IP applications etc.
Symbian is optimized for low-power battery-based devices and ROM-based sys-
tems. Here, all programming is event-based, and the CPU is switched into a low
power mode when applications are not directly dealing with an event. Similarly, the
Symbian approach to threads and processes is driven by reducing memory and power
overheads. Readers are referred to [25] for further details on the Symbian architecture.
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In the next chapter, we present our study on failure rates of various applications
and middleware components in Android and Symbian.
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3. CHARACTERIZING FAILURES IN ANDROID AND
SYMBIAN
As smart phones grow in popularity, manufacturers are in a race to pack an increas-
ingly rich set of features into these tiny devices. This brings additional complexity in
the system software that has to fit within the constraints of the devices (chiefly mem-
ory, stable storage, and power consumption) and hence, new bugs are revealed. How
this evolution of smartphones impacts their reliability is the question we answer in
this chapter. Here, we analyze the reported cases of failures of Android and Symbian
based on bug reports posted by third-party developers and end users and documen-
tation of bug fixes from Android developers. First, based on 628 developer reports,
our study looks into the manifestation of failures in different modules of Android
and their characteristics, such as, their persistence and dependence on environment.
Next, we analyze similar properties of Symbian bugs based on 153 failure reports.
Our study indicates that Development Tools, Web Browsers, and Multimedia appli-
cations are most error-prone in both these systems. We further analyze 233 bug fixes
for Android and categorized the different types of code modifications required for the
fixes. The analysis shows that 77% of errors required minor code changes, with the
largest share of these coming from modifications to attribute values and conditions.
Our final analysis focuses on the relation between customizability, code complexity,
and reliability in Android and Symbian. We find that despite high cyclomatic com-
plexity, the bug densities in Android and Symbian are surprisingly low. However, the
support for customizability does impact the reliability of mobile OSes and there are
cautionary tales for their further development.
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3.1 Objectives
In this chapter, our objective is to analyze failure manifestations in Android and
Symbian. In that regard, we ask ourselves the following questions:
• What are the applications and libraries that fail frequently in Android and
Symbian? Are there any similarity in failure manifestations of these platforms?
• What are the types of code fixes that are applied frequently in Android?
• Does customizability of smartphones impact their reliability?
We answer each of these questions by studying a large number of bugs from Android
and Symbian bug repositories. Below, we present our data collection methodology.
3.2 Data Collection
At the time of this study (May 2010), the Android issue reporting site [26] con-
tained more than 8300 bug reports that are categorized into two types, namely defects
and enhancements. We consider these as the manifestations of faults from an appli-
cation developer’s perspective. Our study considers only bugs marked as defects.
Since the “issue” descriptions are stored as unstructured texts and contained varying
amount of details, we had to go through them manually. To prune the database fur-
ther, we used a set of keywords to list bugs containing those tags. These keywords
are—crash, shutdown, freeze, broken, failure, error, exception, and security. The
motivation behind choosing these keywords is that these events typically represent
significant user inconvenience [7]. The dataset was also filtered to remove duplicate
entries. This initially gave rise to a list with 758 bugs reported between Nov 2007
and Oct 2009. Since the bugs between Nov 2007 and Oct 2008 are reported before
the official release of Android we further removed these pre-release bugs. The final
dataset for Android thus consisted of 628 distinct bugs.
To get an understanding of the terminology used in the issue database, let us
consider the bug displayed in Fig. 3.1. This is the entry of a bug related to memory
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exhaustion (Issue ID 2203) in the Android issue reporting site [26]. The developer
claims that when she tries to rotate the UI of Android more than 20 times, it ter-
minates with an “OutOfMemoryAlert”. The bug type is specified as “Defect” and
it has medium priority. The “Closed” date in the report indicates that the bug has
been fixed and it will be released in future (hence, labeled as “FutureRelease”).
Fig. 3.1.: A Sample Bug Report on the Android Issue Reporting Site
The different categories of the pruned set of bugs (after further removing unhelpful
categories “Questions” and “Declined”) with the associated counts are shown in Table
3.1.
We applied the same methodolgy for collecting bugs from the Symbian bug tracker
[27] which had more than 2700 bugs (as on May 2010). Initially the database was
queried with the keywords mentioned earlier. The collected failure reports were
pruned by removing duplicates and entries of type “enhancement” or “feature”. This
gave us a dataset with size 275 spanning the period May 2009—April 2010. After
removing the pre-release bugs (before 4 Feb, 2010) our dataset contained 153 distinct
failures. The bugs in our Symbian dataset have the status of new (the bug has just
been reported), assigned (the bug has been assigned to an engineer for fixing), pro-
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posed (a solution has been proposed that is awaiting verification), closed/worksForMe
(the bug is closed since it could not be reproduced), resolved/fixed (the bug has been
fixed and the suggested resolution is awaiting verification from the package owner), or
closed/fixed (the bug had been fixed and the fix is in a release or pre-release version).
Table 3.1 shows a breakup of the bugs considered in our analysis for each of the two
platforms.
Table 3.1.: Breakup of Bugs Considered in our Analysis
Android Symbian
New 330 New 106
Assigned 13 Assigned 15
Reviewed 67 Proposed 21
NeedsInfo 9 Resolved/Fixed 5
FutureRelease 119 Closed/WorksForMe 2
Released 69 Closed/Fixed 4
Unassigned 2
Unreproducible 19
Total 628 Total 153
Next, we analyze the failure reports from two viewpoints—the first one is to iden-
tify the frequency of failures in different segments of Android and Symbian, whereas,
the second one is to classify whether the bugs are permanent, intermittent, or tran-
sient.
3.3 Manifestation of Errors
3.3.1 Location of Manifestation of Errors
From the details of the bugs, we initially identified the location where a bug is
manifested. Notice that ‘location’ has different interpretations from different perspec-
tives. From a user’s point of view, the location of a bug is the application which fails
to run correctly, whereas, from a system developer’s point of view, the location is the
exact component of Android that fails (often found from stack trace). Our analysis
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presents categorization of bugs primarily from application developers’ perspective,
however, a small fraction of the bugs are also reported by end-users (containing fair
amount of details).
Fig. 3.2.: Manifestation of Bugs in Different Segments of Android. The total number
of bugs considered here is 628.
From the bug reports, we first identified 55 different segments in Android where
bugs were reported. By segment, we mean an individual application or an individual
library at which the bug manifested itself, from an end-user’s perspective. However,
this proved to be too many segments for getting an understanding of the underlying
bugs and some segments had very few bug reports. Therefore, we performed an
aggregation of some of the related applications and libraries into aggregated segments.
Through this we arrived at 18 Android segments. ‘Segment’ now represents a built-in
application (e.g. Camera, Web Browser etc.), a library in Android (e.g. Graphics,
SSL etc.), or an aggregate. The aggregates are: Eclipse, Android Development Tool
(ADT), Android Debug Bridge (ADB) as Development Tools; GPS and Location
Manager as Location Manager; all the applications that come with Android and are
related to Google’s services, such as Gmail, Map, and Marketplace as Google Apps;
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Fig. 3.3.: Manifestation of Bugs in Different Segments of Symbian. The total number
of bugs considered here is 153.
Networking library and Wi-Fi library as Networking; Image viewer, Media library,
and Media player as Multimedia. Though this grouping introduces disparity among
segments in terms of code sizes, they faithfully emulate a user’s view (e.g., if a user
finds a problem with wi-fi reception, she is likely to report this as a networking issue).
We present another analysis on code complexity and bug density later in this chapter
(Section 3.4.5). The results on failure manifestation for Android is displayed in Fig.
3.2. The Y-axis in the graph indicates the count of distinct bugs that were reported
against a segment.
A large collection of applications that did not have enough severity individually
(examples contain failures of Activity Manager, Content Provider, Memory Manager,
SQLite etc.) were merged to form the largest segment “Others” (91) in Fig. 3.2. The
next most failure-prone segment in Android was Development tools (67) followed by
other significant segments such as Web Browser (58), Google Apps (55), Multimedia
(54), Documentation and Installation related bugs (49), Mail Client (36), and the
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View System (34). It is encouraging to find that a relatively few numbers of bugs are
related to Kernel and Device drivers (24 of 628), and the Dalvik and Core Library
(26 of 628).
A similar analysis of the Symbian bugs initially resulted in a distribution of 153
bugs in 41 segments (“packages” in Symbian terminology). To get a better under-
standing we again combined the related packages into a single segment, e.g., the
packages wrttools, web, websrv, and webuis as Web; the packages podcatcher, mm,
graphics, imagingext, mmappfw, and musicplayer as Multimedia; the packages home-
screen and homescreensrv as HomeScreen. This resulted in 15 segments of which
only 3 are individual packages (these are messaging, contacts, and organizer) and the
rest represent groups of related packages.
It can be seen from Fig. 3.3 that the segment web (31) is most bug prone in
Symbian followed by Multimedia (22). Bugs related to building of Symbian packages
(19), bugs in the Development tools (12), and bugs in Kernel and OS Services (12)
are also significant in number. During our analysis, we observed another interesting
pattern in Symbian—as many as 59 bugs in our data set (38.6% of all the bugs) were
due to build/compilation errors, missing files, missing references, etc. We denote these
types of bugs as “build” bugs. Some of the packages contained significant number of
“build” bugs. Examples include web (8 of 31), Multimedia (6 of 22), Development
tools (5 of 12), and UI softwares (4 of 8). We display the relative counts of “build”
bugs and “runtime” bugs by splitting the bars in Fig. 3.3. Note that the “Build
Pkg” in Fig. 3.3 represents bugs specific to the named package and it forms only a
fraction of the “build” bugs. The number of “build” bugs in Android did not have
such prominence, hence, we do not display the breakup in our analysis. We attribute
the large number of build bugs in Symbian to its recent release and believe that these
will have less prominence in future releases.
By comparing Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.3 it can be seen that of the top 6 bug prone
segments in both the platforms, 4 are identical. These are Web browser (Web in
Symbian), Multimedia, Development tools and Doc-Install (Build in Symbian). In-
28
terestingly, web browsing and multimedia are perhaps the most significant features
of a smartphone as perceived by the users. Unfortunately, these are also most failure
prone leading to dissatisfaction of users as seen in numerous posts in the user forums
(refer Section 3.3.3). One may argue that our findings are biased by the fact that
Web browser and Multimedia are more extensively tested by the user community than
other applications. However, this once again reiterates the need for making these ap-
plications more robust and secure. We further note that the Web browsers in both
Android and Symbian are built from the WebKit engine. This raises concern about
the reliability of third-party applications that are used in the mobile OSes. Apart
from WebKit, SQLite, SSL, and Graphics (based on OpenGL) were also found to be
error prone in Android.
The presence of large number of bugs in Development tools in both these plat-
forms (10.67% and 7.84% of all bugs in Android and Symbian respectively) draws
special attention to this segment. We believe, the efficiency and reliability of these
development environments will be a key factor in determining which platform has a
larger developer community. Moreover, faults in the development environment can
significantly affect the performance of applications and may even be responsible for
creating security holes (e.g., a development tool that does not check for known vul-
nerabilities like SQL Injection and Cross-site scripting). An encouraging finding from
our analysis is that both the platforms have lesser number of errors in the lower
layers—Dalvik and Core, Kernel and Drivers in Fig. 3.2 and Kernel and OS service,
Driver services in Fig. 3.3—compared to application level failures. Android, which
comes with more applications than Symbian, also has more application level failures
(like Mail client and Google apps in Fig. 3.2).
3.3.2 Persistence of Bugs
From the failure reports, we found that only a few bugs in Android were transient
(10) or intermittent (49). Most of the failures are permanent (566) in nature and need
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to be fixed by modifying the Android code. A few bugs (3) could not be categorized
due to lack of sufficient information. It may be noted here that the actual number
of transient and intermittent bugs may be much higher as users often refrain from
reporting them. Furthermore, many non-permanent bugs were also declined by An-
droid engineers as they could not be reproduced. Similar analysis with the Symbian
bugs indicated that only 4 were intermittent bugs and the rest (149) were permanent.
We observe that the large number of permanent bugs in both systems (90.12% in
Android and 97.38% in Symbian) may be due to the fact these are new operating
systems and their codebases are not yet stable.
3.3.3 Analysis of User Forums
Besides the developers’ reports, we also studied publicly available data on the T-
Mobile G1 user forums for incidence of Android failures [28]. Our analysis considered
threads related to Messaging, Google Applications, Phone & Data Connection, and
Operating System & Software Development. It was observed that most of the reports
in the user forums are trivial questions or suggestions for enhancements. Therefore
we discarded these messages from our dataset. The final list consisted of 105 distinct
failures. The failures are frequently reported for Mail Client (15), SD Card (11),
Media Player (9), Messaging (9), GPS and Location Manager (8), Web browser(8),
Android Marketplace (6), and Calendar (5). This result is not identical to that when
we considered the failure reports from a wider audience (Section 3.3.1). This may
indicate that the scope of problems in the different modules varies with the hardware
device being used. We further noted that the common user-initiated recovery actions
are—Restart application, Wait for some time, Restart phone, Modify settings, Factory
reset, Take out battery, Update firmware, and Use third-party software. For example,
many users reported that the location displayed in the GPS of Android is 1-2 miles
away from where they actually were. Waiting for sometime, rebooting the phone, or
doing factory reset may solve the problem, but they do not work on every G1 phone.
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These findings about user-initiated recovery actions are consistent with those in the
prior work on the Symbian OS [7] in terms of the categories.
3.4 Analysis of Code Modifications and Fixes
The statistics presented in the previous section primarily considered manifestation
of failures. Though valuable for identifying the impact of bugs in various segments
of mobile OSes, it does not give any indication about how these bugs originated.
It is therefore necessary to study the root causes of the bugs and to correlate the
user-visible failures with these root causes. This may also help us in identifying error
propagation. With these objectives, we studied the code modifications in some of
the bug fixes and gained useful insights about the failures. Of the two mobile OSes
analyzed in this chapter, we have details of bug fixes only for Android [29].
3.4.1 Data Collection
For this work, we looked into the Android code repositories to study the bug
fixes. The code reviews stored in [29] presented us with the details of the fixed
bugs. It is to be noted that the failures analyzed in this section have some over-
lap with the failures studied in Section 3.3 but do not form a strict subset. Sev-
eral bug-fixes were found which did not appear in the Issue listing site and vice-
versa [26]. Our dataset for this analysis contains 233 bug-fixes from 29 projects in
the Android repository. These bugs were fixed during the period October 2008 to
October 2009. The significant projects within this collection, in terms of the num-
ber of bugs, are kernel/common, kernel/msm, kernel/omap, platform/framework,
platform/dalvik, platform/build, platform/system, and some applications in
platform/packages. An exhaustive listing of all the Android projects may be found
in [30]. In the following sub-section, we present our analysis of root causes of these
bugs.
31
3.4.2 Categorization of Code Modifications
For our analysis, we considered a code-fix to be a Major change if it involved
modifications of more than 10 lines of code, or modifications at more than 5 places
in the source file(s). It was observed from the bug-fixes that most of the bugs (179
of 233) required only few lines of code changes. Among the minor modifications,
we further identified what types of code changes were most frequent. We categorize
different types of code modifications as follows.
1. Add/modify attr val: Update the value assigned to a variable (e.g. the code
A.x=B.y is corrected as A.x=C.z) or declare a new variable.
2. Add/modify cond: Add some new checks (if-stmt), or add a missing else clause, or
modify the condition expression.
3. Modify settings: Update system constants or include modification in the makefiles,
application configuration files etc.
4. Add/modify func call: Introduce a new function call, or modify the arguments of
an existing invocation.
5. Lock problems: Bug was caused because a critical segment was not locked or a
lock was not removed and deleted upon exit.
6. Add/modify lib ref: Bug was caused because code was accessing some non-existent
or incorrect libraries or classes.
7. Modify data type: Update the datatype of a variable.
8. Preprocess change: Introduce a preprocessor directive (e.g. adding an ifdef).
9. Reorganize code: Change the order of execution of certain code blocks.
10. Others: The bug fixes that could not be placed under any of the above-mentioned
categories are considered here.
We designed these categories to incorporate maximum details of root causes in
our classification while maintaining a programmer-centric view. We do not adopt
existing classification approaches like ODC [31] since ODC primarily measures the
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effectiveness of various software development stages. Our work, on the other hand,
looks at manifestations of failures and related programming errors.
In our analysis, some minor fixes contained multiple changes (e.g. some bugs
needed both modification of settings and addition of new attribute values), hence,
they were considered under both the categories. This resulted in a list of 193 fixes
for 179 distinct failures. We show the breakup of the different bug fix categories in
Fig. 3.4. We observe that only 23% of the bugs required major changes. These mod-
ifications primarily include addition of new functions, data structures, and constants.
Among the minor changes (77% of all the bugs), most of the modifications were of the
type Add/modify attr value (21%) and Add/modify cond (19%). The large percentage
of Add/modify attr val (21%) arises due to the fact that some applications/drivers in
Android are still undergoing major code revisions. The list of changes may be seen
from the release notes of different versions of Android. Within the sizable category
Add/modify cond (19%), we observed several instances where an if-stmt did not have
a corresponding else clause. This resulted in exceptional cases not being handled
correctly. Detailed specification of the program behavior could have avoided such
errors. It is known that introducing new conditional statements adds to the cyclo-
matic complexity of a program. Hence, while implementing these fixes, the designers
must be careful so that understandability and testability of the resulting code is not
altered significantly, e.g., if a fix introduces a high degree of nesting for conditional
statements, the designers may try to simplify by reorganizing the code.
3.4.3 Tension between Customizability and Reliability
The presence of 14% Modify settings bugs motivated us to delve deeper into the
Android code base and analyze the flexibilty provided by Android runtime environ-
ment to the upper layer applications. The customizability claim is buttressed by
the fact that Android may be adapted for a wide range of mobile hardware (people
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Fig. 3.4.: Different Types of Code Modifications. Total number of bugs considered
for this analysis was 233.
have even used it to run notebooks), it incorporates virtual machine, SQLite for data
storage, and the fact that people may use their phone to write programs.
We observed that a large chunk of the failures requiring Modify Settings surfaced
during building (compiling) the Android source code. This resulted in modifications
of the Makefiles to support new architectures and APIs, modification of environment
variables, changing application permissions etc. Note that many of the application
configuration files are also generated during the build process itself. Hence, we con-
sider that Modify settings errors relate to customizability of the system, where cus-
tomizability is defined to include both the process of building the system and of
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executing the system. However, this category of bugs only covers a subset of the er-
rors caused by the need to support customizability. According to our categorization,
if a new condition needs to be introduced in the code file to handle a configuration
parameter, that would be classified under Add/Modify Condition, while some support
for customizability may necessitate large changes in the software (considered under
the category Major). Thus, the percentage of bugs to support customizability is non-
trivial. This suggests that customizability does have some negative impact on the
reliability. But this is not egregiously high for the level of customizability supported
by Android. Further, improvements in software practices, especially targeted at the
problematic segments that we have identified here, plus a natural maturing of the
code base (recollect that we are talking of something that has been open sourced for
only about a year and a half) will likely bring these bug incidences down.
3.4.4 Analysis of Environment Variables
We observe that applications often read system configurations and locations of
various executables from the environment variables defined in the runtime kernel.
These parameters, though not comprehensive, are a significant indicator of a frame-
work’s customizability. Extending from the conclusions in the previous section, we
counted the number of environment variables defined in the Android platform and
compared it with a standard Linux Kernel (version 2.6.32). We wrote a script to scan
the source codes of different versions of Android to find the occurrence of export or
setenv keywords. We then built lists of environment variables for each of the Android
versions and the Linux Kernel. Next, we counted the references to each environment
variable and summed them up. Though a variable may be referred multiple times
within a single line, we consider these as a single reference. The results obtained
from our analysis are presented in Table 3.2. “Max ref” is the maximum number of
references to a single environment variable in the entire code base.
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Table 3.2.: Count of environment variables and their references in different versions
of Android and the Linux Kernel
# env vars Total refs Max ref
Android 1.1 62 819 577
Android 1.5 63 854 584
Android 1.6 76 1545 584
Android 2.0 82 2083 592
Linux Kernel
2.6.32 127 953 158
The number of environment variables in different versions of Android is steadily
increasing. Though this number (82 in Android 2.0) is lower than in the Linux Kernel
(127), it is still significant considering that Android is built as a mobile OS and runs
on devices with more constrained resources than the Linux kernel. Also, the growth
in the number of references to environment variables between February 09 (Android
v. 1.1) and October 09 (Android v. 2.0), 154%, is striking evidence of the rapid
march toward a customizable mobile OS. More than 85% of the references to all the
environment variables were made from codes in external/ folder in Android which
include third-party libraries and built-in applications.
In Fig. 3.5, we illustrate the distribution of the number of references to environ-
ment variables. The number of variables with reference count of zero indicates that
a large number of environment variables were not referenced outside the line where
they were defined or “exported”. We also noted that majority of the references were
made to only a few of the variables (less than 5). For example, in Android 1.6, the
environment variables DESTDIR, MK, CFLAGS, and LDFLAGS are referenced 584, 308,
194, 117 times respectively. The maximum reference count for a single environment
variable was much higher in Android than in Linux Kernel. The references to envi-
ronment variables in Linux Kernel are almost evenly distributed, whereas, Android
is more dependent on a few critical variables. This indicates in Android a possibil-
ity of significant error propagation if these key environment variables happen to be
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Fig. 3.5.: Distribution of references to environment variables
incorrectly set. As a corollary, Android will benefit from building in reasonableness
checks for these key environment variables.
3.4.5 Cyclomatic Complexity and Number of Bugs
Cyclomatic complexity, which measures the number of linearly independent paths
through a program’s source code, is frequently used as a metric of code complexity. To
understand the relation between cyclomatic complexity and bug density in Android
and Symbian, we selected a set of projects (packages) in these two platforms that
had the maximum number of bugs. Since, the Android issue reporting site [26] does
not contain the root cause of a bug, we considered the bug counts in section 3.4
for computation of bug density. For Symbian, we found that each bug was assigned
to its corresponding project. Hence, the bug density in Symbian is computed with
the counts presented in Fig. 3.3. We computed cyclomatic complexities (CC) of
these projects (packages) with Understand 2.0—a source code analysis and metrics
generation tool [32]. The unit for computation of cyclomatic complexity is a function,
as is typically done. Source codes for these projects (packages) were downloaded from
Android [30], and Symbian [33] repositories. Note, that the Android repository gives
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kernel/omap 0.04 21 5,311,427 1.12 4,973
kernel/msm 0.06 29 4,724,260 5.60 4,973
kernel/common 0.07 31 4,688,175 5.82 4,973
dalvik 0.18 14 771,865 2.23 766
development 0.46 10 216,344 2.18 169
framework/base 0.79 51 645,978 2.40 221
packages/apps/camera 1.33 2 14,962 2.15 20
packages/apps/mms 1.74 4 23,013 2.02 46
system/core 1.90 13 68,798 4.31 167
hardware/msm7k 2.42 3 12,382 4.00 23
Table 3.4.: Cyclomatic Complexity and Bug Density of different segments in Symbian










Kernel and OS Services 0.03 12 3,684,192 3.02 1,470
Security 0.08 6 752,148 2.29 134
Multimedia 0.12 22 1,866,577 2.44 558
Web 0.17 31 1,807,828 3.01 2,442
HomeScreen 0.38 10 263,305 2.25 149
Build Pkg 0.63 19 299,868 2.24 268
us the latest source codes, whereas, our bug pool is older than the source code. Hence,
the calculated bug density is not completely consistent. Nevertheless, this gives an
approximate measure of code complexity in Android and may be used to suggest
improvements in code quality. Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 show the results obtained
from our analysis.
It was observed that in Android many projects in kernel/* have large overlap
in their code files. As a result, the Max cyclomatic complexity and Source Lines of
Code (SLOC) of these projects are similar or identical. Qualitatively, the bug density
is quite low for both these systems indicating a high standard of code development,
even though these are relatively new software projects. For reference, the pre-release
bug density in Windows XP was 2.66 × 10−3 [34]. However, the bug density in the
Kernel and OS Services of Symbian was lower compared to Android Kernel.
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In standard literature, it is suggested that cyclomatic complexity of functions
should be limited to 20 for manageability of code. Hence, the Max. cyclomatic
complexity figures presented in the table may initially appear erroneous. A careful
examination of the source code, however, revealed that some functions extensively use
macros inline, each of which contains multiple if-else statements. When the macros
are replaced by the preprocessor with their corresponding codes this gives rise to
high cyclomatic complexity. Such inlining is the main reason for our high cyclomatic
complexity in both these tables. We further noted that large case-switch statements
were, in many cases, responsible for cyclomatic complexity above 100. The presence of
long case-switch statements necessitates the creation of extensive code documentation
explaining each of the cases. Verifying that all the cases have been handled properly is
a challenging task. Going forward, as mobile OSes increases in complexity, developers
will need to pay careful attention to managing the long switch statements.
Average cyclomatic complexity (CC) per function, on the other hand, was sig-
nificantly lower (between 1.12 and 5.82 in Android and between 2.24 and 3.02 in
Symbian). This is primarily due to the presence of a large number of default and
inherited functions which have complexity 1. We also measured the CC of the Linux
kernel (version 2.6.32). This system consisting of 6,082,112 lines of source code had
a maximum CC of 4,973 which is identical to the Android kernel. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that Android kernel is built using a modified version of Linux
kernel (v2.6). It was observed that the max CC in Symbian Kernel and OS Services
is much lower than that in Android and the Linux Kernel, while their average CCs
are comparable.
3.5 Directions for Future Research
In this chapter, we presented a failure characterization of mobile OSes based on
large number of bugs in Android and Symbian. This lays the foundation for further
research on smartphone reliability by highlighting the components that fail often.
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However, the results presented in this chapter were based on data collected during
early phases of Android and Symbian release (2008-2010). We surmise that the failure
frequency of various components may have changed over the years. We find some
evidence of this in our next work on Android IPC Robustness, where the number
of crashes in Android 4.0 were far fewer than Android 2.2. Moreover, Android has
released many new and interesting components (or significantly redesigned older ones)
over the years for which we did not have failure data. An example of this may be
Android’s “In-App Billing” APIs. We find the following to be an exciting research
direction for analyzing smartphone reliability.
Reliability with Software Evolution in Android: A study on Android reliability
across its versions would help us understand how its reliability has changed over the
years. We found that during major releases of Android components, several new issues
have surfaced and often older phones were no longer compatible with new services. As
an example, [35] shows that a large number of users had problems accessing Google
Play Services after they upgraded to newer versions. A study across versions would
help us identify the components that has a (possibly) faulty regression testing setup.
40
4. ROBUSTNESS TESTING OF ANDROID IPC
Android has a modular framework with multiple components in each application,
and a security-conscious design where each application is isolated in its own virtual
machine. However, its isolation guarantees would be rendered ineffectual if an ap-
plication were to deliver erroneous messages to targeted applications and thus cause
the target to behave incorrectly. In this section, we present an empirical evaluation
of the robustness of Inter-component Communication (ICC) in Android through fuzz
testing methodology, whereby, parameters of the inter-component communication are
changed to various incorrect values. We show that not only exception handling is a
rarity in Android applications, but also it is possible to crash the Android runtime
from unprivileged user processes. Based on our observations, we highlight some of
the critical design issues in Android ICC and suggest solutions to alleviate these
problems.
4.1 Objectives
Of the two Inter Component Communication (ICC) primitives in Android—Intent
and Binder—we use Intent as the subject of our robustness study due to its flexibility.
Intents are used for a variety of purposes in Android applications which include but
are not limited to—starting a new activity, sending and receiving broadcast messages,
receiving results from another activity, starting and stopping a service etc. To sup-
port these operations across a myriad applications from multiple vendors over many
versions, Intent messages have a flexible structure and therein lies the potential for
vulnerability. In a vulnerability analysis of Android IPC, Chin et al. [36] argued
that it is easy to spoof, snoop, and target Intents to specific application components
unless these are protected by explicit permissions, which is a rare occurrence. Our
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experimental results concur with this analysis and show that the attack surface can
go even deeper (i.e. up to the framework layer or lower as shown in [23]). Due to
these reasons we chose Intents as the primary focus of our study. In essence, we try
to answer the following questions:
(A) How well does an Android component behave in the presence of a semi-valid or
random Intent?
(B) How robust are Android’s ICC primitives? Can the Android runtime contain
exceptions within an application?
(C) How can we refine the implementation of Intents so that input validation can
be improved?
To evaluate (A), we sent explicit Intents to each Activity, Service, and Broadcast
Receiver registered in the system. We evaluate (B) by sending a set of implicit
Intents and answer (C) by presenting a qualitative assessment in Section 4.4.
4.2 Experimental Setup
4.2.1 Design of JarJarBinks
We built our robustness testing tool, JarJarBinks, from Intent Fuzzer at [37]. The
initial codebase contained basic functions like displaying set of components registered
in the system, and sending blank Intent messages to Broadcast Receivers, and Ser-
vices. However, it did not support testing Activities. We added this key feature
in JarJarBinks along with an Intent generation module described in Section 4.2.2.
Fig. 4.1 shows the location and operation of JarJarBinks (JJB) with reference to
Android architecture [23]. It queries Android PackageManager to get a list of com-
ponents (Activities, Services, and Broadcast Receivers) registered in the system and
then uses ActivityManager to send Intents to these components. We use the following
methods from Android API to send Intents: startActivityForResult for Activities,
startService for Services, and sendBroadcast for Broadcast Receivers.
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Fig. 4.1.: JarJarBinks: Interaction with Android Layers
One of the major challenges in automated testing of Android Activities is to
close a callee Activity after sending an Intent. Typically, once a new Activity is
displayed, it expects some interaction from the user and pauses the caller Activity.
We resolved this by using startActivityForResult() and finishActivity() APIs
in Android. Unlike startActivity(), startActivityForResult() can force-finish
a child activity by using its requestCode as a handle. This way we could avoid
manual intervention in most cases. Another design issue with automated testing
of ICC in Android is to avoid resource exhaustion in the system (e.g., sending a
continuous stream of Intents very fast would create a large number of Activities
(windows) causing WindowManager to run out of resources). For this purpose, we
used a pause of 100ms between sending of each successive Intent. This was sufficient
to launch and finish a new Activity (or Service) in our testing environment. Though
we did not explicitly test Content Providers in JarJarBinks, semi-valid content URIs
were specified in some of our fault injection campaigns triggering parsing of these
content URIs and corresponding permission checks.
It may be highlighted that one of our goals was to keep the implementation of
JJB simple and less intrusive, thereby, not introducing new bugs in the firmware. We,
instead, focus on a rigorous analysis of the results obtained from our experiments.
Despite its simplicity, the volume and severity of failures generated through JJB is
truly astonishing. One shortcoming of JJB is its semi-manual approach—our strategy
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of killing a child Activity (by calling finishActivity) did not work well in two
situations: first, when a system alert was generated due to application crash, this
could not be closed programmatically (we consider this as a good security design; JJB
being a user-level application cannot hide system alerts), second, when an activity was
started as a new task the caller could not close it by calling finishActivity() (this
mostly happened while launching login screens of applications like Skype, Facebook,
Settings etc.). Both these cases required manual intervention and will be addressed
in our future work. In the following section, we present an overview of our Intent
generation module.
4.2.2 Generating Intents
An Intent message is essentially a data container having a set of optional fields—
{Action, Data, Type, Package, Component, Flags, Categories, and Extras}
—which can be specified by a caller. Of these, Action (an action to perform, e.g. to
view or edit a contact) and Data (a URI for a data item, e.g. URI for a contact record
on phone) are most frequently specified by a caller. Component specifies the target
component, Flags control how an Intent is handled, Category specifies additional
information about the action to execute, and Extras include a collection of name-
value pairs to deliver more inputs to the target component. Type (content mime-
type) is usually determined from Data (when it is specified), while, Package can be
determined from Component if one is specified.
In JarJarBinks, we modify the fields Action, Data, Component, and Extras
in a structured manner as part of a fault injection campaign and keep the other
fields blank (we select Extras since this can potentially include random or mali-
cious data from users). For most experiments Action is selected from a set of
Android-defined action strings found at [38]. Generation of data URIs is a non-
trivial operation due to the presence of a multitude of URI schemes. A URI consists
of three parts URI := scheme/path?query, where scheme denotes URI type, path
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gives the location to the data, and query is an optional query string. At present
we support the following URI schemes—"content://", "file://", "folder://",
"directory://", "geo:", "google.streetview:", "http://", "https://",
"mailto:", "ssh:", "tel:", and "voicemail:" in JarJarBinks. For each of these
except "content://", we created a predefined set of semi-valid URIs. For "content
://" URIs, JarJarBinks first queried the PackageManager to get a list of registered
Content Providers in the system and then randomly selected one of them to build a
content://provider URI. Our Intent generation can be broadly classified into two
types.
Implicit Intents
Components in the system can advertise their ability to handle Intents by speci-
fying Intent-filters in their manifest file. Implicit Intents do not specify a target, but
are delivered to the best matching component in the system. The matching between
sender and receiver is the responsibility of the Intent delivery mechanism of the plat-
form. Intent-filters can restrict the Action of the Intent, the Category, or the Data
(through both the URI and the data type fields) or any combination of the three. The
test set for implicit Intents is therefore any Intent that matches at least one Intent-
filter in the system. In order to generate Intents, we collect all Intent-filters of all
applications and all restrictions of either the Action or the Category. On our target
platform, we could not find components using the Data in Intent-filters. For each
application and each of its Intent-filter, the following experiments were performed:
(A) Valid Intent, unrestricted fields null: We generate an Intent that matches
exactly all the restricted attributes of the Intent-filter but leave all other fields blank.
For example, if the Intent-filter specifies <action android:name="ACTION EDIT" />,
only this information is used to populate the Intent fields.
(B) Semi-valid Intent: We pick all Intent-filters that have at least one degree of
freedom and set these fields sequentially to each of the valid literals we discovered in
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any other Intent-filter. For the above example, the Category field would be subject
to fuzzing since only Action is restricted through the filter. Thus, the fuzzed fields
are individually valid for some component in the system, but not their combination.
Since each individual field in the generated Intent is valid, there is still a high chance
that it is routed to a component.
Explicit Intents
Our goal here is to find how well the receiver of an Intent behaves after getting
unexpected data. At a high level, our fuzz campaign on explicit Intents is distributed
over three component types—Activities, Services, and Broadcast Receivers. For each
component type, JarJarBinks first queries PackageManager to retrieve a list of com-
ponents of that type in the system (e.g. all the Services, or Activities). After this,
for each selected component (e.g. Calender Activity) JarJarBinks runs a set of four
fuzz injection campaigns (FIC).
FIC A: Semi-valid Action and Data: Here a semi-valid Action string, and Data
URI are generated as described earlier (refer Section 4.2.2). However, the combination
of the two may be invalid. For example, an Intent of this category may be Intent
{act=ACTION EDIT data=http://www.google.com cmp=com.android.someCompo
-nent}. During this FI, the Action and Data sets are combined to generate all
known {Action, Data} pairs each generating a new Intent. Total number of Intents
generated are |Action| × |Data| for each component. Fields other than Action and
Data are kept blank.
FIC B: Blank Action or Data: In this experiment, we specified either Action
OR Data in an Intent but not both together. Other fields are left blank. Intent
{data=http://www.google.com cmp=com.android.someComponent} is an example
of this FI. This campaign generates |Action|+ |Data| Intents for each component.
FIC C: Random Action or Data: Here either Action OR Data is specified as de-
scribed earlier, and the other is set to random bytes. An example of this type of Intent
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may be Intent {act=ACTION EDIT data=a1b2c3d4 cmp=com.android.someCompo
-nent}.
FIC D: Random Extras: For this FI, we first created a set of 100 valid {Action,
Data} pairs following Android documentation. For each of these pairs, 1-5 Extra
fields were added randomly. The name of an Extra was selected from the set of
Android defined Extra strings, while its value was set to random bytes. An ex-
ample Intent can be shown as, Intent {act=ACTION DIAL Data=tel:123-456-7890
cmp=com.android.someComponent has Extras}.
Our choice of experiments is justified by the fact that an application component
may get a malformed Intent either due to error propagation from other applications
or from an active adversary. While FICs A and B verify the robustness of a callee
component against null objects and incompatible actions, FICs C and D emulate the
behavior of a potential adversary.
4.2.3 Machines and Firmware
We conducted our robustness test on three versions of Android, distributed on
three phones and three computers—two of the phones (Motorola Droid) had Android
2.2 as its firmware (release date: June 2010 and nicknamed “Froyo”), while one (HTC
Evo 3D) had Android 2.3.4 (release date: April 2011 and nicknamed “Gingerbread”);
the computers all ran Emulators loaded with Android 4.0 in Linux environments
(release date: October 2011 and nicknamed “Ice Cream Sandwich”, the image of
which was useful during long late night experiments with it). The HTC Evo was used
for running experiments on implicit Intents. Experiments on explicit Intents, where
we sent a large number (9000) of Intents to each Android component, being more
time consuming, was run in parallel on two Droid phones (having identical hardware
and firmware). The emulators were used for testing Android 4.0, the latest version of
Android, for which a physical device has been available only in late November 2011,
clearly not enough time for us to carry out experiments. Android 4.0 is a promising
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target of the study since it has been widely hailed as “the biggest Android update
in ages” (PC Magazine) and is touted to bring real improvements to the Android
platform. Initially, it was noted that the devices as well as the emulator had nearly
800 components (Activities, Services, and Broadcast Receivers combined) per version
of Android which include a large number of third-party applications. In this work,
we focus our attention to Android framework and common applications that are
pre-loaded into every Android distribution (e.g. contacts, calendar, messaging etc.).
These application are also used by third-party application in implementing common
functionalities. Hence, rigorous evaluation of these built-in applications are of prime
importance. In Android namespace hierarchy, these applications all share the package
name prefix of com.android. After filtering the list of components with this prefix
we found 398 components (297 Activities, 42 Services, and 59 Broadcast Receivers)
in Droid and 455 components (332 Activities, 54 Services, and and 69 Broadcast
Receivers) in Emulator.
In addition to built-in applications, we also tested 5 Most popular (as on 3 Dec,
2011) free apps from Android Marketplace (recently renamed Google Play). These
apps—Facebook, Pandora Radio, Voxer Walkie Talkie, Angry Birds, and Skype—
had a total of 103 Activities and 11 Service components. Even though our set of
Marketplace apps is small, the large number of Activities (103 as opposed to 294 in
Droid) gives us a realistic comparison of their robustness with that of Android. Our
experiments started by subjecting all these (Android and Marketplace) components
to a flow of Intents from JarJarBinks over a seven day period. In the following section,
we present our findings.
4.3 Results
During the course of our experiments, more than 6 million Intents were sent to
800+ components across 3 versions of Android. We define an experiment as follows:
Choose one particular component and inject all the Intents targeted to that component.
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The injection is done according to the Fault Injection Campaigns (thus, if we are doing
FIC A, the <Action, Data> pairs are changed to semi-valid values).
We collected execution logs from the mobile phones and emulators using logcat,
a logging application in Android platform tools. This generated more than 3GB
of log data which were later analyzed to gather information about the failures and
their root causes. We define a crash to be a user visible failure, i.e., a system alert
displaying the message "Force Close" (in Android 2.2) or "Application x stopped
unexpectedly" (in Android 4.0). These failure messages manifest in the log files as a
log entry stating "FATAL EXCEPTION: main" and are essentially effects of uncaught
exceptions thrown by the Android runtime. It is to be noted that sending(receiving) of
certain Intents (e.g. <action=ACTION SHUTDOWN> or Intents with "content:" URIs
in Data field) in Android are protected by permissions and when JJB sends these
Intents SecurityExceptions are generated. JJB is able to handle these exceptions
gracefully and we discard these from our results. At present we focus on crash failures
as opposed to thread hangs due to their visibility and negative user experience.
We discuss our results from three perspectives: (i) prevalence of crashes caused in
the application components due to the fuzzed Intents for the various types of compo-
nents and different fault injection campaigns; (ii) distribution of uncaught exceptions
thrown by components in response to the fuzzed Intents; and (iii) error propagation
from a user-level application to the Android framework.
In general, Android 2.2 displayed many more crashes than Android 4.0 and compo-
nents in all the versions were vulnerable to NullPointerExceptions. It was possible
to crash some components by sending them an implicit Intent that matched exactly
with their Intent-filter (i.e. nothing other than the mandatory fields were specified).
In Android 2.2, three of the application crashes caused cascading failures which even-
tually restarted the Android runtime. The Android Emulator also showed signs of
stress-related failures, whereby, the system server (the framework component that
coordinates interaction between Kernel space and user space) restarted periodically
after testing a fixed number of components. The system server is a key part of
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the Android environment—it runs a host of essential services (Power Manager, De-
vice Policy, Search Service, Audio Service, Dock Observer, etc.). A crash of the
system server kills all user level application and services and restarts the Android
runtime.
Below we present our experimental results organized into three discussions.
4.3.1 Results for Explicit Intents
In Section 4.2.2, we described how we generated explicit Intents for four different
fault injection campaigns. In FIC A we sent an invalid <Action, Data> pair to
components, in FIC B we sent an Intent with either Action or Data blank, in FIC C
random bytes were assigned to either Action or Data, and finally in FIC D random
bytes were assigned to Extras values. During our experiments we found a large
number of crashes—2148 in Android 2.2, 641 in Android 4.0, and 152 for Marketplace
apps. One may argue that a comparison between Android 2.2 on a real phone and
Android 4.0 on an emulator compromises the validity of our results. To verify this,
we conducted a smaller-scale test of Android 2.2 on emulator and Droid and did not
find any major difference. Our choice of Android 4.0 on emulator was driven by the
lack of a physical device in a timely fashion. Even if results obtained from a physical
device change from its emulator (i.e. absolute numbers of crashes change), it does not
invalidate the general trends described in our results. Below, we present an analysis
of the observed crashes.
Distribution of Failed Components
We define a failed component to be a program that crashes at least once during a
fuzz injection campaign. Due to the nature of our Intent generation it is possible that
a component fails repeatedly in one experiment where that component is targeted,
e.g. an activity that dereferences Data field without null check will crash for all
Intents that has a blank Data field. Counting such repeated crashes masks the actual
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Table 4.1.: Summary of component crashes in different versions of Android in response to fuzzed Intents in four different
injection campaigns. Here one component crashing one or more times in response to one or more malformed Intents directed
at it counts as one crash.
Droid (Android 2.2) Emulator (Android 4.0) Marketplace Apps on Droid (Android 2.2)
Activities Services Broadcast Activities Services Broadcast Activities Services Broadcast
Receivers Receivers Receivers
297 42 59 332 54 69 103 11 10
#crash % #crash % #crash % #crash % #crash % #crash % #crash % #crash % #crash %
A. Semi-valid 30 10.1 1 2.4 2 3.4 29 8.7 3 5.6 2 2.9 4 3.9 0 0.0 0 0.0
B. Blank 21 7.1 1 2.4 6 10.2 8 2.4 3 5.6 6 8.7 2 1.9 1 9.1 0 0.0
C. Random 18 6.1 1 2.4 4 6.8 9 2.7 3 5.6 2 2.9 2 1.9 0 0.0 0 0.0
D. With Extra 13 4.4 1 2.4 1 1.7 7 2.1 3 5.6 0 0.0 3 2.9 0 0.0 0 0.0
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number of faults at source code, therefore, for a fault injection campaign like ours,
a better metric of a framework’s reliability can be obtained by finding how many
failed components it has. Table 4.1 presents the number of failed components for
various types (Activity, Broadcast Receiver, and Services) in each of our experiments.
The number at the top, under the component type represents the total number of
components of that type, e.g., Android 2.2 has 297 Activities. The number in the
column “#crash” denotes the number of components that crashed.
It is encouraging to see that in all cases but two, the percentage of failed compo-
nents is less than 10. The percentage of failed components in Android 4.0 is generally
lower than in Android 2.2, with the exception of Services. Across experiments, Ac-
tivities display higher fraction of failed components in FIC A than the rest. However,
this may also be due to the fact that FIC A sends nearly twice as many Intents than
FICs B, C, and D combined. The high count of failed components across component
types in FIC B is another key finding of our experiments. This indicates that many
Android components do not perform null checks before dereferencing a field from an
Intent and, therefore, are vulnerable to blank fields. This fact is also verified by our
data in the next section.
The failure percentages of Marketplace apps are nearly identical to that of Android
4.0 components with the exception of FIC A for Activities and for Services, where
Marketplace apps are significantly more robust. However, it was observed that 3 of
the apps had at least one component that failed one or more experiments. Though our
sample size for Marketplace apps (5) is too small to make any claims about general
robustness of third-party apps, we expected the Top 5 to be more robust as they
come from reputed vendors. This intuition is only partially borne out by the analysis
results.
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Distribution of Exception Types
To understand how well the Android framework handles exceptional conditions, we
measured the distribution of exception types from failure logs. Here, we are focused
on uncaught exceptions, because they result in the crashes. Since we are interested
in measuring what percentage of all the crashes are constituted by a given exception
type, here we count each crash individually. Thus, if in one experiment, 100 fuzzed
Intents are sent to a component and the component crashes 20 times, we will have 20
data points (unlike in Section 4.3.1 where we would have counted the component as
having crashed and it would have resulted in a single data point). It can be seen from
Fig. 4.2 that NullPointerExceptions (NPE) make up the largest share of all the
exceptions. Though the percentage of NPEs in Android 4.0 (36.50%) has improved
since Android 2.2 (45.99%), this is still significant and concurs with our findings in
Section 4.3.1. The results are given in terms of percentage of all the exceptions, thus
for a given Android version, all the exceptions’ numbers should sum to 100%. Other
exceptions like ClassNotFoundException and IllegalArgumentException are sig-
nificantly lower in Android 4.0 than in its previous version. Though exception types
are sensitive to input data, we are applying similar inputs to the two different versions
of Android. Therefore, our comparisons across the two versions are still valid.
However, the most significant finding from this study is the introduction of unpre-
dictable environment-dependent errors in Android 4.0. Fig. 4.2 shows that the second,
third and fourth largest exception types in Android 4.0 are android.view.Window
Manager$BadTokenException (26.83%), java.lang.IllegalStateException
(23.56%), and java.lang.RuntimeException (3.12%). These exceptions are almost
non-existent in Android 2.2. A dominant reason for these crashes was garbage collec-
tion, where resources allocated to activities were released—a severe side-effect being
restart of the Android system server. It was observed that the same fuzzed Intent
sent to the same component at a different time point in the experiment did not always
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Fig. 4.2.: Distribution of different types of (uncaught) exceptions in Android 2.2 and
4.0. The bars represent percentage of all the exceptions, thus will sum to 100 (for
each Android version). Note that we do not include Marketplace apps for this study.
cause the failure, or caused a different failure. The exact manifestation depended on
the state of the device (the Emulator of the device to be more precise).
Another important point to note for Android 2.2 is the presence of exceptions that
are typically thrown by the framework to notify the calling component of erroneous
input or state, e.g., java.lang.IllegalArgumentException, java.lang.Security
Exception, java.lang.UnsupportedOperationException etc. It is the responsi-
bility of the calling function to implement proper exception handling, however such
behavior is often missing in standard Android components.
System Crash from User Level Applications
Another significant discovery from our experiments was the cascading failure of
the Android runtime system. We found a total of three Activities in the built-in
applications that caused Android’s system server to restart. Due to the sensitive
nature of these bugs and their potential security impact on millions of Droid users,
we shall not disclose the names of the applications or the Activities in this forum.
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Fig. 4.3.: Partial stack trace of crash of ActivityX, which eventually causes the entire
device to crash
Instead, we use the generic name ActivityX for purposes of explanation. All of the
failures occurred due to NullPointerExceptions. Upon inspection of the configu-
ration files of these activities, it was revealed that all these activities run under the
“system” process of Android (i.e. system server). When these activities tried to
access some fields inside an Intent, they did not catch the NullPointerException,
which crashed the current thread and eventually sent Signal 9 (SIGKILL) to Android
system server. A special concern is that to test these components JarJarBinks did
not need any extra permission at install time. Thus, potentially, any user level ap-
plication is capable of sending the malformed Intents to these vulnerable Activities,
causing the entire device to crash. Such promiscuous use of privileged operations is
a concern for millions of customers using Android 2.2/2.3 handsets.
Fig. 4.4.: Code responsible for crash of ActivityX, which eventually causes the entire
device to crash
Let us take a look at the stack trace for one of these crashes. This crash occurred
when we sent an Intent
{act=ACTION PACKAGE DATA CLEARED cmp= android/.ActivityX} to the Activity.
The stack trace for this crash (refer Fig. 4.3) showed an error at line 58 of the source
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file ActivityX.java. The relevant code snippet is shown in Fig. 4.4. This code tries
to read the extra field EXTRAS ACCOUNT. However, since our Intent did not specify an
Extras field, it raises a NullPointerException. This uncaught NPE kills the thread
of this activity and eventually the process, which, in this case, is system server.
The problem can be avoided by verifying that the extras object in line 57 is not
null before accessing it, or by handling the exception gracefully. The severity of this
bug lies in its ability to crash Android system server, in other words, to render the
device unusable till the Android runtime is restarted.
4.3.2 Results for Implicit Intents
In experiment A, we sent implicit Intents that applications had opted in to
receive but we left all unspecified fields blank, e.g., when a filter only restricts
the Action, there is no Category, Data, or Extras field set. Overall, the HTC
phone had 211 applications registered from which we could derive 1910 Intent-filters.
For each Intent-filter, we sent out exactly one Intent matching the filter through
startActivity(). Note that some of these Intent-filters are registered by Services,
hence, sending a matching Intent through startActivity() simply results in an
ActivityNotFoundException. Those Intents that were delivered to an application,
crashed 5 of the recipients. 12 unexpected exceptions occurred during the experiment,
which are exceptions other than ActivityNotFound or any flavor of security excep-
tion. Most frequent exception was once again the NullPointerException followed
by IOException and Resources$NotFoundException. All three are the result of in-
sufficient input validation either causing a missing value to get dereferenced (NPE)
or, even worse, propagated as an argument to a IO or resource loading call. At the
end of the experiment, the phone crashed with a system reboot in 50% of the cases
due to cascading failures. Even though the number of failures is not large relative
to the number of applications tested, it has to be pointed out that all Intents we
sent are completely valid according to what a sender is able to find out through the
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Intent-filters. The problem arises from the fact that there is a significant amount of
unspecified assumptions about the Intents that the receivers take for granted and fail
to verify (e.g., a specific information in the Extras data being present).
Experiment B goes a step further by combining all valid combination of Action
and Category, thereby, significantly enlarging the number of Intents sent.
From the Intent-filters, we were able to derive 643 distinct Actions and 37
Categories that were used in at least one of the filters. For each application, we
now generated all possible combinations of Action and Category that were valid
according to the filter. The experiment consistently crashed the phone after 26 out
of the 211 applications tested. This happened even though we set the delay between
the Intents to 2 seconds to allow for manual interaction (e.g., closing dialog boxes)
and thereby avoiding resource exhaustion.
From this small set of 26 tested applications, we observed 83 exceptions. The dis-
tribution of the specific exception types is shown in Table 4.2 with NullPointerExcep
-tion and IOException again being the most frequent ones. Overall, 14 applications
crashed during the experiment and showed a dialog to the user and only half of them
were actually targeted directly, i.e., were the applications from which the filter was
derived. The majority of the applications (including basic apps like Clock, Inter-
net, Gallery, etc.) were most likely affected due to collateral failures, e.g., an Intent
matching more than one filter and getting routed to more than one component.
4.3.3 Discussions
Our experiments have so far revealed three important aspects of Android—first
is the presence of many components with poor exception handling code (most of
these relate to NullPointerExceptions), second is the prevalence of environment-
dependent errors in Android 4.0, and third is the presence of privileged components
with unrestricted access. The first problem can be addressed by a methodical training
of developers on good exception handling practices. Application developers should
57












always check for exceptional conditions when dealing with inputs (Intents) from ex-
ternal sources. Resolution of the second and third problems need more work at the
Android framework level. The third issue also exposes some potential problems with
Android’s default policy for process-assignment of an application component. At
present a component X in application A can run in the process of application B if A
and B are signed with the same developer key. Despite signature-based permissions,
this may pose a problem for vendors that build custom ROMs. If a component (C)
of this custom build is permitted to run as privileged process, it may wreak havoc
like ActivityX in a similar fashion (note that component C and the kernel of this
build are signed with the same key). A potential solution is to restrict accessibility of
component C with an explicit permission, in other words, every component running
in a privileged process must be protected by explicit permissions.
JJB Limitations: Apart from its handling of new tasks and alert dialogues
(where a tester must manually close these), JJB has another limitation—it cannot
distinguish between thread hang, resource exhaustion, and UI wait. Detecting thread
hangs in response to a malformed Intent would require knowledge of a component’s
life cycle which is currently not visible in logs generated by logcat. Our future work
would look into adding this capability in JJB.
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4.4 Suggestions for Robust IPC
The key challenge in making Intents more robust is the lack of a formal schema.
Intents are effectively untyped; their application-level type is only determined by
a String identifier but is not reflected by the Java type system. Therefore, there
is no explicit contract between a sender and a receiver of an Intent and mutual
agreement is expected among the two about what format of data a specific Intent
needs to have and what an invalid message is. Additional data is stored in a map-like
data structure that is not fully type safe either. The data structure keeps separate
key spaces for values of different types and provides typed methods for adding and
retrieving data but it is again not formally specified what the expected additional
values are and which type they are supposed to have. It is up to the author of the
receiver code to perform the input validation, which is a repetitive and error-prone
task. To make matters worse, primitive types are stored and retrieved as actual
primitives, which means that in the absence of the value the result is the neutral
element of the type, e.g., false in the case of a boolean value. The absence of a
primitive value in the extra data is therefore not detectable by the receiver. Another
problem arises from software evolution. Implicit message formats are hard to keep
consistent across different versions of the applications, especially within an ecosystem
where components are contributed by different sources. There is no way to version a
specific Intent or to indicate compatibility between a sender and a receiver.
4.4.1 Subtyping/POJO Approach
One way to make the message format more explicit and therefore possible to
capture for an automated message verification system is to use subclasses for Intents
instead of a single flat type. Extra data belonging to a message would be expressed
as fields of the subtype. In the spirit of Plain Old Java Objects (POJOs), there
would be getters and setters for the field. As a side effect, the Java compiler can now
do automatic type checking since the messages use a type schema that the compiler
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is able to understand and enforce. What this approach does not achieve is further
constraints on the values of data. For instance, there is no way to enforce a certain
reference-type value to be not null or a numeric value to be always smaller than
10. Furthermore, there is currently no way in Java to express version information
of classes in a standardized and accessible way. The cost for using the subtyping
approach is that the total footprint of the platform is slightly increased since every
Intent type now becomes a separate class in a separate file.
With a little experiment we found that a single class (subclass of Intent) with 3
fields (String, int, URL) having bean-like setters and getters adds 273 bytes to the
footprint of an Android application, while the increase in size for a class with 6 fields
is 403 bytes. Considering a handset where we have 200 Intent types, this implies a
80KB additional footprint for turning all these Intents into Subtypes with 6 fields.
We argue that this is, in fact, an upper bound on footprint increase since we consider
average 4-6 fields per Intent. In reality, most Intents have only between 2-3 fields,
with few having a large number of fields (e.g., informative Intents like Battery Status).
4.4.2 Java Annotations
One way to express additional constraints about the message format when choos-
ing the subtyping approach is the use of Java Annotations. Annotations are fully
embedded into the language (since Java 1.5) and can be processed by the Java com-
piler. Therefore, it is possible to use the annotations already at compile time for
criteria that are amenable to static checking. For dynamic checks, the corresponding
code can either be realized as a common generic checker facility implemented as part
of the Intent delivery mechanism of the platform or synthesized and injected into
Intent receivers.
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4.4.3 IDL and Domain Specific Language
Extended input validation requires additional knowledge about the message for-
mat since the semantic gap between the implicit message format and what can ex-
plicitly be expressed by classes and the Java type system is still large. For instance,
an Intent responsible for a contact lookup might want to be able to do approximate
matching and return the contact names together with a matching factor between zero
and one. In the Java type system, it would have to use a float type for the latter
data but thereby would extend the range of permitted values to the entire IEEE 754
floating point number range. Another example is the problem that every reference
type can always be set to null so that there is no way to express mandatory data in
messages. One way to more expressiveness is to use a domain specific language to
express the schema of the Intents.
Historically, a similar approach has been taken with many RPC systems which
used an interface definition language (IDL). This IDL describes exactly the format
of a remote invocation in enough detail so that the stub and skeleton code can be
synthesized from this description. Systems like CORBA extensively used IDLs but
arguably also web services employ the same principle, e.g., through the WSDL files.
For instance, a type system like XML Schema allows value restrictions and would
be a viable candidate for a domain specific language approach to specifying Intents.
A well-designed domain specific language can express any type of constraint and
therefore permit full input validation including version checks.
There are two different possibilities to interface general-purpose languages with
domain-specific languages. External DSLs are free-standing and independent of the
host language. IDLs, for instance, are external DSLs. As a result, however, code
written in the host language and the meta-data written in the DSL have to be devel-
oped independently and cannot easily be cross-validated by existing tools. Internal
or embedded DSLs are themselves implemented in the host language and therefore
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agree much better with existing tools. They are, however, restricted to what the host
language can express.
4.5 Directions for Future Research
In this chapter, we presented the design and implementation of JarJarBinks (JJB),
a tool for testing the robustness of Android’s IPC primitives. With the help of JJB,
we found a large number of exception handling bugs (some of which even crashed
the runtime system) in various versions of Android. Despite its success JJB had
few limitations—i) Since JJB is a user-space application, it could not automatically
close alert dialogues or new processes. This made our testing process semi-manual.
ii) JJB cannot distinguish between thread hang, resource exhaustion, and UI wait.
Detecting thread hangs in response to a malformed Intent would require knowledge
of a component’s life cycle which is currently not visible in logs generated by logcat.
Both of these may be solved by implementing JJB in the ActivityManager layer.
However, such changes would require the users to have root access on their phones.
Based on these observations, we find several exciting research directions for im-
proving smartphone dependability.
1. Extending JJB by Instrumenting ActivityManager: By moving parts of JJB
in ActivityManager we can perform several new tests that were not possible
with a user-space app. Examples are: testing for thread hangs and testing
components that require authentication tokens (e.g. Facebook or Twitter apps
in our experiments). By bypassing the authentication phases of these apps
and intercepting network traffic, we can test these components more rigorously.
However, the downside of moving JJB in ActivityManager is that it would
require changes in firmware of the tested phones.
2. Robustness of Mobile Payment Services: In recent times, both Android and
iPhone have introduced their mobile payment systems (Google Wallet and Apple
Pay respectively). These present lucrative targets for hackers and malware
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writers (note that owner of the phone himself may be the adversary against these
services). Few existing research show security vulnerabilities of such payment
APIs, however, the robustness of these applications and (cloud-based) services
are not well understood. This present a promising direction for dependability
research.
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5. OVERVIEW OF CLOUD SERVICES
Cloud Computing, which started as a way to maximize server utilization and reduce
IT costs, has evolved into a ground-breaking technology changing our everyday lives.
Amazon Web Service got its start in 2006 and from then to now, it has grown to
revenues of $2.25B in 2013 and store 2 trillion objects by Q2 of 2013 [39]. This
statistic, although representative of the growth in the overall cloud adoption, only
shows a small fraction of cloud utilization in the public domain. Benefits provided
by cloud services such as massive scalability, on-demand provisioning (elasticity), and
reduced operational cost have enticed small and large businesses alike.
Cloud computing provides high efficiency in part by multiplexing multiple cus-
tomer workloads onto a single physical machine. Access to the CPU is given to mul-
tiple virtual machines (VMs) in the form of virtual CPUs (vcpu). To share compute
resources fairly, each vcpu is given a pre-specified amount of scheduler credits. Simi-
larly, physical memory (RAM) of the computer is also shared among VMs, typically in
an on-demand basis. Often, physical resources of the servers are overcommitted (i.e.
the sum of virtual resources assigned to VMs is greater than the physical resources)
with the assumption that all VMs do not utilize their requested resources to the full
extent simultaneously. Server Virtualization, the key enabling technology underlying
infrastructure clouds (IaaS), has seen a staggering amount of research in recent years
leading to many excellent algorithms for efficient sharing of cpu and memory [40,41].
However, with this efficiency comes performance interference. When two VMs exe-
cute on the same physical machine, they not only contend for cpu and memory but
also contend for low level hardware resources such as cache, memory bandwidth, io
bandwidth etc.. Existing hardware and software virtualization mechanisms do not
provide perfect isolation for sharing these resources resulting in serious concerns about
unpredictable application performance in the cloud. Our work primarily deals with
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such performance issues and helps improve application performance in the face of
resource contention.
5.1 Overview of Cloud Dynamics
An IaaS cloud is a dynamic environment, where virtual machines are frequently
created, cloned and deleted. Further, the resources allocated to virtual machines are
transparently modified using VM live resizing and virtual machines migrated from one
host to another using dynamic live migration [42]. In theory, virtualization promises
perfect isolation between virtual machines. In practice, an application running in
a VM can get impacted by cache contention [43] or network contention [44]. Page
sharing mechanisms and lack of reservation for memory bandwidth may further lead
to lack of isolation across virtual machines [45].
This lack of isolation combined with frequent VM resizings and VM live migration
lead to frequent changes in the environment for a VM. Verma et al. [46] report that
an average of 25% of all virtual machines may get migrated in a 2 hour period due
to dynamic consolidation. The impact of co-located VMs and VM resource settings
on an application is captured by operating context, first introduced in [47].
Definition 1 An operating context of an application captures the impact on a virtual
machine due to the environment outside the virtual machine. The operating context
for a VM VMi is defined as a 2-tuple consisting of the physical host H(VMi) and the
set of co-located VMs VMj on the host.
Static environments have a fixed operating context, whereas VM creation, cloning,
deletion, and live migration lead to frequent changes in the operating context for an
application running in the cloud.
Similarly, we define the resource context of a VM as the resource assigned to the
virtual machine.
Definition 2 Resource Context for a virtual machine captures the resources assigned
to a VM and consists of the CPU and memory entitled to the VM.
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A VM’s resource context changes when it uses live resizing. This is usually more
prevalent is private cloud platforms but is rarely seen in public clouds such as EC2.
5.2 Performance Interference in Cloud
Performance isolation in multicore systems has traditionally been a hard problem
since partitioning low level hardware resources, such as cache and memory bandwidth
is not only challenging but also has high overhead. For example, to partition cache or
memory bandwidth, the controllers of these subsystems would need to maintain a list
of all running VMs, their current allocations, and resource demands. Fundamentally,
the cache and memory controllers are at a much lower level in the system stack than
VMs and therefore, allowing visibility of VM resource issues to these controllers will
need a profound re-design of the system stack. Such a solution will also reduce the
overall utilization of the resources, which is particularly important considering that
these resources are more scarce than the resources for which isolation works well. For
example, the latest generation Intel i7 processor has 12 MB of L3 cache, compared to
memories of several GBs which are standard on even low-end servers. Contention for
these shared hardware resources can, therefore, lead to variable performance across
VMs. We define performance interference in cloud as follows.
Definition 3 Performance interference in cloud platforms is defined as the situation
where performance of a VM (application response time or throughput) suffers due to
the activity of other VM(s) co-located on the same physical machine.
For example, if two VMs A and B are running on the same physical machine and
A starts using a larger share of the memory bandwidth, then throughput of B may
degrade. Note, that the cause of performance anomaly is external to the affected VM
B and beyond its control. Performance interference can be considered as a special
case of change in operating context (or effect thereof) defined earlier.
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5.2.1 Effect of Interference
Several existing papers have highlighted the problem of interference due to con-
tention of shared resources and their extent of performance degradation [13,48,49]. [13]
reports that contention between two network intensive VMs can increase benchmark
runtime upto 2x, while disk-disk and cache-cache contention can increase runtimes
by 4.5x and 5.5x respectively. Another interesting observation here is that a network
intensive VM can degrade performance of a cache intensive VM by upto 7x. We found
similar results in our experiments, where a cache intensive benchmark can increase
average response time of a web server from a fraction of a second (10−1) to several sec-
onds. End customers in today’s commodity clouds have no way of efficiently dealing
with such interference except hoping that the cloud providers detect such interference
and take action. For example, Amazon EC2 does not allow customers to migrate their
VMs to less busy servers. An alternative in EC2 is to run a VM on a dedicated host,
thereby, nearly eliminating performance interference (note that storage and network
contention may still exist) and side-channel attacks—but this comes at a significantly
higher price.
5.2.2 Existing Solutions for Interference Mitigation
Existing solutions primarily try to solve the problem from the point of view of a
cloud operator. The core techniques used by these solutions include a combination of
one or more of the following: a) Scheduling, b) Live migration, c) Resource contain-
ment. Research on novel scheduling policies look at the problem at two abstraction
levels. Cluster schedulers (consolidation managers) try to optimally place VMs on
physical machines such that there is minimal resource contention among VMs on the
same physical machine [16]. For example, it will try to schedule two VMs that are
running network-hungry applications on different physical machines. Novel hypervi-
sor schedulers [14] try to schedule VM threads so that only non-contending threads
run in parallel. An example may be the following execution schedule: a cpu intensive
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VM can be running parallely with an IO intensive VM, whereas two IO intensive
VMs are run at different time slices. Another approach in scheduling is to allocate
extra time slices to suffering VMs to minimize lost work [17]. Live migration involves
moving a VM from a busy physical machine to a free machine when interference is
detected [15]. Resource containment is generally applicable to containers such as
LXC, where the cpu cycles allocated to batch jobs is reduced when interference is
detected [50,51].
However, all these approaches have their shortcomings. Firstly, a VM’s resource
usage pattern may change over time, often unpredictably. A consolidation manager
(cluster scheduler) cannot foresee such usage changes without knowing of the applica-
tions running within the VM, and that is usually considered too intrusive and hence,
not made available to the consolidation manager. Secondly, all these approaches re-
quire access to the hypervisor (or kernel in case of LXC), which is beyond the scope
of a cloud consumer. These solutions need to be incorporated by cloud providers
in their virtualization infrastructure. We found that, despite having (arguably the
best of) schedulers, the public cloud service, Amazon Web Service, shows significant
amount of interference as we show in Section 6.2.
Solutions that use live migration for avoiding interference have their drawbacks
as well. In [46], the authors show that VM live migration is very resource intensive,
especially when the source server is highly loaded. Live migration in such a scenario
is often long drawn and fails frequently. Further, it significantly impacts application
performance during the migration. So, it is not suitable to deal with short-lived
interference, which we observe is prevalent in EC2.
We therefore need to find practical solutions that do not require modification of the
hypervisor. We observe that, to improve application performance during interference,
we must reduce contention for the shared resources. One approach to achieve this
would be to reconfigure the affected application in a manner that reduces its load. We
found that standard web servers and application servers have several configuration
parameters that allow an administrator to control its load. We use these parameters
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to build our interference mitigation framework. In the next two chapters, we show
that this is indeed a practical solution with promising results.
5.3 Web Services in Cloud
In this dissertation, we focus on improving the performance of cloud applications
that are latency sensitive. More specifically, we consider the response times of web
service applications. We selected web services as our preferred application domain
for two primary reasons. First, web applications constitute a large portion of cloud
workload. [52] reports that nearly 25% of all ip-addresses in Amazon EC2 host a pub-
lic website. Our interference-aware configuration manager has the potential to reduce
a large fraction of performance anomalies of these websites in the face of interference.
Second, web applications and middleware components typically have a large number
of tunable parameters with known performance benefits. For example, 2 of the pa-
rameters (MaxClients1 and KeepaliveTimeout) that we use for reconfiguration in
IC2, has been used by researchers [20] for tuning Apache in other contexts.
5.3.1 Web Application Configurations
Enterprise web applications typically follow a three-tier architecture consisting of a
Front-end Server, an Application Server, and a Database Server. The front end server
receives web requests from clients, while the application server processes the request,
fetches results from the database and sends the desired responses back. We use the
Apache Httpd server as our front-end server and Php runtime engine (Php-fpm)
as our application server. In this dissertation, we argue that optimal configuration
parameters of these applications and middleware depend on the operating context in
which they are running.
Apache web server (HTTP server version 2.4) has 258 configuration directives
(Only counting the directives in the core, the base, and the multi-threaded module.)
1These are concurrency and timeout related parameters in Apache httpd server.
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Adjusting these configuration parameters in a non-virtualized environment is difficult
enough—for example, the configuration may need to change with the type of workload
and the intensity of the workload. This task becomes even more challenging when the
reconfiguration has to be done at runtime in response to changes in other customer’s
applications over which the service consumer has no control. We next highlight the
configuration parameters that are adjusted by our interference mitigation engine. It
may be noted that the parameters we select are generic thread-pool management pa-
rameters and are applicable to a wide variety of multi-threaded enterprise middleware.
MaxClients: MaxClients (MXC) captures the maximum number of parallel threads
the web server employs to serve requests. This is typically configured based on
the workload intensity, number of hardware threads available on the physical server,
and its RAM capacity. Virtualization replaces hardware threads by virtualized cpus
(vcpu), and provisions memory dynamically based on VM activity. Presence of co-
located VMs may change actual number of hardware threads or physical memory
available to a web server impacting performance.
KeepaliveTimeout: KeepaliveTimeout (KAT) indicates how long a web server
would keep an idle client connection in its connection pool (typically occupying a
thread). KeepaliveTimeout is known to be sensitive to the nature of web application
and users’ browsing patterns. We found it is sensitive to both operating context and
resource context changes.
PhpMaxChildren: We refer to pm.max children parameter of Php fastcgi process
manager (php-fpm) as PhpMaxChildren (PHP) in this dissertation. This defines the
maximum number of threads used by the Php interpreter. PhpMaxChildren generally
has high sensitivity to resource context and low sensitivity to operating context.
Our interference mitigation tools (IC2 and ICE) update these three parameters
autonomously to maintain stable application performance.
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5.4 Overview of Load Balancers
Load balancers are used to scale websites to serve larger number of users by dis-
tributing load among multiple servers. Existing research on load balancing can be
primarily categorized into two orthogonal problems: i) Routing: How to redirect
or route traffic for a web server to its internal “real” servers transparently and effi-
ciently? ii) Scheduling: How to decide which server would get the current request
so that the servers have equal load?
There are many load balancing solutions that are available in the market. A major-
ity of these operate at the network layer and tries to balance network load between
servers. Both IBM and Cisco have commercially available hardware load balancers
that provide high availability and good performance. Among the open source soft-
ware load balancers, HAProxy [53] and Linux Virtual Server (LVS) [54] are popular
choices. These two load balancers have complementary features which are good for
different situations. While Linux Virtual Server operate at layer 4 of the network
stack (transport), HAProxy operate at layer 7 (i.e. application). LVS is therefore
good at network load balancing, whereas, HAProxy can understand http requests
and balance application sessions across servers. Another key difference between the
two is that LVS operate at Kernel level (by using custom modules that have been
integrated with Linux mainline), but HAProxy operate at application level. Both
these load balancers implement four major scheduling policies. These are:
Round Robin (RR): Each server is picked in a circular order.
Least Connection (LC): Server with the least number of active connections are
chosen. This is better than round robin in general since it considers server state
(num connections).
Weighted Round Robin (WRR): This policy helps when servers have unequal
capacity. The scheduler picks a server based on its weight. For example if servers
S1, .., Sn have weights w1, .., wn, then Sk is chosen if wk = max(w1, .., wn). Note that
weight wk is reduced every time a server is selected, hence it keeps track of how many
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requests a given server has served so far. When all the servers have weight 0 they are
reset to their initial values.
Weighted Least Connection (WLC): Similar to LC, but server weight is also con-
sidered for scheduling decision. If Wi is the weight of server i and Ci is the current
number of connections to it, then the scheduler picks server j for the next request
such that, Cj/Wj = min{Ci/Wi}, i=[1, .., n].
In rest of the paper, we use the terms RR and WRR (LC and WLC) synonymously
since the concept of weight is often implicit. Apart from these there are also load
balancing policies that are based on source address of a client. In this case, an ap-
propriate hash function is used to map the source address to a server. Often load
balancing policies also consider geographical location of a client and forwards the
request to the server farm that is closest to the client location. Such policies are
typically implemented by a DNS based load balancing, where the same domain name
maps to different IP addresses.
Once a client session has been established, the load balancer remembers which
server is processing requests originating from that client. In HAProxy, the session
mapping is performed by inserting a cookie SERV ER ID in the HTTP header.
When HAProxy finds the cookie in a new request, it directly forwards the request
to that server instead of computing a destination. In LVS, a connection table is
maintained which maps a given client to a server. If an entry exists in this table, LVS
uses the same server for sending subsequent requests. Note that this is required since
most web servers maintain sessions and relevant application state locally.
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6. MITIGATING INTERFERENCE USING
MIDDLEWARE RECONFIGURATION
Application performance has been and remains one of top five concerns since the
inception of cloud computing. A primary determinant of application performance is
multi-tenancy or sharing of hardware resources in clouds. While some hardware re-
sources can be partitioned well among VMs (such as CPUs), many others cannot (such
as memory bandwidth). In this chapter, we focus on understanding the variability in
application performance on a cloud and explore ways for an end customer to deal with
it. Based on rigorous experiments using CloudSuite, a popular Web2.0 benchmark,
running on EC2, we found that interference-induced performance degradation is a
reality. On a private cloud testbed, we also observed that interference impacts the
choice of best configuration values for applications and middleware. We posit that
intelligent reconfiguration of application parameters presents a way for an end cus-
tomer to reduce the impact of interference. However, tuning the application to deal
with interference is challenging because of two fundamental reasons — the configura-
tion depends on the nature and degree of interference and there are inter-parameter
dependencies. We design and implement the IC2 system (Interference-aware Cloud
application Configuration) to address the challenges of detection and mitigation of
performance interference in clouds. Compared to an interference-agnostic configu-
ration, the proposed solution provides up to 29% and 40% improvement in average
response time on EC2 and a private cloud testbed respectively.
6.1 Motivation
In the brief history of cloud computing, unpredictable application performance has
been one of the two key issues preventing widespread adoption of the cloud paradigm.
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In a recent survey of IT buyers, about 40% cited application performance as a key
concern [55]. Operational support for critical applications was another key concern
with 40% IT buyers, making performance-related issues two of the top five concerns
for cloud customers.
6.1.1 The Problem
Performance issues in the cloud are often attributed to misconfigurations of virtual
machines (VMs), storage, and networks [47, 56, 57]. Another key reason for perfor-
mance issues, which has not received adequate attention, is imperfect isolation of
hardware resources across multiple VMs. Some resources, such as CPU and memory
can be partitioned among VMs with little interference. However, current hypervisors
do not isolate low level hardware resources, such as cache and memory bandwidth.
Contention for these shared hardware resources leads to variable performance across
VMs—a situation commonly referred to as performance interference (or interference
in short). In the previous chapter, we presented a formal definition of interference
and showed how much performance degradation can be seen during interference (re-
fer Section 5.2). Partitioning low-level hardware resources in software (hypervisor)
will introduce significant overheads and we do not envision that processor caches and
memory bandwidth will be isolated on a per-VM basis in the foreseeable future. We,
therefore, need practical solutions to deal with interferences when such situations
arise.
6.1.2 Existing Solutions
Existing work on handling interference in clouds are driven primarily from a pri-
vate cloud perspective. The key idea is to either schedule interfering VMs at different
points in time on the same host (e.g., [14]) or place interfering VMs on different hosts
(e.g., [15, 16]). The first approach is limited in terms of the choices of VMs available
on a host that can be co-scheduled. The second approach requires frequent live mi-
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grations, which is very resource intensive, especially when the source server is highly
loaded [46]. Live migration in such a scenario is often long drawn and fails frequently.
Further, it significantly impacts application performance during the migration. So, it
is not suitable to deal with short-lived interference, which we observe is prevalent in
EC2. Finally, these approaches are application-oblivious and cannot accurately judge
the real impact on application performance.
6.1.3 Our Solution Approach
In this chapter, we present a complementary approach of handling interference by
application reconfiguration. We argue that an application can mitigate the ill effects of
short-term interference — rise in response time and drop in throughput — by deploy-
ing an intelligent configuration manager. This configuration manager continuously
monitors for interference and when it is observed, reconfigures the application and/or
middleware (e.g., web server, database) to reduce contention for the bottlenecked re-
sources. Our solution gives power in the hands of the application owners, and does
not rely on the infrastructure provider making prompt changes to help the application
with its periods of interference. This is also important because interferences in public
clouds are often short-lived, less than a minute, and therefore application reconfig-
uration, which can be more agile than infrastructure reconfiguration, is particularly
well suited. In this chapter, we make the following key contributions:
1. We rigorously study the performance variability of web-based applications in a
public cloud environment. In this study, we run the CloudSuite [19] benchmark in
Amazon’s EC2 for 100 hours over a 5-day period. We then compare the statistics ob-
tained from these runs with sample runs of CloudSuite in a private cloud testbed. We
observe that CloudSuite has much longer response time distribution in EC2 (ranging
up to 55X of median) than in the local testbed (up to 4X of median) with identical
resource configurations. This validates our hypothesis, that public clouds have high
degree of performance uncertainty.
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2. We conduct a study to understand if applications can be configured to deal with
interference. We observed that an ideal operating configuration for Apache web
server depends on the type and degree of interference. Further, parameters in differ-
ent elements of the software stack depend on each other and the inter-dependency
changes with the degree of interference; and finally, the application performance
curves with the configuration values are discontinuous in places, making traditional
control-theoretic approaches for parameter tuning [20] ineffective. Specifically we
found three parameters corresponding to the degree of concurrency and the time to
live of existing connections to be particularly significant.
3. We present a simple, heuristic-driven configuration manager, IC2, to reconfig-
ure the application upon interference. IC2 solves three key challenges for dynamic
reconfiguration—first, it presents a machine learning based technique for detecting
interference; second, it uses a heuristic-based controller for determining suitable pa-
rameter values during periods of interference; and finally, it reduces the cost of recon-
figuration of standard Apache distributions by implementing an online reconfiguration
option in the Httpd server. A prototype implementation of IC2 was deployed both
in EC2 and our private testbed. The experiments show that IC2can recapture lost
response time by up to 29% in EC2 and 40% in our private testbed.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we verify the
presence of interference in cloud platforms and present a quantitative evaluation of
performance degradation. We next show the impact of interference in a private cloud
testbed and identify how interference changes optimal configuration values for appli-
cations. The design of our proposed solution and performance improvement achieved
by it are highlighted in Sections 6.4 and 6.5. Finally, we conclude the chapter by
discussing few shortcomings of the proposed solution and highlight future research
directions.
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6.2 Is Interference Real?
We performed an experimental study to see if the performance concerns due to
interference are real. Our objectives here are to answer two questions: i) Does an
application suffer from unpredictable latencies in EC2? ii) What happens when a
co-located VM starts accessing memory very fast? To answer the first question, we
ran an application benchmark on Amazon EC2 with a constant workload setting and
collected periodic performance data over 100-hours. We then analyzed the collected
data to detect outliers and see how much performance variability there is. The ap-
plication benchmark we selected for our experiments is CloudSuite, a popular web
application benchmark [19]. CloudSuite internally uses Olio, a social event calendar
application as the base package1. The web server and database of CloudSuite were
installed on separate EC2 VMs each of type m1.large instances (equivalent to 2 vcpus
or 4 EC2 compute units, and 7.5GB memory).
Observations. We see that as a result of interference, there is significant variance in
the performance of Olio on EC2 with regard to the response time (Fig. 6.1(a)), and
correspondingly, the throughput. The median response times in EC2 and the private
testbed were found to be 0.10s and 0.12s respectively. The histogram in Fig. 6.1(a) is
plotted such that the value represents response time between the two marks on the X-
axis, e.g., there are 539 measurement intervals with response times (RT) between 0.5
and 1 sec (which is more than 5X of median RT). In contrast, for a similar experiment
on local testbed (measurements taken over 60 hours) we found the response time was
always < 0.5s (i.e. < 4X of median). The response time distribution in EC2 has a
much longer tail indicating periods of unpredictable performance. In EC2, we also
measured the duration of interference using an outlier detection method as shown in
Equation 6.1. Our results indicate that there are several instances when interference
lasted for 30s or longer, the longest duration being 140s. While these interference
instances are a small portion of the total number of requests, there are two condi-
1In this dissertation, we use the terms “CloudSuite,” “Olio,” and “Application benchmark” inter-
changeably.
77
tions that suggest we need to deal with them—they are unpredictable and therefore,
worst-case provisioning for performance critical applications suggests we must put
in place mechanisms to deal with them; when interferences do happen, they cause
pathologically poor behavior of the application and may push the application into a
“death spiral”. Evidence of death spiral in applications due to transient degradation
has been given in the past, such as, due to overfilling of application queues [58].
| Pi − PN/2 |> C ×median(| {Pi}
N


























Fig. 6.1.: Distribution of response times of Olio running on (a) Amazon’s EC2 (b)
Private cloud. VM resource settings and workload intensity are identical in both
cases. The longer tail in EC2 (ranging up to 55X of median in EC2 compared to 4X
in private cloud) indicate presence of interference.
To answer the second question raised earlier, we ran another set of experiments
both on EC2 and private cloud testbed. The results indicate cache-intensive interfer-
ence from co-located VMs can increase response time of a web server by an order of
magnitude. Our experiments in following sections substantiate this point.
78
6.3 Interference Impacts Optimal Configuration Values
In this section, we endeavor to understand the relationship between optimal con-
figuration values of middlewares and interference. To do so, we ran an extensive
set of experiments with Cloudsuite in a private cloud testbed. We first describe our
experimental setup and then highlight our findings.
6.3.1 Experimental Setup
Hardware. Our private cloud testbed consisted of three Poweredge 320 servers with
Intel Xeon E5-2440 processors. Each server has 6 cores (or 12 hardware threads with
hyperthreading enabled), 15 MB cache and 16 GB memory. We installed the KVM
hypervisor on these machines. We co-located our custom interference VMs on the
same host as the web server, while database VM was run on a separate physical ma-
chine. In this work we focus only on web server performance and over-provisioned
the DB VM to eliminate any DB bottleneck. The database (approx. 1.6GB) was also
loaded in memory to reduce disk contention. The third machine of our setup was
used to run the benchmark driver and rest of the client emulators. All the computers
were connected via a dedicated 1 Gbps switch. Table 6.1 lists the values of different
configurations for each experiment presented in this chapter. It is to be noted that,
we never created contention for CPU and memory on the physical server. With two
interference threads running and 4 vcpus for WS, the physical server’s CPU utiliza-
tion was at the 50% mark or lower for all experiments. Similarly, memory utilization
of the host was never an issue. Our maximum WS memory utilization was well below
3GB for all workloads.
Application Benchmark. The application benchmark we selected for our exper-
iments is CloudSuite, a popular web application benchmark [19]. In our setup,
we hosted Cloudsuite on a multi-threaded Apache server (apache-worker v2.4) and
used Php Fastcgi Process Manager (php-fpm) for dynamic content generation. Our
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setup closely resembles a typical three-tier application with php-fpm v5.3 as the busi-
ness logic (BL) tier. We use identical CloudSuite setup in all our experiments—
homogeneous VMs with Ubuntu 12.04/Apache 2.4/php-fpm 5.3/Java 1.7. Cloud-
Suite uses the Faban harness to emulate clients. Client emulation is done using a
pre-defined distribution (negative exponential) of think times and operation mixes as
defined in [59]. Workload size is given in terms of #concurrent clients.
Interfering Application. We emulated interference from co-located VMs by run-
ning two different benchmarks–LLC-Probe and Dcopy–on two VMs (also referred to
as interference VMs). Dcopy is an application under the BLAS [60] benchmark suite,
which copies contents of a source array to a destination array. LLCProbe [13] creates
an LLC (Last Level Cache) sized array in memory and then accesses each cache line
very frequently. Both Dcopy and LLCProbe are cache intensive, however, rate of cache
access is higher in LLCProbe than in Dcopy. Moreover, by using Dcopy with a large
array size we can also emulate memory bandwidth contention. Interferences of this
type may arise in reality if a co-located VM runs data mining applications like Hadoop
or even under periodic consolidation operations. Earlier work has shown [13,46] that
such interferences are a routine occurrence in present-day cloud infrastructures.
Parameter Selection. In our experiments and subsequent evaluations, we consider
three key configuration parameters – MaxClients (MXC) and KeepaliveTimeout
(KAT) from Apache web server2 and pm.max children from Php runtime. These
parameters greatly impact Apache’s web application performance [20].
MaxClients captures the maximum number of parallel threads the web server
employs to serve requests. This is typically configured based on the workload intensity,
number of hardware threads available on the physical server, and its RAM capacity.
KeepaliveTimeout indicates how long a web server would keep an idle client
connection in its connection pool (typically occupying a thread).
2We use the terms Apache and Httpd synonymously to identify the Apache web server.
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pm.max children defines the maximum number of threads used by the Php in-
terpreter. We refer to pm.max children as PhpMaxChildren in this dissertation.
It is pertinent to note that these parameters are generic thread-pool manage-
ment parameters and have their counterparts in most commercial server distributions
making our study applicable to most enterprise middleware (e.g. thread pool size in
Glassfish).
Metric Collection. CloudSuite (Olio) uses Faban harness to emulate clients and
generates high level benchmark metrics for each run (Response Time and Through-
put). For each data point in our plots (i.e. a given setting of configuration values
or workload) we consider an average of three runs. Each run lasted for 10 minutes
(excluding ramp-down) of which last 5 minutes were considered as steady state and
reported. The experimental VMs were rebooted after each run to clear any state.
For monitoring hardware performance counters we started oprofile [61], a low over-
head profiler, on the hypervisor of the web server VM. We use the observation that
a guest VM in KVM is represented as a qemu process in the hypervisor. We used
oprofile to monitor the hardware events corresponding to the qemu process of the WS
VM. We next report some of our key experimental results.
6.3.2 Impact of Interference on Middleware Configurations
In this experiment, we evaluate the impact of interference on the choice of optimal
values for the three parameters—MaxClients, KeepaliveTimeout in Apache and
PhpMaxChildren in Php-fpm. For each of these parameters, we ran the web server
with different interference intensity - LLCProbe with array size of 15MB and Dcopy
with array sizes 15MB and 1.5GB. Due to its fast cache access, LLCProbe emulates
a strong interference, while Dcopy 15MB emulates a low interference. With Dcopy
size of 1.5GB we emulate contention for both cache and memory bandwidth, and its
overall effect is that of a moderate interference. Here a Dcopy size of 0.0MB implies
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Table 6.1.: Summary of WS VM config. and parameters during different experiments. Values with asterisk(*) are reconfig-
ured with IC2.
Experiment # Vcpus Memory(GB) MaxClients KeepaliveTimeout PhpMaxChildren Load Size
Sec. 6.3.2 4 4.5 Variable 5 1000 1500
Sec. 6.3.2 4 4.5 1700 Variable 1000 1500
Sec. 6.3.3 4 4.5 Variable Variable 1000 1500
Sec. 6.2,6.5 2 7.5 650* 5* 50* 550
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a run where no interference benchmark was run (baseline). For each interference
intensity, we varied one parameter of Apache while the other was set to an observed
good value. Run configurations for each experiment can be seen from Table 6.1.
For all the experiments, we kept the workload intensity (#concurrent clients) to a
fixed value of 1500 which was found to be lower than the saturation point of the web
server3. Note that although we have a constant number of concurrent clients, Faban























Response Time vs MaxClients
(a) Response Time vs. MXC
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Response Time vs KeepaliveTimeout
(b) Response Time vs. KAT
Fig. 6.2.: Choice of optimal parameter values with varying Dcopy and LLCProbe. For
all experiments, #concurrent clients is 1500, chosen default values are MXC =
1700, KAT = 5, and PHP = 1000. In each experiment, one of the parameters are
varied while others are kept constant at their default values.
Figure 6.2(a) show the choice of optimal MaxClients (MXC) values for different
interference intensities. In the baseline case (Dcopy 0MB), best response time can
be obtained by setting MXC to 1700. However, the optimal value reduces to 1100
for Dcopy-1.5GB and LLC-15MB. Interestingly, with a smaller interference of Dcopy-
15MB, the optimal value increased to 2000 (although the gain in response time was
3We define saturation point to be the minimum workload intensity when the web server exhausts
its cpu or memory capacity.
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small compared to at 1700). Even though all the curves show concave nature before
saturation, they diverge from each other significantly clearly highlighting a change in
the operating environment.
It can also be seen that interference causes the response time of WS to go up from
fraction of a second (< 0.5s) to several seconds. If we keep MXC constant at the
baseline optimal value of 1700 (refer Fig. 6.2(a)), with LLCProbe it increases up to
2.5s. However, with a different MXC value (1100), this degradation can be limited
to only 1.5s. One may argue that we can always keep MXC fixed at 1100, but this
wastes server resources (e.g. baseline throughput at 1100 is 13% lower than that at
1700). A better alternative is to configure it for the dominant case (no-interference)
and to reconfigure when interference is detected.
Effect on KeepaliveTimeout
We found similar results for variable KeepaliveTimeout (KAT) which suggests
different optimal KAT values for varying interference intensity (refer Fig. 6.2(b)). For
this experiment, we kept the MXC value fixed at the optimal baseline MXC value of
1700 and varied KAT from 2 to 40 seconds. The curves show very different patterns
with varying interference intensity. In the baseline case, increasing KAT beyond 5s
increases response time. On the other hand, with strong interferences increasing KAT
reduces response time significantly. Based on this, one may argue that we can always
keep KAT fixed at a high value (e.g. 20). We see from the plot that such a choice is
suboptimal for no-interference; it also shows poor throughput. As a general rule we
found that interference from co-located VMs increases the optimal KAT value. This
emphasizes that a web application needs to reconfigure its KAT value in the presence
of interference and finding the optimal is a non-trivial problem.
Due to space limitations we only present the key findings of varying PhpMaxChildren
(PHP). In general, increasing PHP had almost no impact in no-interference response
time. We therefore choose a low PHP value (100) with lower memory footprint
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as the no-interference optima. With interference, optimal response time is seen for
PhpMaxChildren= 800 or higher although the performance improvement is smaller
compared to MaxClients. Interested readers may find the details in [62].
Table 6.2 presents a summary of our observations about optimality of parameters
and the relationship with interference. Each cell in this table summarizes the impact
of interference on the optima of a given parameter (whether it increases or decreases)
and the degree of impact this parameter has on performance (high or low).
Table 6.2.: Summary of our experiments on evaluating the impact of interference on
optimal parameter values.
Application runtime Apache and Php
Operating context
changes
Cache, memory bandwidth pressure
General impact on optimal configuration values
Context MXC KAT PMC
No interference
Initial value High Low Low
With Interference Decrease Increase Increase
Performance Impact High High Low
Memory Pressure Decrease Increase Decrease
Performance Impact High High High
6.3.3 Change in Inter-parameter Dependency
In this section, we answer a commonly asked question on configuration management–
are two parameters independent? We verify this with the specific example of two
parameters that had the most profound effect on the performance of our benchmark
applications, namely, MaxClients and KeepaliveTimeout. We find that dependency
does exist between these parameters and it changes with interference.
For this experiment, we varied both MXC and KAT for the Apache server under
two scenarios. In the first, we ran the web server with no interference, while in
the second, we ran it with LLCProbe-15MB. We found that the nature of curves
changed significantly across these experiments (refer figures 6.3(a) and 6.3(b)). For
the case with no interference, the curves generally have a negative slope, while with
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interference, the curves display both positive and negative slopes. Choice of optimal
KAT for a given MXC is significantly different in the two. As a general observation,
we find that lower KAT is better at baseline while higher KAT is better during
interference.
One may argue that the following simple equation suffices to determine KAT value
for a given MXC:
KAT = MXC/#new connections/sec
However, this does not work well during interference. For example, during interfer-
ence, if we reduce MXC then according to this formula we should also reduce KAT to
maintain a constant connection rate. But such an action would further increase load
on the server. Due to shorter KAT, a larger fraction of established client connections
would time out, necessitating new connection establishment. A better alternative is
to be aware of interference and select a different value for #new connections. This
emphasizes the need for the tuning algorithm to be context aware. Depending on the















































Response Time vs MaxClients
(b) With LLCProbe
Fig. 6.3.: (a–b) Response Time vs. MXC with varying KAT. Dependency between
MaxClients and KeepaliveTimeout changes with interference.
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6.3.4 Interference and Web Server Capacity
In the previous section, we found that interference has a significant impact on the
response time of a web server. In this section, we ask ourselves what is the root cause
for such increase? To answer this question, we analyzed the system metrics obtained
from the previous experiments (Section 6.3.2). We also evaluated the impact of
































(b) CPI of WS-VM
Fig. 6.4.: Effects of interference. Here we identify system level bottlenecks that causes
response time to increase by an order.
Interference increases CPU utilization of WS-VM. We found that for a mem-
ory allocation of 4.5GB, the WS was never constrained for memory. But the cpu
utilization (Fig. 6.4(a)) values showed significant bottleneck. It can be seen that for
a given choice of MaxClients, the IdleCPU values for with-interference curves are
lower than baseline. Note that the IdleCPU values are virtual utilization measured
inside the WS VM. Intuitively, for a constant workload this should remain fixed ir-
respective of the functioning of a co-resident VM. To understand this behavior, we
measured the CPI (cycles per instruction retired) values for the WS VM with vary-
ing degrees of interference. Due to the large number of cache misses induced by the
interference VM, the WS VM uses more of its cpu cycles fetching data from memory
to cache and consequently the CPI increases. It can be seen from Fig. 6.4(b) that
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the CPI values for the WS with interference is between 2 and 2.25, whereas, baseline
CPI is only 1.5. It implies that, on average, a WS thread takes longer time to finish
execution. The overall effect is that a larger fraction of the WS VM’s time slice is
occupied by some busy thread. This is reflected as increased cpu utilization inside
the guest VM.
Interference increases active memory of WS-VM. Similar to Section 6.3.4, we
found active memory of the web server increased during interference. This happens
since with interference, Apache threads are active for a longer duration on aver-
age (higher response time). Note that an active Apache thread has larger memory
footprint than in an idle one (in Apache terminology an active thread includes the
request pool, a large block of memory for storing the request and response data,
in addition to server and configuration pools), therefore longer response time
implies increased active memory. We found that this observation becomes even more
significant if the web server is under memory pressure. In such a case, if a web server’s
memory footprint is just below capacity in a baseline case, with interference it is likely
to start swapping. This again has catastrophic impact on performance. We verified
this hypothesis by running the WS VM with 2GB RAM in a separate experiment and
found evidence of swapping with interference even though no swapping happened in
a baseline run. Details of this experiment may be found in [62]. Based on Fig. 6.4,
we conclude interference reduces the capacity of a web server.
6.4 Design and Implementation
In the previous section, we found that the choice of optimal configuration values
for web services middleware depend significantly on interference created by co-located
VMs. Here we propose the design of a configuration manager that is aware of the
operating context [47] of the web server VM. Although most of our implementation
focuses on mitigating impact of cache-intensive interference, the same principles can
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be applied for other types of interferences (e.g. network). To design an interference-
aware configuration manager we need to answer three important questions:
i) How do we detect a web server is suffering from interference?
ii) Which parameters can be configured to mitigate interference?
iii) For the parameters determined in step (ii), how should their values be set as a
function of the degree of interference?
We answer each of these questions in rest of this section.
Fig. 6.5 presents a high level system architecture of the proposed solution. IC2
consists of two primary modules: a) Performance monitor, and b) Config manager.
For all the VMs that are part of a web application (e.g. web server, database and mail
server) and managed by IC2, performance monitor collects performance data at three
levels. At the application level it collects aggregate response time and throughput
measurements, whereas at system level, it collects utilization values for CPU, memory,
IO, and network. If hardware performance counters are available (on our local testbed,
but not on AWS), it also collects CPI (cycles per instruction) and CMR (last level
cache-miss rate) data for the monitored VMs. Based on the collected data, config
manager can detect if any system context has changed. This can either be a change
in workload, VM resource allocation or presence of interference. There are several
existing solutions that can handle workload and resource changes [20, 63] and these
can run concurrently with our solution.
A high level functioning of IC2 is shown in Fig. 6.6. After collecting metrics, IC2
tries to detect if the web server is under interference. Based on the detection result it
maintains a state machine for the web server. The state machine, in turn, is used to
decide when reconfigurations are needed. Finally, the config controller actuates the
reconfiguration action. Details of this configuration loop is presented below.
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Fig. 6.5.: System architecture of IC2
Fig. 6.6.: High level functioning of IC2
6.4.1 Interference Detection: Metrics Used
Any interfering VM that is accessing large amounts of memory, such as our two
experimental interference VMs running DCopy or LLCProbe, will ultimately cause
a pressure on the shared cache on the physical machine. We find empirically that
a sharp increase in CMR and CPI is a leading indicator of interference. Since in
this dissertation, we focus on cache intensive interference, CMR was chosen as a
representative trigger in the local testbed. We determined two thresholds for CMR
as CMRthreslow = max(CMR of Cloudsuite no-interference) and CMR
thres
high = min(CMR
of Cloudsuite with interference). CMRthreshigh detects when interference is in effect and
CMRthreslow detects when interference has gone away. This approach, however, cannot
be used in public clouds due to the policy of disallowing access to hardware counters.
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For our experiments on EC2, we used a sharp rise in CPU, reduction in throughput











Variation of various metrics with interference
Fig. 6.7.: Interference impacts load per operation (LPO) and work done (WorkDone)
by a web server. These, together with response time, can be used as metrics for
detecting interference. The values are normalized by the factors shown in figure for
better visualization.
Instead of using raw CPU utilization which may show sharp fluctuations due to
stochastic nature of request arrivals, we use a normalized metric Load Per Operation
(LPO). LPO is defined as LPO = CPUutil
Throughput
. We also define another derived met-
ric WorkDone = RT ∗ THPT ∗ CPUutil. Intuitively, Workdone approximates the
number of CPU cycles spent to serve all the requests during current measurement
interval. Without interference, assuming the server is not saturated, Workdone is
small since RT < 1s even though throughput is high. With interference, however,
Workdone is large as response time increases significantly even though throughput
reduces. To determine applicability of LPO and Workdone for interference detection,
we ran CloudSuite in EC2 for multiple 1-hour runs. During these runs we periodi-
cally start Dcopy on a co-located VM at fixed intervals of 8 minutes (4 minutes of
interference followed by 4 minutes of no-interference). The collected metrics for one
1-hour run is shown in Fig. 6.7. It can be seen from the figure that both LPO and
Workdone form distinct clusters with and without interference. It may be argued that
interference detection based on CPU utilization may fail to detect small interferences
that does not increase utilization above threshold. In our experiments, we found such
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interferences have minimal impact on response time. Here, our primary focus is to
detect pathological cases that saturate server resources.
6.4.2 Decision Tree for Detecting Interference
To detect interference in EC2 we built a Decision Tree classifier using the at-
tributes LPO, Workdone, and Response time. A decision tree generates a finite set
of “tests” on attribute values to determine the class of a given sample. Our choice
of decision tree is due to its two key advantages: i) simplicity—it is easy to visu-
alize the rules in a decision tree ii) customizability—an administrator can manually
change the thresholds of various attribute values based on expert knowledge or QoS
requirements. Our classifier consists of 3 classes: Interference, No-interference, and
Transient. The Transient class is introduced to capture temporary fluctuations in
performance (e.g. immediately after starting or stopping of emulated interference).
Based on current observation values the classifier tries to predict if the web server is
suffering from interference or interference has gone away.
A key challenge in building the decision tree is to deal with changes in parame-
ter values. When IC2 reconfigures a web server during interference, its performance
metrics also change. A decision tree trained with baseline runs (with and without
interference, but default parameters only), doesn’t work well to capture parameter
changes. For example, during interference, when IC2 reduces ResponseTime and LPO
by modifying parameters, the decision tree incorrectly classifies this as no-interference.
A possible solution for this is to collect metrics with various combination of param-
eter values, with and without interference. However, collecting training data for all
combinations of parameter values is time consuming and may even be impractical.
We therefore select an alternate bootstrapping approach where the classifier is trained
in 3 phases. Each training phase consists of 10-hour run of Cloudsuite and is done
offline. In phase I, we run Cloudsuite with baseline optimal setting (IC2 disabled),
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periodically generating interference. The collected data is used for training the phase
I (base) classifier. In Phase II, we repeat the experiment with IC2 enabled and use
the base classifier for interference detection. The metrics collected approximate mea-
surements with random parameter combinations. We use 50% data from Phase I
(thereby, still biasing it towards default parameter values) and 50% data from phase
II measurements to train the phase II classifier. Finally, in phase III we use phase
II classifier and collect more data with IC2 enabled. The data collected in phase III
is used for training the final classifier. Note that, during training we use only Dcopy
with varying array sizes and intensity (#dcopy threads) as our interference bench-
mark, while in evaluations we use both Dcopy and LLCProbe to test our detection
module. We used the Weka [64] toolkit to create the decision tree.
6.4.3 Configuration Controller
IC2 internally uses a simple state machine to keep track of current operating
context of the web server and generate reconfiguration triggers (Fig. 6.8). In local
testbed, the state machine consists of only two states and interference detection is
merged with the state machine. We use response time in the trigger to ignore cases
where response time was within QoS values, this prevents the server from incurring
reconfiguration overheads during less-intense interferences. Self-loops in the state di-
agram are the negations of the trigger conditions on outgoing edge. In EC2, however,
we use a 5-state machine, two representing interference and two representing normal
(no-interference) runs, and one for the transient phase described in the previous para-
graph. The transition labels are classifier outputs based on recent observations. Our
choice of 5-states instead of two serves two purposes: i) Due to ambient interference
in EC2, state changes may be short lived. Reconfiguring frequently in such cases may
impact throughput. Our design forces IC2 to reconfigure only after it has seen two
successive periods under interference or no-interference (assuming the current phase
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will last a while). ii) This hides classifier false positives. For example, if the server
is under no-interference but the classifier predicts interference, it would take at least
three successive misclassifications for a reconfiguration (No-interference → Transient
→ Interference → Interference), the probability of which is much smaller than the
classifier error rate. IC2 performs reconfiguration actions when the server enters the
states I2 or NI2 as shown in Fig. 6.8.
Fig. 6.8.: State transitions of IC2. In EC2, reconfiguration is done when the server
enters I2 or NI2.
6.4.4 Reconfiguration Actions
Our reconfiguration actions in IC2 are currently implemented as a heuristic backed
by a knowledge base (refer Table 6.3). This knowledge base directs IC2 which pa-
rameters to reconfigure when a trigger is detected. It does not include precise values
of the parameters but instead specifies a set of rules. The knowledge base can be
created in two ways: i) with the help of a domain expert, ii) analyzing performance
logs from training runs. Note that most commercial web applications go through load
testing phase before going to production. A systematic variation of critical middle-
ware parameters (as in Section 6.3.2) during these tests can generate insights about
application performance. Our current implementation deals with row 3 of Table 6.3,
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i.e. increased CMR. Our earlier experiments suggest that the actions MXC↓, KAT↑,
and PHP↑ can improve application performance during phases of cache interference.
We reconfigure all three parameters simultaneously.
Table 6.3.: Knowledge base for web server reconfiguration
Context Change Config. Heuristic
Increased Workload (High Idle Memory) MXC↑ and PHP↑
Increased Virtual/Physical CPU ratio MXC↓ and KAT↑
Increased LLC Miss Rate MXC↓, KAT↑, PHP↑
Increased Host Memory Contention MXC↓ and PHP↓
Increased Page Faults (Active Memory Low) PHP↓
Algorithm 1 Parameter update functions for IC2
1: procedure reconfigure for interference()




3: δMXC ← checkBounds(δMXC)
4: δKAT ← (δresponse ∗ CKAT )
5: δKAT ← checkBounds(δKAT )
6: update params(δMXC , δKAT , (400− PHP ))
7: end procedure
6.4.5 Update Functions
The quantitative update functions for the three parameters are shown in Algo-
rithm 1. The update objective for MXC is to reduce CPU demand of the web server.
We therefore decrease it proportional to the increase in CPU utilization (approxi-
mated by δLPO). We restrict the new value to be within a min-max bound so that
throughput does not degrade alarmingly. A similar objective function can be realized
for a memory constrained web server by considering memory utilization. An underly-
ing assumption here is that the server’s CPU utilization is dominated by the Apache
Httpd server. In our setup, though Php-fpm was used for dynamic content genera-
tion, we found the impact of PhpMaxChildren on response time/throughput was much
95
smaller than MaxClients. This likely indicates that the effect of PhpMaxChildren on
CPU utilization of the VM was marginal.
On the other hand, increase in response time implies the server’s average request
cycle time (response time + wait time) is increased. We increase KAT proportional
to the δresponse time to offset increased cycle time, i.e., to keep a connection alive for
longer since the server is taking longer time to respond to client requests. During
experiments in Fig. 6.2(b), it was found that the increase in optimal KAT value
(KAT intfopt −KAT
nointf
opt ) during interference is several times larger than δresponse time.
Therefore, a constant multiplicative factor (CKAT ) is used with δresponse time to come
up with the change in the KAT value. We empirically determined the value of CKAT
to be 3. For PhpMaxChildren, we found performance improvement beyond a certain
value (400, for a VM with 2vcpus) is negligible. We therefore select two constant
values of PHP for interference and no-interference scenarios.
6.4.6 Implementation
IC2 currently has been implemented as a Java application which combines the
functionalities of Performance Monitor and Config Manager described in Fig. 6.5.
One instance of IC2 is designed to handle an application group as shown in Fig.
6.5, e.g., an application group may consist of web server, database server, and e-
mail server. In current implementation, we focus on managing the web server. IC2
uses remote scripts to fetch performance metrics from various levels of the monitored
systems. It uses Faban logs to collect application level metrics (in periodic intervals
of 5s), and uses sysstat utilities (inside WS VM) for cpu and memory utilization.
In the local testbed, we also collect hardware counters from the hypervisor. Based
on the collected data and configured threshold values, it detects if an interference
has started or stopped. It then sends reconfiguration commands to the Apache and
Php servers. A separate program was implemented to start and stop the interference
benchmarks in periodic intervals.
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Redesigning Httpd. During initial testing with IC2, we found that CloudSuite had
significant increase in response time and decrease in throughput immediately after a
reconfiguration. This transient phase lasted between 30-60s and was determined to
be a limitation of Apache Httpd server. In order to update configuration values, the
server has to restart all child processes. This is essential because Httpd internally
assumes that configuration values are never changed (read-only)—doing so allows it
to avoid synchronization overhead during request processing.
To avoid the penalty of restarting Httpd, we implemented an online reconfigura-
tion option for Httpd. The online reconfiguration option enables Httpd to gracefully
change over from old parameter values to new parameter values without needing to
shut down and restart all worker processes. We noted that MaxClients is used only
in Httpd master process to control the number of worker threads. The children pro-
cesses (workers) are oblivious of MXC. Therefore MXC can be updated in master
(and subsequently propagated to children) without requiring restart. KAT value is
read at the end of every request processing, therefore any change to it is reflected
in the next request. Assuming a relaxed consistency model, we can modify KAT in
master and propagate the changes to children later.
We implemented a custom signal handler (SIGUSR2) and an online reconfigura-
tion command (apachectl reconfigure) in the Httpd server (worker mpm) to ini-
tiate online reconfiguration of these two parameters. The signal is delivered to the
master process by apachectl and later propagated to children via Httpd’s Pipe of
Death (POD) implementation. We also updated the Scoreboard structure to store
runtime values of MXC and KAT. The reconfiguration decisions are implemented in
server main loop() in master and child main() in children. Our implementation
involved adding/modifying 500 lines of code in current Apache codebase (v2.4.3).
With our implementation of online Httpd, the server showed significantly less over-
head of reconfiguration as explained in the next section. The modified version of
Apache can be downloaded from [65].
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6.5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of IC2 in detecting and remediating
interference. The high level objective here is to reduce the response time for the web
server during periods of interference. Therefore, if the average response time after
reconfiguration is lower than that before reconfiguration, we consider IC2 to have
achieved its objective. More specifically, we ask ourselves the following questions,
individually for the local testbed and Amazon EC2:
i) Can IC2 successfully detect interference?
ii) How much improvement in response time can be obtained by running IC2?
iii) What is the overhead of reconfiguration in IC2?
6.5.1 Setup
To quantify the performance change due to IC2, we compare IC2 with the perfor-
mance of an interference-agnostic controller. We assume that an interference-agnostic
controller is able to achieve optimal parameter setting under normal runs and does
not react to interferences. We found that for resource configurations equivalent to
EC2 m1.large instances, the optimal parameter values for no-interference runs were
< MXC = 650, KAT = 5, PMC = 50 >. For all the experiments, we consider a
CloudSuite workload with 550 concurrent clients which is below the saturation point
of the web server.
Interference Emulation. To emulate interference we star-ted the interference
benchmarks with varying array sizes at different instants in time. To simplify im-
plementation, we consider a periodic interference behavior as opposed to a stochastic
behavior. Due to transient behavior of httpd-basic immediately after reconfiguration,
we found it difficult to precisely evaluate benefits of IC2 with a bursty interference.
For our evaluations the interference benchmarks are on for 240s followed by an off
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period of 240s. We selected emulated interference to evaluate IC2 instead of natural
interference in EC2 primarily because of two reasons: 1) Interferences occur infre-
quently enough to make statistically significant results difficult within a reasonable
experimental time. 2) The nature (intensity and duration) of interference may change
every time making it hard to draw comparable results. We run LLCProbe with an
array size of 20MB, Dcopy with 20MB (also referred to as Dcopy-low) and Dcopy
with 1.5GB (Dcopy-high). On EC2, this synthetic interference happened in addition
to ambient interference in the environment. On the local testbed, we ensured that no
other VM, extraneous to our experiment, was running.
Co-location in EC2. In order to evaluate IC2 in EC2 we needed to co-locate some
of our VMs on the same machine as the WS VM. This is necessary to emulate in-
terference on the web server. We iteratively started 10 EC2 instances in batches (as
described in [52]) and were able to successfully co-locate 2VMs after some trial and
error. We found that the co-located instances had sequential domids and were able to
pass messages among themselves using xenstore (write in one VM and read from an-
other). We used this as verifying evidence that co-location was achieved. Our results,
in themselves, are also secondary validation of co-location since we found noticeable
impact of interference on WS performance. The co-located VMs on EC2 were hosted
on a Xeon-2650 machine having 8(16) physical(logical) cores and 20MB L3.
Baseline Formation. To form baseline observations for both private testbed and
EC2 we first configured their corresponding web servers to the no-interference op-
timal settings. These settings, with IC2 disabled, emulate an interference-agnostic
controller. We then used Faban to generate client requests for a 1-hour run. During
the run we started our interference controller described above to generate periodic
interferences. The application metrics for CloudSuite (response time and through-
put) were collected at intervals of 5s. These metrics when plotted against time axis
represent performance of one baseline run. In general, we found that interference
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had more performance impact in EC2 than in local testbed. For this experiment,
we reconfigured the WS VM on the local testbed to match Amazon EC2’s m1.large
instances. To achieve noticeable impact, we had to use 4 threads of the interference
benchmark on the local testbed compared to 2 in EC2. We found that with this
utilization of the local server (6 of 12 hardware threads) the effects of interference in
local and EC2 were of comparable magnitude.
Similar to baseline measurements, we also ran CloudSuite with IC2 enabled. In
both testbeds, we evaluate IC2 under two scenarios: one where Apache is reconfig-
ured with traditional apachectl -k graceful command (httpd-basic) and the other
where our instrumented version of Apache is reconfigured online (httpd-online). We
iteratively start 1-hour of baseline run followed by 1-hour of IC2 with httpd-online,
and 1-hour of httpd-basic. This was repeated 16 times for a total runtime of 48 hours
(3× 16). We restart the web server between each 1-hour run.
6.5.2 Results
Improvement in Response Time
Fig. 6.9 shows the variation in Response time with Time in local testbed and
in EC2 for a set of representative runs. In each plot, red vertical lines show the
point on time axis when an emulated interference is started and green vertical lines
show when interference is stopped. The blue vertical lines show the point when
IC2 reconfigured with httpd-online. New parameter settings at each reconfiguration
point is annotated as the three tuple |MXC|KAT |PHP |. It can be seen that in
general both httpd-online and httpd-basic are able to reduce response time during
interference. In case of httpd-basic, there is a spike in response time following a
reconfiguration, an indication that Apache is restarting all of its child processes. With
httpd-online this spike is nearly eliminated, although, some overhead remains due to
updating of PhpMaxChildren. Interference detection is faster in Local than EC2
since we use cache miss rate. Another interesting fact is that the effect of interference
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(b) On EC2 Testbed.
Fig. 6.9.: IC2 improves response time of a web server during phases of interference.
Red vertical bars show when an emulated interference is started and green vertical
bars show when interference is stopped. The blue vertical bars show the point when
IC2 reconfigured with httpd-online. New parameter setting at each reconfiguration
point is annotated as the three tuple |MXC|KAT |PHP |. Baseline run implies IC2
is disabled.
persists longer in EC2 even after emulated interference is stopped. This happens for
two reasons, i) ambient interference in EC2, ii) max throughput in EC2 is lower than
in the local testbed, hence queued requests persist for longer in EC2.
To quantify improvement in response time, we analyze response time during in-
terference in two halves—a) From onset of interference (red line in Fig. 6.9) up to
60 seconds is considered first half. This is the period when interference detection and
reconfiguration take place effectively showing overhead of IC2, specially in case of
httpd-basic. b) From 60s after interference to stopping of interference (green line in































































































(d) Secondhalf RT (EC2)
Fig. 6.10.: Response time with IC2 for various interferences. Numbers represent
percentage improvement from baseline RT.
We found that, across different interference types in EC2, httpd-basic degraded
response time by 5-10% in the first half, but httpd-online improved response time by
3-10%. This proves that the online version of Apache is able to reconfigure faster. In
local testbed, during the first half, httpd-basic showed improvement between 5 and
19% while httpd-online showed improvement between 20 and 25%. The measurements
are better in the local testbed compared to EC2 since interference detection happens
faster. In steady state or second half (60-240s from onset of interference), httpd-
online showed improvements of 21-29% in EC2 and 32-40% in the local testbed (refer
Fig. 6.10). The numbers for httpd-basic are 18-22% in EC2 and 34-40% in Local.
The steady state performance of httpd-basic and httpd-online are comparable in the
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Table 6.4.: Summary of IC2 Results. Response time numbers are %change from







FH SH FH SH INTF NI
Local 20-25↓ 32-40↓ 6-19↓ 34-40↓ 15s 10s
EC2 3-10↓ 21-29↓ 5-10↑ 18-22↓ 20s 65s
local testbed, although httpd-online outperforms httpd-basic in EC2. Overall IC2
showed higher improvement in response time in the local testbed since it was able to
compute δMXC and δKAT more precisely (no ambient interference as in EC2). We find
that the response time improvements are significant considering the simplicity of our
controller. It further establishes our point that, in a cloud deployment, an application
configuration manager must be interference-aware. A summary of our results can be
found in Table 6.4.
Detection Latency
From the collected metrics we also measured how long it takes for IC2 to detect
interference in EC2 and in the local testbed. We define detection latency to be
time from the starting or stopping of an emulated interference to the time when IC2
reconfigures Apache server. In Fig. 6.9 these are the times between a red line and the
next blue line (we call this interference detection latency) or time between a green
line and the next blue line (no-interference detection latency). We found that in local
testbed, median values for interference and no-interference detection latencies are 15s
and 10s respectively. In comparison, IC2 detects interference in EC2 with a median
latency of 20s. Detection of no-interference in EC2 takes much longer—a median
value of 65s. This happens since effect of interference persists much longer in EC2
as described in the previous section (Fig. 6.9(b)). Our future work includes finding
ways to reduce detection latency even further in both testbeds.
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Classifier Accuracy
To measure the accuracy of our classifier we apply it on the data collected from our
experiments in Section 6.5. For each experiment type (httpd-online and httpd-basic),
we create a test set comprising measurements collected by IC2 in that experiment.
Due to space constraints, we present only the first type here. We label the test
data based on its timestamps and our knowledge of when an emulated interference is
started and stopped. Data from the start(stop) of an interference up to 30s is labeled
Transient, rest are labelled according to which interval it is (Interference or No-
interference). Note that this labeling does not take into account ambient interference
in EC2 and therefore may manifest as poorer precision, although the classifier works
well in practice as seen in results from Section 6.5.2. We found the Transient class had
significant overlap with both Interference and No-interference in the training data, as
a result it had very low precision. But since IC2 does not perform any reconfiguration
in this state, the cost of misclassification is zero. We therefore ignore the results for

















Fig. 6.11.: Accuracy of Interference Detection with varying cost matrices. The cost
values 5 : 1 : 10 are used in production.
During the training phase, it was found that with default cost for misclassification,
the decision tree had significant number of False Negatives (FN). This causes IC2 to
perform badly, e.g. using baseline parameter setting while in interference may have
significant performance degradation and vice versa. We tried several combinations
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of cost matrices and selected the one with lowest miss rate. Fig. 6.11 shows the
interference detection rate of our classifier with different cost matrices for httpd-
online test data. Here a cost value of {a : b : c} represent a 3 × 3 cost matrix, a is
the cost of No-interference (NI) detected as Interference (I), b is the cost of Transient
misclassified as any other class, c is the cost of (I) classified as (NI), and cost of
correct prediction is 0. We define Miss Rate as (I classified as NI + NI classified as
I)/Total Samples. It can be seen that, initially with default cost of 1 : 1 : 1, miss
rate was 12%, but with higher cost values miss rate reduced to 6%. We used the
cost values of 5 : 1 : 10 in our production runs based on the fact that response time
penalty for misconfiguration in (I) is much higher than cost of misconfiguration in
(NI). The largest percentage of FNs (98.7%) arise from NI being detected as I (with
cost 10 : 1 : 10). This happens since impact of interference persists longer in EC2 as
seen in Fig. 6.9(b) (but our labeling does not account for this). This also manifested
as lower precision of (I) and lower recall of (NI). In general, our interference detection
achieved 89% recall and 73% precision.
Cost of IC2
The cost of IC2 can be defined in terms of two metrics—(a) Apache performance
immediately after a reconfiguration, and (b) execution cost of IC2. We already found
in Section 6.5.2 that IC2 with httpd-online improves response time during first half,
both in EC2 and in private testbed. This indicates httpd-online is able to reduce cost
of reconfiguration significantly (compared to httpd-basic, response time improved by
up to 17%). Note that IC2 is trained offline, therefore it does not have any runtime
cost for building the classifier. Since the classifier has only 3 attributes, the tree has
a simple structure and classification decision is made in the order of 10 comparisons.
This is insignificant compared to our measurement period of 5s, which is also the




How generic is the knowledge base in IC2?
Even though we work with Apache, most parameters we work with are common
to thread-pool based middleware. Parameters like MXC, PHP capture concurrency,
whereas timeout parameters capture state preservation. Hence, we believe the knowl-
edge base (KB) in Table 6.3 to be applicable to other thread-pool based servers (e.g.
Glassfish, WebSphere, DB2, MySql etc.). In a small scale experiment with Glassfish,
we found that it has sensitivity to thread-pool size (similar to MXC). Our KB, how-
ever, is not applicable to event-driven architectures (e.g. Nginx).
How expensive is it to generate the knowledge base?
The knowledge base in IC2 can be created empirically by systematically varying im-
portant parameters as described in Sec. 6.3.2. It can be done in parallel with the
load testing phase of web applications. Note that the KB does not include precise
values of parameters, rather IC2 can figure out the parameter values depending on
runtime conditions, including interference. Once created, it can be used for a given
application and middleware distribution irrespective of deployment (assuming similar
architectures, e.g. x64 or x86).
Can IC2 handle other types of interference?
Network interference is another major problem that seriously affects performance of
cloud applications. IC2 can also be useful in mitigating some of the effects of network
interference through application reconfiguration. In our preliminary experiments, we
simulated an environment where bandwidth available to the WS-VM became con-
strained (by up to 20%) due to a co-located VM using up a major share of the net-
work. We observed, as the level of network interference increases (i.e. the available
bandwidth to WS-VM reduces) the response time of the webserver sharply degrades.
IC2 can improve response time by employing an admission control mechanism, which
is equivalent to reconfiguring the MaxClients parameter in Apache to a lower value.
We empirically verified that optimal MXC setting with network interference is lower
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than no-interference optima [62]. IC2 can be trained to use response time along with
packets pruned from send-buffer as a trigger to detect such network interference.
6.7 Directions for Future Research
In this chapter, we presented the design and implementation of IC2, an au-
tonomous middleware configuration engine for mitigating performance interference
in clouds. IC2 has the distinct advantage that it can be used by website administra-
tors who usually do not have access to the hypervisor in public clouds. In such cases,
the simple heuristic-driven controller in IC2 is able to reduce the response times of
web server VM(s). However, the design of IC2 requires substantial expert knowledge
in determining which parameters should be reconfigured during interference and how
their values should be changed (increased or decreased). We generated this knowledge
base (KB) for popular web services middleware such as Apache Httpd and Php-fpm
engine by running an extensive set of experiments. The KB tells us how the opti-
mal values of various parameters change with and without interference. In further
experiments, we found that the knowledge base is applicable to a specific class of
middleware: e.g., in our setup the IC2 knowledge base was applicable to thread-pool
based middleware (such as Apache web server and Darwin streaming server). How-
ever, for event-based middleware (such as Nginx) we didn’t find any change in optimal
parameter values with interference. Further research is required to automatically find
application parameters that are performance-critical.
Below we present some future research directions for enhancing IC2.
1. Automatically Finding Performance-critical Parameters in IC2: Finding per-
formance critical parameters for applications and especially finding optimal pa-
rameter values has been a long-standing “open” problem in the systems com-
munity. The difficulty of the problem arises from three facts: i) the exploration
space for configuration values is huge, ii) there are dependency among param-
eters and often this dependency spans across machines in the server cluster,
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iii) it is very difficult and time-consuming to gather sufficient training data for
all possible combinations of parameter values. Significant research is required
to address these challenges and find optimal values for performance-critical pa-
rameters in a completely autonomous and efficient manner.
2. Handling Other Types of Interference: In IC2, we detect and mitigate inter-
ferences due to cache contention. A possible direction for future research is
to extend IC2 to handle other types of interferences such as network or IO
bandwidth. Such a solution would require designing new modules for detecting
these interferences and finding which parameters can mitigate their ill effects.
We highlight a possible solution in Section 6.6.
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7. ICE: AN INTEGRATED CONFIGURATION ENGINE
FOR CLOUD SERVICES
Performance degradation due to imperfect isolation of hardware resources such as
cache, network, and I/O has been a frequent occurrence in public cloud platforms. A
web server that is suffering from performance interference degrades interactive user
experience and results in lost revenues. Existing work on interference mitigation tries
to address this problem by intrusive changes to the hypervisor, e.g., using intelli-
gent schedulers or live migration, many of which are available only to infrastructure
providers and not end consumers. In this chapter, we present a framework for admin-
istering web server clusters where effects of interference can be reduced by intelligent
reconfiguration. Our controller, ICE, improves web server performance during inter-
ference by performing two-fold autonomous reconfigurations. First, it reconfigures
the load balancer at the ingress point of the server cluster and thus reduces load on
the impacted server. ICE then reconfigures the middleware at the impacted server
to reduce its load even further. We implement and evaluate ICE on Cloudsuite, a
popular web application benchmark, and with two popular load balancers - HAProxy
and LVS. Our experiments in a private cloud testbed show that ICE can improve
median response time of web servers by upto 94% compared to a statically configured
server cluster. ICE also outperforms an adaptive load balancer (using least connection
scheduling) by upto 39%.
7.1 Motivation
Performance issues in web service applications are notoriously hard to detect and
debug. In many cases, these performance issues arise due to incorrect configurations
or incorrect programs [66]. Web servers running in virtualized environments also
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suffer from issues that are specific to cloud, such as, interference [50, 67] or incor-
rect resource provisioning [47]. Among these, performance interference and its more
visible counterpart performance variability cause significant concerns among IT ad-
ministrators [55]. These concerns are justified since a slow website almost always
implies customer dissatisfaction and missed revenues. Performance interference also
poses a significant threat to the usability of Internet-enabled devices that rely on
hard latency bounds on server response (imagine the suspense if Siri took minutes to
answer your questions!). For other latency sensitive tasks such as web search, delayed
tasks are simply discarded resulting in wasted computation. Existing research shows
that interference is a frequent occurrence in large scale data centers [50, 68]. There-
fore, web services hosted in the cloud must be aware of such issues and adapt when
needed.
7.1.1 The Problem
Interference happens because of sharing of low level hardware resources such as
cache, memory bandwidth, network etc. Partitioning these resources is practically
infeasible without incurring high degrees of overhead (in terms of compute, memory,
or even reduced utilization). Existing solutions primarily try to solve the problem
from the point of view of a cloud operator. The core techniques used by these solu-
tions include a combination of one or more of the following: a) Scheduling, b) Live
migration, c) Resource containment. We presented a high level overview of these
techniques and their shortcomings in Chapter 5. Our principal objective here is to
mitigate effects of interference without requiring modification of the hypervisor.
7.1.2 Improving IC2
In the previous chapter, we saw how IC2 mitigates interference by reconfigur-
ing web server parameters in the presence of interference [67]. The parameters
considered are MaxClients (MXC) and KeepaliveTimeout (KAT) in Apache and
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pm.max_children (PHP) in Php-fpm engine. We found that IC2 could recapture
lost response time by upto 29% in Amazon’s EC2 and 40% in private cloud testbed.
However, the drawback of this approach is that web server reconfiguration usually
has high overhead (the web server need to spawn or kill some of the worker threads).
We found that with a standard Apache distribution, the response time immediately
after a reconfiguration shot up by 1s and the negative effects lasted for about 30s.
This limits how frequently the web server can be reconfigured. Moreover, IC2 alone
cannot improve response time much lower without drastically degrading throughput.
We observe that the key goal in IC2 is to reduce the load on the web server (WS)
during periods of interference. The reconfiguration actions to reduce MXC and to
increase KAT help in achieving this objective. However, this is an indirect way of
implementing load reduction. We also observe that most deployments have multiple
instances of web servers placed behind a load balancer. Therefore, implementing ad-
mission control at the gateway (load balancer) is a more direct way of reducing load
to the affected web server. An out-of-box load balancer is agnostic of interference and
therefore treat the WS equallly irrespective of whether it is suffering from interference
or not. We aspire to make this context aware, and evaluate how much performance
gain can be achieved.
7.1.3 Solution Approach.
Our solution approach relies on leveraging the admission control functions of load
balancer to make the system more agile. We observe that existing load balancers
(e.g. HAProxy with least-connection scheduling) can mitigate the effects of interfer-
ence to some extent. However, if we can detect and mitigate interference sooner, it
can improve system stability and reduce response time even further. The proposed
solution, called ICE, uses hardware counter values to detect the presence of inter-
ference and therefore provides fast detection. Access to hardware counters does not
always require hypervisor (root) access as these may be virtualized [69]. Our evalu-
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ations showed that ICE could detect and reconfigure the WS cluster with a median
latency of 3s. This is better than existing techniques which would incur a detection
latency of 15-20s [67].
When interference is detected, ICE performs two-level reconfigurations of the web-
server cluster. The first level, geared towards agility, is to reconfigure the load balancer
in such a manner so that fewer requests are forwarded to the affected WS VM. We
found that this provides the maximum benefit in terms of reduced response time. The
second level of reconfiguration, which configures Apache and Php-fpm as described in
IC2, is activated only if the interference lasts for a long time. This prevents the server
from incurring unnecessary reconfiguration overheads if the interference is short. The
second level reconfiguration ensures that the WS does not incur overhead of idle
threads (note that since the LB has been reconfigured this WS VM will receive fewer
client requests). Moreover, it also works as a fail-safe for situations where the WS
VM still receives lot of requests because of a sudden spike in client load at the LB.
Our key contributions in this chapter are as follows:
1. We present the design and implementation of a two-level reconfiguration engine
for web server clusters to deal with interference in cloud. Our solution, called ICE,
includes algorithms for: a) detecting interference quickly (primarily cache and mem-
ory bandwidth contention), and b) predicting new weights for impacted server(s) to
reduce load on them.
2. We deploy our solution on a popular web application benchmark called CloudSuite.
Our evaluation experiments show that on a combination of Apache+Php+HAProxy
middleware, ICE can reduce median response time of web servers by upto 94%.
We evaluate ICE for two different scheduling policies (weighted round-robin, and
weighted least-connection) in HAProxy and find that it improves response time across
both scheduling policies (upto 94% and 39% respectively). Median interference de-
tection latency was 3s.
3. To evaluate the generalizability of our framework, we also ran some experiments
with the Darwin media streaming server running with LVS load balancer. Our results
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show that reconfiguring server weight in LVS can be used to reduce the inter-frame
delay for an affected Darwin VM. We also found that the optimal num_threads pa-
rameter in Darwin is vastly different with and without interference indicating our WS
reconfiguration is also applicable to Darwin.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, we show that
interference can degrade response time of a WS VM even in a load-balanced setup.
It is followed by a detailed description of the design of ICE. Section 7.4 shows
the performance improvement of ICE over a simple load-balanced WS cluster and
IC2. Next, we show the generalizibilty of our solution approach by illustrating how
ICE can be applied in a media streaming server cluster. We use the Apple Darwin
media streaming server and LVS load-balancer for this work. We finally discuss the
shortcomings of ICE and conclude the chapter.
7.2 Interference Degrades Performance of Web Servers
In this section, we present an empirical evaluation of the impact of interference
on web server (WS) performance. The metric of interest in this dissertation is the
average response time of the WS, which is a dominant factor for customer satisfaction.
7.2.1 Experimental Setup
Testbed. Our experiments were conducted in a private cloud testbed consisting of
three poweredge 320 servers. Each server is equipped with an Intel Xeon E5-2440
processor consisting of 6 cores (or 12 threads with hyperthreading), 15MB L3 cache
and 16GB main memory. The hypervisor used to manage this cloud testbed is the
popular KVM hypervisor. Each of our experimental virtual machines (VM) were con-
figured with 2 vcpus and 3GB RAM except the DB VM. The DB VM was provisioned
with 4 vcpus and 4GB RAM to eliminate any DB bottleneck. All the machines were
connected by a 1 Gbps switch.
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Application Benchmark. For our experiments with web servers, we use the pop-
ular CloudSuite [19] web application benchmark. CloudSuite emulates a social event
calendar application written in PHP. It is an example of a dynamic web application,
where most of the responses are generated by executing PHP scripts and running
database queries. The benchmark also includes a custom workload generator based
on real-life distribution of user requests.
Fig. 7.1.: Layout of virtual machines in private cloud testbed.
Virtual Machines and Middleware. We used a multi-threaded Apache web server
(Apache-worker) to host CloudSuite, while PHP scripts were interpreted using the
PHP-Fastcgi Process Manager (php-fpm). Note that one instance of Apache and php-
fpm runs in a single virtual machine (called WS VM). We replicated the WS VM three
times to create a web server cluster with 3 virtual servers. These were distributed
across 2 physical machines (refer Fig. 7.1). The third machine was used to emulate
clients. Note that the physical machine with one WS VM was chosen to run interfer-
ence to limit the impact of interference across the cluster. Unless otherwise specified,
we refer to this WS VM as the monitored web server (or impacted web server, also
denoted WSX). All our measurements and analysis below pertain to this single WS
VM instance (WSX). This also makes sure that our measurements are free from
WS-WS (intra-cluster) interference. The CloudSuite database was hosted in MySql
and placed on the same physical machine as the other two WS VMs. Note that the
combined utilization of these VMs (2WS VM + 1DB VM, for a total of 8 vcpus) was
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below the total capacity of the phycial machine (12 vcpus) and the physical machine
never contended for CPU or RAM. We used the popular HAProxy load balancer to
distribute requests equally among the WS VMs. HAProxy was deployed in a VM on
the same physical machine as the client emulator. This was done to reduce network
overhead. We found that the CPU and Memory utilizations of HAProxy and Client
VM were always well below their provisioned capacities.
Interference Benchmarks. We use the LLCProbe and Dcopy benchmarks de-
scribed in [67] for generating interference on the monitored WS VM. LLCProbe cre-
ates an LLC Sized array in memory and then accesses each cache line very frequently.
On the other hand, Dcopy from the linear algebra suite (BLAS) copies contents of one
array to another. While LLCProbe is an example of a cache read benchmark, Dcopy
is an example of cache read+write benchmark. We found that in general LLCProbe
has greater cache access frequency than Dcopy and therefore emulates a stronger in-
terference. Interferences of these types occur frequently in cloud platforms during
computation of data mining tasks [50], or during periodic consolidations [47].
Configuration Parameters. We consider several parameters in Apache, PHP and
HAProxy for reconfiguration tasks in ICE. The HAProxy parameter that ICE man-
ages is the server weight parameter which determines what fraction of all client
requests go to a particular WS VM. In Apache, we automatically reconfigure the
MaxClients (MXC) and KeepaliveTimeout (KAT) parameters for improving re-
sponse times. While MXC indicate the maximum number of worker threads that
an Apache server can spawn, KAT determines how long a client connection is per-
sisted in idle state before terminating it. Both these parameters have large impact
on response time of an Apache server. In Php, we consider the pm.max_children
(PHP) parameter for autonomous reconfiguration. Similar to MXC, PHP indicates
the maximum number of worker threads in the Php-fpm engine. Note that although
our current experiments are geared towards Apache+Php+HAProxy setup, similar
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parameters exist for most threadpool-based web services middleware and load bal-
ancers. Therefore, our design principles can be easily adapted for other web servers.
We show this with an example of the Darwin media streaming server with LVS load
balancer in Section 7.5.
7.2.2 Interference Increases Response Time
In this experiment, we run CloudSuite with a given load size (#concurrent clien
-ts) for several 1-hour runs. Note that all the clients direct their requests to the
HAProxy load balancer which distributes the requests equally among WS VMs. The
scheduling policy selected by HAProxy for distributing client requests is round-robin
in this experiment. During each run, LLCProbe benchmarks were started and stopped
in the interference VMs periodically. We show the response times of each WS VM
over time in Fig. 7.2. It can be seen that with interference the response time of the
impacted WS VM (WSX) increases sharply from 10x ms to 100x ms. This clearly
shows that interference can degrade performance of few WS VMs, although, we found
that rest of the cluster remained under-utilized. The reason behind this sharp rise in
response time is that interference reduces capacity of the WS. Therefore, an impacted
WS may saturate with fewer number of clients than in a no-interference scenario. For
a detailed treatment on how interference impacts performance of WS, the readers are
referred to [67].
This shows that a load-balancer which has no knowledge of which WS VM is suf-
fering from interference, would continue to send the same number of requests to the
impacted server(s), as to the other WSs (assuming same default weight). We there-
fore need to make the load-balancer aware of dynamic situations (interference) and





















Response Time vs Time
Fig. 7.2.: The plot shows response time of the impacted WS VM over time. Response
time here indicate the average time the web server takes to serve a single URL.
Interference increases WS response time even though the server is behind a load
balancer. The scheduling policy used here is round-robin.
7.2.3 Interference vs. Load
In a separate experiment, we ran CloudSuite on a standaloneWS VM (no HAProxy)
with varying workload sizes and interference types. Unlike the previous experiment,
each run here indicates a 15-minute run of CloudSuite with a specific combination
of (workload x interference). The interference benchmark is executed for the entire
duration of a run. The results from our experiments is displayed in Fig. 7.3. Note
that each data point in the plot indicate the average of all observations during a
15-minute run for a given combination of workload and interference. An interference
of type Dcopy-0.0MB indicate no interference was run. It can be seen that the rise
in response time due to interference, for a given interference, varies with workload
size. For example, with very low workload (< 1000), the impact of interference is
negligible and all the plots overlap with each other. However, as the workload size
increases (> 1000), the slopes of the curves increase upto a saturation point (2000)
beyond which the slope decreases again. In other words, the rise in response time
(RT) depends on the server load. Therefore, if the load of a WS can be reduced




















Response Time vs Workload
Fig. 7.3.: Increase in response time during interference with varying workload sizes.
The X-axis here indicate number of concurrent client connections. The response
times shown here are the times to finish an operation (a sequence of URL requests)
as described in Cloudsuite. The plot shows interference has greater performance
impact with larger workloads and the impact varies across interference benchmarks.
be reduced (or nearly eliminated). This observation provides a key motivation in the
design of ICE.
In a load-balanced WS setup, reducing load on an impacted WS VM implies for-
warding fewer client requests to that server. This can be achieved by reducing the
scheduling weight of the corresponding server in the load-balancer configuration. To
validate this hypothesis, we ran another simple experiment on our Apache+HAProxy
setup. Here, we run CloudSuite with periodic interferences as described before. How-
ever, the scheduling weight of the monitored WS (WSX) is set to 100 and 80 (100
being the default value) in two separate runs. It can be seen from Fig. 7.4 that
the average response time of WSX reduces quite significantly while using a lower
weight during interferences. In the following section, we describe how we automate






















Response Time vs Time
Fig. 7.4.: The plot shows response time of an affected WS VM over time. Chang-
ing the Server Weight parameter in the load balancer can reduce its response time
significantly during interference.
7.3 Design and Implementation
7.3.1 Overview
ICE primarily consists of four components: i) monitoring engine (ME), ii) in-
terference detector (DT), iii) load balancer configuration engine (LBE), and iv) web
server configuration engine (WSE) as shown in Fig. 7.5. These components are coor-
dinated by ICE-Core. Fig. 7.6 shows the high level functioning of this configuration
engine. First the monitoring engine collects performance metrics from the web server
cluster. These are then fed as inputs to the subsequent modules. In the second stage,
the interference detector analyzes observed metrics to find which WS VM(s) are suf-
fering from interference. Once the affected VM(s) are identified, the load-balancer
configuration engine then reduces the load on these VMs by diverting some traffic
to other VMs in the cluster. We chose the LBE as the first level configuration en-
gine since reconfiguring load balancer has much less overhead than reconfiguring web
servers (the first one involves updating global variable(s), whereas, the second one
involves creation or destruction of processes). If interference lasts for a long time, the
web server configuration engine reconfigures the web server parameters (MXC, KAT,
and PHP) to improve response time further. Finally, when interference goes away the
load balancer and web server configurations are reset to their default values. Fig. 7.5
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shows how these components are distributed across the web server cluster and their
dependencies. Note that the exact deployment of a given component is flexible and
choices are driven by the need to reduce network and computation overhead. As an
example, our ICE core is deployed in the hypervisor of the monitored WS VM. We
present the details of each module in the following sections.
Fig. 7.5.: Components of ICE and their deployment.
Fig. 7.6.: ICE control loop. This figure shows the sequence of steps performed for
two-level reconfigurations in ICE.
7.3.2 Monitoring
ICE monitors the performance metrics of WS VMs at three levels of the system.
The sensor placements are shown in Fig. 7.5. At the hypervisor level, the hard-
ware counter sensor collects values for cycles per instruction (CPI) and cache miss
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rate (CMR) for all monitored VMs, whereas, CPU utilization (CPU) of each VM
is monitored inside the VM. The application level sensor at HAProxy gives us the
average response time (RT), and requests/second (RPS) metrics for each VM. While
the hardware counter values are primarily used for interference detection, system and
application metrics are used for reconfiguration actions. We chose a monitoring in-
terval of 1 second for all the metrics. During training, we found that system and
application metrics give better accuracy with an interval of 5 sec (refer paragraph on
Estimating ξ()). Therefore, we also maintain a periodic average of 5 sec for those
metrics. In the later sections, we discuss how using different measurement intervals
help in improving responsiveness and accuracy of various modules.
7.3.3 Interference Detection
We found that the CPI and CMR values of affected WS VMs increase significantly
during phases of interference. This is shown in Fig. 7.7 where the red vertical lines
(start of interference) are followed by a sudden rise in CPI and CMR. Both these
metrics are leading indicators of interference (as opposed to response time which is
a lagging indicator) and therefore allow us to reconfigure quickly and prevent the
web sever from going into a death spiral (i.e., one where the performance degrades
precipitously and does not recover for many subsequent requests). Prior work has also
shown that distribution of CPI values can be used to detect interference in web server
clusters [50]. In our experiments, we found that during interference CPI values had
larger variance than CMR, hence, the latter provided better accuracy for interference
detection. This matches with our intuition that for cache intensive interference such
as LLCProbe or Dcopy, CMR is a good indicator of interference.
Interference detection in ICE is performed by a Decision Tree (DT) classifier which
uses CPI and CMR as the attributes. Our choice of classifier is primarily due to
the simplicity and understandability of the clasification rules generated by DT. The













Variation of CPI and CMR with interference
Fig. 7.7.: Variation in CPI and CMR with interference. Metrics are measured with
a periodic interval of 1 sec. Actual values are scaled with the factors shown in lables
for clarity.
description of training runs until the next section since the same data is also used to
train the LB reconfiguration engine. It was found that although both CPI and CMR
were used as attributes for training the DT, the final classifier included thresholds
on CMR only. This happens because CMR alone is able to classify most samples
correctly. The classifier showed a detection accuracy (TP+TN) of 99.12% on the
training data using 10-fold cross-validation. In contrast, a DT constructed with CPI
only, showed detection accuracy of 98.15%. We used the first classifier (with CMR)
for our evaluation experiments.
7.3.4 Load-balancer Reconfiguration
A key component of ICE is the load-balancer configuration engine, which reduces
load to an impacted web server by forwarding traffic to other servers in the cluster.
In Section 7.2, we found that the impact of interference (rise in response time) on
a web server is a function of its load. During high server load, interference creates
greater performance degradation since it can easily saturate the CPU [67]. Therefore,
the goal of ICE is to reduce traffic to the affected WS so that it does not cross a
CPU utilization setpoint (uthres). We achieve this by updating the weight of the
corresponding WS VM in the load balancer configuration. Note that, #requests
forwarded to a WS is a function of its scheduling weight. Formally,
r = f(w, T ),
122
where r is the requests per second (RPS) received by a WS, w is the scheduling
weight, and T is total requests received at front-end (HAProxy).
Similarly, it is traditionally known that the CPU utilization (u) of a WS is a
function of its load, i.e., u = g(r). [67] also showed that u depends on interference.
The degree of interference on a WS can be approximated by its CPI measurements
(c). Therefore, u = h(c). We approximate the dependence of u on r and c with the
empirical function
u = ξ(r, c)
During our experiments we also found that CPU utilization ut at time t is often
dependent on the utilization ut−1 at time t− 1. This happens because execution of a
task may often last multiple intervals. For example, a request that started executing
just before taking measurement for interval tmay be served in interval t+1. Therefore,
the measurements in intervals t and t + 1 are not independent. This dependence is
captured by taking into account the cpu utilization at the previous interval (we denote
this as Oldcpu or o) in our empirical function. The final function for estimating u is
represented as
u = ξ(o, r, c)
Our LB reconfiguration engine works as shown in Algorithm 2:
Assume that CPI, RPS and CPU values at time t are ct, rt, and ut. When the
DT detects interference it sends a reconfiguration trigger to LBE. The LBE then
computes the predicted CPU utilization (uˆt), given the current metrics ct, rt, and
ut−1. Notice that we use the estimated CPU utilization uˆt to compare with setpoint
uthres since rise in u often lags behind rise in c. If uˆt is found to exceed the setpoint, we
predict a new RPS value rˆt s.t. the CPU utilization falls below setpoint. To predict a
new load-balancer weight we first compute the percentage reduction in RPS (δ) that
is required to achieve this. This is then used to reduce weight w proportionately.
Note that during periods of heavy load, the estimated δ may be very high, practically
marking the affected server offline (very low wnew). To avoid this, we limit the change
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in w within a maximum bound (40% of its default weight). In the following sections,
we present how to train the estimator function ξ().
Algorithm 2 LB reconfiguration function for ICE
1: procedure update lb weight()
2: if DT detected interference then
3: Estimate uˆt ← ξ(ut−1, rt, ct)
4: if uˆt > uthres then
5: Estimate rˆt, s.t. uthres = ξ(ut, rˆt, ct)
6: Compute δ ← (rt − rˆt)/rt
7: Set weight wnew ← (1− δ)wcurrent
8: Check Max-Min Bounds (wnew)
9: end if
10: else
11: Reset default weight
12: end if
13: end procedure
7.3.5 Collecting Training Data
To collect training data for estimating the function ξ(), we ran CloudSuite under
various scenarios. Each run involved running the Faban workload emulator for 90
minutes with a constant number of concurrent clients. For each run, we collected
application and system metrics as decribed earlier. During a run, we periodically
started various interference benchmarks (LLCProbe and Dcopy) every 5 minutes.
The interference benchmark was run for the first 3 minutes of this interval followed
by no-interference for 2 minutes. To emulate various degrees of interferene, we run
LLCProbe and Dcopy with varying number of interference threads (between 2 and 4)
and varying array sizes (between 8MB and 750MB per thread). This gave us sufficient
variance in the values of CPI and CMR. To collect measurements with varying server
loads, we changed the HAProxy weights of the monitored server between 100, 80 and
60 across runs. This allowed us to collect measurements with sufficient variance in
RPS values. The benchmark was run for a total of 9 runs amounting to observation
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data collected over 13.5 hours. Note that we used this data for training both the
Decision Tree and the Estimator. For building the DT, we labeled the observations
based on whether an interference benchmark was running at that time or not (we use
the class labels IF and NI for Interference and No-interference respectively). Since the
WS has different performance characteristics during interference and no-interference,
we use only the data collected during interference for training the estimator (note
that the estimator is used only when interference is in effect).
7.3.6 Estimating ξ()
We approximate ξ() using multi linear regression on variables r, c, and o, where
o is a time-shifted version of the vector u (observed CPU utilization). We found
that although RPS values were tightly centered around the median there were a few
observations when RPS varied widely from the median. We removed these outliers
with standard IQR (inter-quartile range) measures. The thresholds for the selected
obeservations were chosen as r > 1Q− 1.5 ∗ IQR and r < 3Q+1.5 ∗ IQR, where 1Q
and 3Q are first and third quartile values and IQR = 3Q − 1Q. For other metrics,
we found the values to have much fewer outliers. The metrics were also scaled to a
value between 0 and 1 by normalizing them with their range (max−min). The final
dataset was fed to the lm regressor in R. We measure the accuracy of a regression





where SSres is the residual sum of squares and SStot is the total sum of squares
(proportional to variance of the dataset). Intuitively, R2 measures how much of the
variance in the dataset is captured by the predicted model. Therefore, a higher R2
score implies a better model. Initially, we found that the metrics collected with 1
sec interval had high variance in RPS and CPU and therefore resulted in a lower R2
score. On the other hand, using a larger measurement interval (5 sec) averages most
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of the noises, thereby, giving a better model fit. Based on this observation, we used
the measurements collected at 5 sec period as input to the estimator.
To check if a higher degree polynomial in o, r, and c produces a better fit for the
training data, we also ran regression with various degrees. The R2 scores for models
with varying degrees of polynomials are shown in Fig. 7.8. We found that models that
include dependence of u with past CPU utilization (i.e., u ∼ (o, r, c)i) have better fit
than those not considering this dependence (u ∼ (r, c)i). It can also be seen from
Fig. 7.8, although higher degrees give a better fit, the improvements in R2 values for
degrees > 1 are very low. Moreover, in a linear model, the estimated values of u and
r can be computed easily and the model can be updated over time with relative ease.
We therefore choose a linear model in (o, r, c) as our estimator. The final prediction
function ξ() was computed as:











Fig. 7.8.: Accuracy of regression with varying degrees of polynomials. The metrics
used for regression are shown in the plot labels.
7.3.7 Web Server Reconfiguration
The final level of reconfiguration in ICE is performed by updating parameters
of web server middleware (Apache, Php-fpm, Darwin etc.) hosting an application.
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Note that reconfiguring middleware parameters is costly since it often involves pro-
cess creation or destruction. Also, the effects of parameter changes are only visible
after a lag (usually 5-10 sec). Due to this, ICE performs Web Server reconfiguration
only if an interference lasts for a long time (> 20 sec). Our WS reconfiguration de-
cisions are based on a knowledge base described in earlier research. [67] found that
during interference the optimal parameters of Apache and Php changes significantly.
More specifically, the following reconfiguration actions are necessary to improve WS
response time during interference: MXC ↓, KAT ↑, PHP ↑, i.e., the optimal values
of KAT and PHP increases during interference, while the optimal MXC values de-
creases. New values for the parameters are computed based on proportinal increase
in CPU utilization (MXC) or response time (KAT). We use the controller described
in [67] as the WS reconfiguration engine in ICE.
ICE is currently implemented as a Java program (ICE-Core) and a collection of shell
scripts distributed across the WS cluster (refer Fig. 7.5). Logically, ICE-Core com-
bines the functionalities of DT, LBE, and WSE in a multi-threaded application. We
used the Weka toolkit for generating the DT, while R was used to compute the esti-
mator function ξ(). Monitoring and reconfiguration actions are performed with the
help of shell scripts and are also driven by ICE-Core.
7.4 Evaluation
We hypothesized earlier that the response time of a web server can be improved
during periods of interference by taking two measures: a) by diverting traffic away
from the impacted VM and b) by reconfiguring the web server parameters. This is
the core design principle of ICE. Therefore, if we find that the average response time
of a WS VM during interference is reduced by using ICE, we may conclude that our
hypothesis is validated. More specifically, to evaluate the benefits of ICE, we ask the
following questions:
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i) How much improvement in response time is achieved by using ICE over a statically
configured load-balancer?
ii) Does the performance of ICE vary across selection of scheduling policies (WRR
and WLC)? If so, how much?
iii) How fast can ICE reconfigure in presence of interference?
We answer each of these questions in the following sections.
Setup. We use the same CloudSuite setup described in Sec. 7.2 to run our eval-
uation experiments. Only one of the VMs in the web server cluster was subjected
to interference as before and we use the metrics collected from the impacted VM
to perform our analysis. To quantify the response time improvement with ICE, we
compare it against two scenarios: i) when the WS cluster is statically configured (i.e.
the LB weight and WS parameters never change), we call this the baseline run, and
ii) when the LB is statically configured, but the WS VMs are reconfigured using IC2.
While the improvement over baseline shows the overall benefit of ICE, its compar-
ison against IC2 shows how ICE outperforms existing solutions. The experiments
are repeated with different scheduling policies at HAProxy to answer question (ii)
earlier.
Interference Emulation. We emulate interference by running Dcopy and LL-
CProbe in a periodic manner. The array sizes chosen for our evaluation were LL-
CProbe (32MB), Dcopy-Low (30MB), and Dcopy-high (3GB) with 4 threads of inter-
ference. Note that only a subset of these interferences (LLCProbe 32MB and Dcopy-
high 3GB, 4 threads) were present in our training set. To analyze results across
interfernce types, only one type of interference is run at any given point in time.
Each run of CloudSuite is an emulation lasting 1 hour, during which interfernces are
run with a period of 8 minutes. Within each period, an interference benchmark runs
for 4 minutes followed by 4 minutes of no-interference.
Data Collection. Note that our experiments involve measuring response time across
various combinations of scheduling policies (WRR, WLC) and configuration con-
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trollers (Baseline, IC2, and ICE). Each such combination is considered one ex-
periment. Within one experiment, we run CloudSuite as described above for 5 X 1
hour runs. This gives us enough measurements for each interference type (LLCProbe,
Dcopy-Low, and Dcopy-High) to have statistically significant results. The cumulative
runtime of the evaluation experiments was more than 30 hours. The metrics observed
by ICE during each run are stored in a log file. These are analyzed offline to extract
measurements during a given interference run (using the timestamps when interfer-
ences are started and stopped). Below, we present the results from our experiments.
7.4.1 Improvement of Response Time due to ICE
The performance of ICE compared to baseline and IC2 is shown in Fig. 7.9.
The plots here show the response times of the monitored WS VM during periods of
interference. The starting(stopping) points of interferences are shown with red(green)
vertical lines. The magenta(blue) vertical lines show the points when HAProxy(WS)
are reconfigured. The texts associated with the blue lines indicate new parameter
values for reconfiguration. It can be seen from Figures 7.9(a) and 7.9(b) that the
WS response times show very different characteristics depending on scheduling pol-
icy. With round-robin, response time of the impacted WS always goes up and the
degradation lasts as long as the interference. On the other hand, with least con-
nection scheduling, response time shows occassional spikes. Since least connection
scheduling implicitly accounts for server state (#busy_connections), an out-of-box
load balancer with least connection can mitigate the effects of interference to a large
extent. However, in both cases, ICE outperforms a baseline run. With round-robin
scheduling, this improvement is markedly visible. With dynamic weight assignment
and WS reconfiguration, ICE can reduce response time to the same level as (or bet-
ter than) a baseline least connection run. It can also be seen in Fig. 7.9(b) that
although the response time spikes in baseline are not very high or long-lasting, they
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Table 7.1.: Summary of ICE Results. Numbers indicate % change in median response
time from baseline runs for different interference benchmarks. The arrows indicate







IC2 ICE IC2 ICE IC2 ICE
WRR 29%↓ 94%↓ 18%↓ 92%↓ 59%↑ 82%↓
WLC 5%↑ 39%↓ 15%↑ 21%↓ 35%↑ 25%↓
persist throughout the entire duration of interference. In contrast, with ICE, after
LB reconfiguration these spikes are much fewer. The performance of IC2 falls midway
between a baseline run and ICE. Although IC2 is able to reduce the response time
during stronger interferences, the reduction is not as significant as ICE. Moreover,
a baseline least-connection run outperforms IC2 with round-robin. This is because
of the fact that reducing MXC as in IC2 is an indirect and milder way of reducing
load on an impacted WS, while using load-balancer is a more direct way of preventing
server overload.
Fig. 7.10 shows the median response time of the monitored WS VM across in-
terference types with various scheduling policies. We find that, when using a WRR
scheduler, ICE shows an improvement of 82-94% over baseline response time while
improvement with IC2 is 20-30%. Across interference types, LLCProbe, which is
the strongest interference, shows the most performance benefit. Interestingly, with
Dcopy-Low IC2 shows performance degradation.
With WLC scheduling the performance benefits are significantly less compared to
round-robin. WLC by itself is able to direct some traffic away from the congested
WSs and therefore help mitigate interference to a significant extent. However, using
ICE alongside WLC improves response time even further. Across interference types
this improvement varies between 21 and 39%. However, using IC2 alongside WLC
shows poorer performance compared to baseline (degradation of 5-35%). This is pri-
marily beacuse of the fact that, even though the WS is reconfigured to handle fewer
clients the LB has no knowledge of it and it continues sending nearly the same num-
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(a) Scheduling policy is round-robin
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(b) Scheduling policy is least connection
Fig. 7.9.: Response time over time. ICE improves response time significantly com-
pated to baseline and IC2 with round-robin scheduling. With least connection the
lines are not clearly distinguishable, however, median response time is best with ICE.
ber of requests to the WS as before. This results in increased overhead of queuing or
connection dropping, thereby, increasing processing times over existing connections.
This effect is most prominent with WRR scheduling and DcopyLow benchmark (58%)
in IC2, where the effect of interference is much less than stronger interferences. The
response time values during our experiments may be seen in Table 7.1.
To summarize, we found that using WLC as a scheduling algorithm instead of
WRR can mitigate much of the performance degradation during interference. ICE
outperforms baseline LB with both types of scheduling (WRR and WLC). It also















































(b) Load balancer scheduling policy is least con-
nection
Fig. 7.10.: Median Response time with IC2 and ICE for various interferences against
a statically configured load balancer (baseline). Note that baseline LC is able to
reduce response time significantly compared to baseline RR. Response time with IC2
increases in LC (also with Dcopy-Low) due to overhead of dropped connections.
7.4.2 ICE has Low Detection Latency
To measure how fast ICE can mitigate the effects of interference, we computed
the detection latency of ICE from our evaluation runs. Note that detection latency
defines the duration between the onset of an interference and the first reconfiguration
action at HAProxy in response to that interference. This includes the performance of
the DT classifier (how quickly and accurately it can detect interference) as well as any
lag between detection and the corresponding reconfiguration action. Since HAProxy
is only configured in the runs with ICE enabled, only these samples are used for
measurement of detection latency. We found that across interference types, ICE had
a median detection latency of 3 sec (the maximum being 4s). We observe that this
is a very fast response considering most interferences in public clouds last for 10s of
seconds. This is also much faster compared to IC2 where reconfiguration happened
with a delay of 15-20 sec. In IC2, the authors didn’t have access to HW counter data
and they had to rely on CPU Utilization and Response Time which increases with
a delay, whereas, in ICE, use of hardware counters allows us to have much lower
detection latency.
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7.4.3 Performance of Classifier
To evaluate the accuracy of the classifier we also ran it on the data collected dur-
ing our evaluation experiments. The collected data was labeled based on whether
an interference benchmark was running. We found that the decision tree showed an
accuracy (TP+TN)/(Total Samples) of 99.6%. Notice that the decision tree gener-
ated in our evaluations of ICE has ranges on a single attribute (CMR) (7.3). It is
therefore identical to a threshold-based detection, therefore the cost of classification
is negligible.
We found that ICE incurred about 10% cpu overhead in the HAProxy load bal-
ancer for calculating average response time. Note that the total cpu utilization of
the HAProxy was less than 60%. Therefore, our monitoring overhead does not skew
the results. This can be eliminated by moving the response time from HAProxy to
a dedicated ICE VM. The monitoring overhead of other metrics (sysstat + ocount)
was negligible.
So far, we have described the implementation of ICE only in the context of
CloudSuite setup. However, the general concepts used here can also be used to adapt
to other server setups and other types of workloads. We validate this by showing a
set of simple experiments on the Darwin streaming media server in the next section.
Darwin and Apache+Php are two very different server frameworks (the first one
optimized for delivery of media streams, i.e. static content, while the second one
is optimized for generating dynamic responses) and they have different workload
characteristics (the former has long client sessions, while the latter is usually short).
Therefore by validating ICE’s design principles on both of them, we provide strong
evidence of generalizability.
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7.5 Streaming Server Evaluation
We evaluated ICE’s capabilities for widely used open source Darwin streaming
server [70] (originally developed by Apple), which shares the same code base as
QuickTime streaming server.
7.5.1 Monitoring and Performance Metrics
For video streaming server, ICE uses sensors in each VM to monitor CPU uti-
lization and CPI and CMR measurements are collected from the hypervisor. Video
streaming servers do not follow a strict request-response pattern during its operation.
Typically clients requests for videos and some protocol messages are exchanged be-
fore the server starts streaming the videos to client devices. In the absence of strict
request-response pattern, we define a metric called frame-delay to quantify the per-
formance of the streaming server. While streaming, the server sends video frames
to multiple clients. Based on the frames per second (fps) playing rate of the videos
and clients’ remaining buffer size, the server calculates an expected sending time for
each frame. The time difference between when a frame was actually sent by the
server to its expected sending time, is called the frame-delay. Under normal circum-
stances, this delay should be non-positive, i.e. the server will send the frame no later
than its expected time for sending. When the server is overloaded or in the presence
of interference, server will not be able to sustain its performance and frame-delay
will increase. In our setup, the streaming server was instrumented to output average
frame-delay encountered by all the clients in every second and we use that to quantify
the performance of the streaming server.
7.5.2 Experimental Setup
In our private-cloud, we set up two Streaming Server(SS) VMs in two physical ma-
chines and put a load-balancer in front. Each SS VM (we also call real-servers) was
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allocated 2-vcpus and 2GB of RAM. SS typically communicates using RTSP protocol
and sends data using RTP transport protocol. Since majority of the RTP implemen-
tation is built on top of UDP, we use Linux Virtual Server (LVS) as our load-balancer
as it can handle both UDP and TCP traffic. Specifically we used the Direct Routing
(DR) configuration for LVS for our load-balancing purpose. We used CloudSuite’s
media streaming benchmark [71] to test the performance of media streaming servers.
CloudSuite’s media streaming benchmark clients emulates real-world user requests
for different videos using Faban engine. Benchmarks clients request various videos at
different resolutions. Some videos are requested more frequently by the clients than
others to emulate popular videos. Client also stops watching (by closing the connec-
tion) after different duration - a real-world usage pattern found in many studies [72]
[73]. Using CloudSuite-benchmark we emulated 10,000 clients in a separate physical
machine connected to the same LAN as the load-balancer. We started with a weight
of 100 to each machine so that the LVS load-balancer divides the client load equally.
Thus each SS gets request for videos from 5000 clients. In all the experiments, we
used default values for all the configuration parameters for Darwin streaming server,
except maximum connections (maximum number of allowed RTSP connections) and
maximum bandwidth (maximum allowed bandwidth usage), which we set to -1, i.e.
removing any restrictions. For each experiments we used average values from 3 sets
of experiments.
7.5.3 Results
a) Variation of frame-delay with number of threads: without interference
In this experiment, we wanted to find the optimum number threads that is sufficient
for handling 5,000 clients connected to each SS. We modified the run num threads
(number of threads created by the server to handle concurrent connections) config-
uration parameter. We used 600 seconds of steady state period for the Faban client
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# threads = 150
Average delay vs load-balancer weights, under interference
(c) Frame-delay vs load-balancer weights
Fig. 7.11.: Two replicas of media Streaming Servers behind a load-balancer is serving
10,000 clients simultaneously. (a) Shows the variation of frame-delay with number of
threads when no interference is present. With just 1 thread, the server gets extremely
overloaded hence it calculates a very high expected delay for the frames. With 10
optimum number of threads, the server shows negligible delay. (b) Shows the variation
of frame-delay with number of threads with LLC interference. With 150 optimum
number of threads, the server shows minimum frame-delay. (c) Shows how frame-
delay of the affected server changes with load-balancer weights - when one real-server
is under LLC interference. Two plots show how delay changes for optimum number
of threads calculated for both interference and non-interference cases
than 1 GB) and it is mostly CPU bound. As Fig. 7.11(a) shows, we found when only
1 thread is used, the server experiences massive frame-delay. But the delay quickly
drops and we found 10 is the optimum number of threads giving almost negligible
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delay. For higher number of threads, frame-delay remained negligible and we did not
observe any significant increase due to context switching overhead.
b) Variation of frame-delay with number of threads: with LLC interference
We wanted to find how the streaming server behaves under cache-interference and
what would be the optimum number of threads under such situation. Even if memory
foot-print of Darwin streaming server is not significant we found LLC interference
causes a significant disruption in the service. We created LLC interference by running
LLC-probe benchmark on another co-located VM (similar to WS experiments). As
shown in Fig. 7.11(b), even with optimum number of threads, i.e. 10, found under
normal usage, the SS experiences significant frame-delay ( 3,200 msec). As we increase
the number of threads, we found 150 is the optimum number where we observed the
least amount of frame-delay. Beyond that we observed slight increase in frame-delay.
Thus, in the presence of interference, the optimum number of threads differs from
normal operating environment.
c) Variation of frame-delay with reconfiguration of the load-balancer
Similar to WS, interference in media streaming servers can be detected early from the
change in CPI and CMR. Once interference is detected, weights in the load-balancer
can be dynamically reconfigured for reducing frame-delay. In this experiment, we
show how frame-delay improves as we decrease the relative weight of the affected SS.
We ran 2 sets of experiments, one with optimum number of threads (10 threads) found
under normal condition and another with optimum number of threads (150 threads)
found when the Streaming Server’s performance is affected by interference. As can be
seen in Fig. 7.11(c), as we decrease the relative weight of the affected SS (i.e. move the
clients to the other server), the frame-delay metric improves. For relatively higher
weights (100 and 90), using optimum number of threads for interference scenario
gives better performance. But with further decrease in weight, performance of the
Streaming Server converges for both type of optimum thread counts. With a relative
weight of 70, the frame-delay of the affected SS becomes almost negligible. In fact,
at this point, performance with 10 threads is marginally better than performance
137
with 150 threads. We interpret that such behavior is due to higher context switching
overhead with 150 threads. Thus, the same design principle of ICE applies to two
very different kinds of servers (web server and media streaming server) to improve on
the metrics of interest.
7.5.4 Discussion: Advanced Streaming Techniques
While naive load-balancing technique by redirecting new requests for videos away
from the affected server will bring down the frame-delay in a highly dynamic (i.e.
lot of new requests coming in every second, and old streams end) streaming service.
The responsiveness of the mitigation mechanism would work best if a significant per-
centage of the streams are short lived, which is the case in reality [73]. However, our
technique will work best (for both short and long lived streams) if state-of-the-art
streaming techniques such as Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP (DASH) [74]
is used. By augmenting basic DASH protocol (as done by [75]), it is possible to
request the next slices of videos from a different server which is not affected by in-
terference. Thus, even for long running streams we can effectively migrate the load
to a different server which in turn will improve the frame-delay of the affected server
as shown by Fig. 7.11(c). We leave implementation of such augmented DASH based
load-balancing as our future work.
Summary
From the experimental evaluations in Sections 7.4 and 7.5, we have the following
three key take-aways:
1. An off-the-shelf Load Balancer can mitigate the effects of interference in VMs
significantly by using the Least Connections scheduling strategy.
2. ICE improves the WS performance in the face of interference further, by detecting
interference quickly and dynamically adjusting the weights of the Load Balancers.
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3. These results are generalizable to a very different kind of server (media streaming
server) with a different metric of interest.
7.6 Directions for Future Research
In the previous sections, we presented the design and implementation of ICE, a
two-level reconfiguration engine for web server clusters, which mitigates interference
by reconfiguring load-balancers as well as web services middleware. We found that
ICE showed significant improvement in web service response time compared to IC2.
However, the effectiveness of ICE is dependent on the length of user sessions. In
Chapter 5, we showed that once a client session is established on a server X, all
subsequent requests in the same session go to server X irrespective of load-balancer
policy. This is especially bad for media streaming servers where a client’s stream
can be active for a long time. Moving such long-lasting sessions from one server to
another during interference is part of our future work as described below.
Improving Effectiveness of ICE for Long-lasing Sessions: To be able to move
client sessions from one WS VM to another without interruption we need to store
session specific data in a distributed datastore such as memcached. In case of media
streaming server, the server must also support advanced streaming techniques like
DASH (refer Section 7.5.4). We are currently finding techniques for integrating DASH
with Darwin streaming server.
139
8. RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we present some of the earlier research work related to this disser-
tation. We have already introduced few of these solutions in Chapters 2 and 5 to
build the motivations for our work. Here we revisit those in greater details and add
comparison of our work with other related research domains. We organize the chapter
into a set of research topics so that it may be easily compared with our work in earlier
chapters. While Section 8.1 is primarily related to our work in Chapter 3, Sections
8.2–8.3 are related to our work in Chapter 4. In Sections 8.4–8.5, we present research
related to our work in Chapters 6 and 7.
8.1 Operating System Reliability
The goal of research in software reliability analysis has been to classify software
errors, as well as to characterize various properties of failures. Such characterization
enables us to not only assess the effects of failures but also to prevent and detect new
bugs. Reliability literature over the years contains the results of many research efforts
directed at analyzing bug reports for popular operating systems [5, 6, 76–78]. In one
of the early works on OS reliability, Sullivan et al. [76] analyzed defects of the MVS
operating system based on empirical failure records documented by field IBM staff.
This work categorized defects as overlay (errors that corrupt memory) and regular
(those that do not corrupt memory). The frequency and effects of both types of errors
were analyzed. Chou et al., in [5], presented their finding on OS errors by compiler
attachments, which checks code for certain types of bugs, and counts bug density. The
work discovered the correlation of different types of bugs with directories, function
size, and file age. Our work looks into similar problem with different scope: instead
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of compiler attachments, our research is based on the developers’ view and how bugs
are fixed.
In another work on software reliability, Chandra et al. [78] contradicted a popular
belief that most application faults can be tolerated using generic techniques such as
process pairs. They categorized faults into 3 types: environment-dependent transient,
environment-dependent non-transient, and environment-independent. It was found
that only 5-14% of the faults were triggered by transient conditions and 72-87% of
faults were environment-independent. A similar trend is observed in our analysis
where an overwhelming majority of the bugs (more than 90%) are permanent.
In [77], Liang et al. highlighted the failure characteristics of BlueGene/L super-
computer by correlating data obtained from event loggers. Applying similar concept
of failure event loggers, Cinque et al. [7] performed one of the few pieces of work
that focuses on mobile OS reliability. In this work, the authors attached fault event
loggers to a set of 25 Symbian OS based mobile phones to record failure events and
panics (kernel-generated warnings for Symbian). Through this, the authors unveiled
characteristics of the panics (burst, etc.) and the relation between panics and user-
visible failures. However, since Symbian was not open-sourced at the time of this
analysis, their research was limited to the manifestation of failures. Our work in
Chapter 3 extends the scope beyond these findings by classifying failures according
to their root causes in the source code (for Android). We also present an analysis on
customizability and complexity of mobile OSes which is distinct from previous work.
8.2 Robustness Testing
Robustness evaluation of software systems is broadly categorized into functional
and exceptional testing. Functional testing [79] employs generation of expected test
inputs with the intention of checking the functionality of a software module, while
exceptional testing employs generation of specially crafted test inputs to crash the
system in order to check its robustness. Generated input test data can be random,
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a pure fuzz approach [80], or semi-valid (intelligent fuzzing) [81, 82]. UNIX utilities
were first fuzzed by Miller et al. [80] by feeding random inputs to show that 25-
33% of utility programs either crashed or hanged on different versions of UNIX.
This simple technique has caught a variety of bugs like buffer overflows, unhandled
exceptions, read access violations, thread hangs, memory leaks, etc. A later work by
the authors [83] showed that robustness of UNIX utilities improved little over five
years. A study [84] of similar nature on Windows NT and Windows 2000 showed
their weakness against random Win32 messages, while, blackbox random testing on
MacOS [85] reported a considerable lower failure rate (7%). Our research extends
these works to a mobile platform where we fuzz the ICC of Android and show a variety
of exception handling errors. In terms of knowledge about the target application (i.e.
whitebox [82, 86] vs. blackbox testing [87]), our tool takes a combined approach
(blackbox for explicit Intents and whitebox for implicit Intents).
Fuzz tools reported in literature can also be classified based on their input gener-
ation techniques and their intrusiveness. The input data produced by a fuzzer tool
may be either generation based or mutation based [88]. Generation based fuzzers
generate test inputs based on specification of a protocol or an API to be tested while
mutation based fuzzers rely on capturing and replaying a mutated version of valid
input. Our tool (JJB) in Chapter 4 falls under generation-based fuzz tools, as it
generates input data, i.e., Intents conforming to Android Intent API specifications.
JJB is also intelligent in that it has knowledge of Android APIs (e.g. known Action,
Category, and Extras strings) and partial knowledge of the target applications (e.g.
Intent-filters). Fuzzing tools typically produce input received across trust bound-
aries [89], i.e., Runtime-OS and Application-Runtime boundary. At a lower layer,
fuzzing can be done at Runtime-OS interface as shown by [90]. Another similar work,
Ballista [81], identified ways to crash operating systems with a single function call
at Runtime-OS boundary. At a higher layer, fuzzing can be done at Application-
Runtime boundary where runtime is responsible for validating data. In this work, we
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fuzz at Application-Runtime boundary with the aim of crashing Android runtime by
fuzzing Intents that are passed between application components.
8.3 Smartphone Reliability and Security
A malformed Intent delivered to a receiver through ICC exposes attack surfaces
as pointed out by [36], example vulnerabilities being triggering of components that
are unintentionally exported by a developer (i.e., an Intent spoof) or unauthorized
receipt of an implicit Intent by malicious component. ComDroid [36], a static analysis
tool, detects these two vulnerabilities in Android applications. We narrow down
these attack surfaces to a set of input validation errors by runtime testing, however,
actual exploit of these errors may require combining these with other vulnerabilities
(e.g. improper permission assignment). Our approach discovers vulnerabilities in the
application components, but, we do not provide exploits to use these vulnerabilities
from an external source, i.e., we do not show external requests that will generate
malformed Intents for actually exploiting these vulnerabilities. That is part of our
ongoing work.
Other work on Android security looked at permission assignment of applications,
misuse of sensitive information [91], and provided future directions for application
certification [92]. Our work does not directly detect privacy leaks, but can be used
for giving insight to good application design practices (specially input validation).
These practices in turn can be incorporated in an application certification process
that is geared towards improving application robustness.
8.4 Autonomous Configuration Management
Configuration management of complex software systems has been an area of active
research over the last decade leading to many interesting solutions to the correctness
problem [93–97]. Most of these approaches try to identify causality between a config-
uration event and a detected failure and then predict (correct) the error [93–95]. Yin
143
et al. presented a wealth of real-world examples of configuration errors from both
commercial and open-source applications (CentOS, MySQL, Apache, and OpenL-
DAP) in [66] which served as a key motivation of our work. The authors found that
parameter mistakes accounted for 70-85% of the configuration errors. However, all
of this work focuses on correctness errors and in non-virtualized settings, whereas we
focus on performance configuration in a virtualized setting.
In one of the early works on tuning of Apache servers [98], Liu et al. showed that
MaxClients exhibits a concave upward behavior on response time—an observation
that led to the design of a tuning agent using hill-climbing algorithms. Our results
also highlight this behavior of MaxClients, but we find that the gradients of the
curves change frequently due to interference and dependence on other parameters. In
another work [20], Diao et al. presented a multi-input multi-output (MIMO) feedback
control for optimizing web server performance, however, their controller only considers
stabilizing CPU and Memory utilization with changes in workload intensity—one of
the many challenges we present in our work. A more recent work [99] looks into
automatic generation of configuration files in multi-tier web servers. The authors
considered dependency with a different set of configuration parameters, however,
their work is in a non-virtualized setting where reconfiguration events are infrequent
(addition of physical nodes).
The question of how to performance tune applications that are executing in vir-
tualized environment has been addressed by several prior works. Such approaches
were applied to configuration of software systems like Apache server [94], application
server [100], database server [101] and online transaction services [99, 102]. Some of
these consider coordinated tuning of resources allocated to VMs and associated ap-
plication configurations [101, 103]. We note that doing so is disadvantageous for two
reasons—i) it increases the exploration space, ii) it underutilizes a wealth of research
on cloud hypervisors. In our work, we assume the cloud provider already employs
sophisticated provisioning algorithms and we use resource changes as a trigger for
reconfiguration.
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8.5 Performance Interference in Clouds
The issue of interference in virtualized environments has been pointed out by sev-
eral researchers [12,13,104,105] and some efforts have been made for providing better
resource isolation [12,105,106]. However, due to the intrusive nature of these changes
and the impact on the performance, today’s production virtualized environments still
do not provide isolation for cache usage and memory bandwidth, which are relevant
to the results that we presented here.
Effect of interference on application performance has been evaluated by many
researchers over the years [11, 13, 48, 49, 106]. In terms of contended resources, the
papers can be classified as either related to memory interference (cache, memory-
bandwidth) [13,48,49], or network interference [11,106,107]. While most researchers
have looked at performance isolation (or the lack of it) in a security oblivious man-
ner [11,48,49,106], others have pointed this as a source of vulnerability in the public
cloud [13,52]. In most cases, the performance degradation observed is severe enough
to encourage implementation of sophisticated mitigation strategies. Among the mit-
igation strategies, better scheduling [14, 16, 17] and live migration [15, 49] are most
common. However, each of these solution strategies has its shortcomings. Firstly, a
VM’s resource usage pattern may change over time, often unpredictably. A consolida-
tion manager cannot foresee such usage changes without knowing of the applications
running within the VM, and that is usually considered too intrusive and hence, not
made available to the consolidation manager. Secondly, both types of solutions oper-
ate at a level which is beyond the scope of an end-customer. Solutions that use live
migration for avoiding interference have their drawbacks as well. In [46], the authors
show that VM live migration is very resource intensive, especially when the source
server is highly loaded. Live migration in such a scenario is often long drawn and
fails frequently.
In this work we try to mitigate the effects of performance interference using intel-
ligent reconfiguration of load balancers and web servers. We observe that Live migra-
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tion is an example of infrastructure reconfiguration and usually takes several minutes
to complete. In comparison, our work ICE is an example of application adaptation
and may be finished in seconds. Our work is also partially related to research on
building adaptive web servers using intelligent configuration engines [20,98–101,103].
However, most of these are evaluated in a non-virtualized environment and the re-
configuration actions are performed in the order of minutes. This is unsuitable in




To answer the questions raised in Section 1.2, we have taken several steps to evaluate
and improve the dependability of smartphones and cloud-based applications. We have
described our design, implementation, and results in Chapters 3–7. Here, we present
a summary of our findings from earlier Chapters.
9.1 Study of Failures in Android and Symbian
In Chapter 3, we presented a measurement based failure analysis of two operating
systems—Android and Symbian—by studying publicly available bug databases. The
key findings are: (1) Most of the bugs (more than 90%) in both these platforms are
permanent in nature, suggesting that the codebases are not yet mature. (2) The Ker-
nel layer in both the platforms is sufficiently robust, however, much effort is needed
to improve the Middleware layer (Application Framework and Libraries in Android).
(3) Development tools, Web, Multimedia, and Build failures are most prevalent in
both the platforms. This suggests the necessity for better mobile application devel-
opment tools and need for caution in using third-party libraries. (4) Android offers a
great degree of customizability in both the build and the execution processes. This
customizability comes at a cost for a significant fraction of bugs—between 11% and
50% (assuming all of Modify settings, Add/modify cond, Preprocess changes, and
Major changes are due to customizability). At present, the percentage of build errors
is also high in Symbian (38.6%). (5) According to our analysis, a significant minority
of the bugs in Android (22%) needed major code changes. Among various types of
code modifications, fixing configuration parameters and control flow update (adding
if-else clause) are most widespread.
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9.2 Evaluation of Robustness of Android ICC
In Chapter 4, we have successfully conducted an extensive robustness testing
on Android’s Inter-component Communication (ICC) mechanism by sending a large
number of semi-valid and random Intents to various components across 3 versions of
Android. Our learnings from this fault injection campaign are many, most prominent
ones being: 1) Many components in Android have faulty exception handling code
and NullPointerExceptions are most commonly neglected, 2) It is possible to crash
Android runtime by sending Intents from a user-level process in Android 2.2, 3)
Across various versions of Android, 4.0 is the most robust so far in terms of exception
handling; it, however, displays many environment dependent failures.
Based on our observations, we have highlighted the guideline that any component
that runs as a thread in a privileged process should be guarded by explicit permis-
sion(s). We have also proposed several enhancements to harden implementation of
Intents; of these, subtyping in combination with Java annotations can be easily en-
forced.
9.3 Mitigating Interference using Middleware Reconfiguration
In Chapter 6, we investigated one of the major sources of performance variability
in clouds, namely, interference and presented ways in which an end-customer can
mitigate its ill-effects. More specifically, we evaluated the frequency and impact
of interference in public clouds like Amazon EC2. Our experiments suggest that
performance anomaly due to interference is a reality. We designed and evaluated an
interference-aware application configuration manager (IC2), which is able to detect
interference and find suitable parameter values during these phases. Through an
extensive set of experiments, we also identify the challenges associated with finding
optimal application parameter values during interference.
IC2 solves three key challenges for dynamic reconfiguration—first, it presents
a machine learning based technique for detecting interference; second, it uses a
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heuristic-based controller for determining suitable parameter values during periods
of interference; and finally, it reduces the cost of reconfiguration of standard Apache
distributions by implementing an online reconfiguration option in the Httpd server.
Our solution reduced response time of CloudSuite, a dynamic web application bench-
mark, by upto 29% in EC2 and 40% in a private cloud testbed during periods of cache
interference.
9.4 Handling Interference by Two-level Reconfiguration
In Chapter 7, we presented a two-level configuration manager for web server clus-
ters which can mitigate effects of performance interference in cloud. Our solution
called ICE consists of a decision engine, a load-balancer configuration engine, and
a web server configuration engine. The decision engine detects interference with the
help of a decision tree (trained on hardware performance counter measurements). We
found that the decision engine can detect and reconfigure very fast (∼ 3s). The load
balancer configuration engine uses an estimator to predict how much reduction in
request rate is required to improve response time.
We observed that, an off-the-shelf Load Balancer can mitigate the effects of in-
terference in VMs significantly by using the Least Connections scheduling strategy.
However, ICE improves the WS performance in the face of interference further, by
detecting interference quickly and dynamically adjusting the weights of the Load Bal-
ancers. The proposed configuration controller (ICE) improves the median response
time of the WS by upto 94% compared to a static configuration. We find that ICE
also gives better resposne time by upto 39% compared to an adaptive load balancer
(least-connection). We also show the applicability of ICE to a media streaming server
(Darwin). This shows that ICE can be generalized to other cloud services that do
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